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Abstract 
 
Challenges and potential of technology integration in                                                   
modern ship management practices 
 
Suresh Bhardwaj 
 
This thesis explores the challenges and potential of technology integration in current ship 
management practices.  While technology advancements were designed to be contributing 
to minimising task complexity, issues such as fatigue, increased administrative burden and 
technology assisted accidents still plague the industry. In spite of the clearly recognisable 
benefits of using modern technology in the management of ships, in practice its application 
appears lacking by a considerable margin. The main driver of the study was to appreciate 
the cause of this disparity. 
The study first reviewed a wide body of literature on issues involving the use of technology 
which included academic literature with empirical evidences and theoretical explanations of 
implementation of technology at work. With the help of the extant knowledge this research 
embarked on providing an explanation to the gap that existed in the application of 
technology in the shipping industry. By taking a case study approach the thesis looked into 
the induction and integration of technology in the management and operation of ships that 
primarily interfaced closely between the ship and its management unit on shore. Three 
companies with mutually diverse management setup were studied. The fourth case 
comprised of purposefully selected senior members of ships’ staff.  
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The analysis of the data revealed that the manifestation of the gap in technology 
implementation is caused by deeper influences at work in the shipping industry. The un-
optimised technology integration results in the seafarer, who is the keystone to the 
technology application, becoming a victim of the circumstances. The technology that was 
intended to ease operations and burdens ends up in controlling him, even leaving him 
under-resourced and causing fatigue. This was not an unintended outcome but the result of 
weak regulatory practices, short-term capital outlook and weakened labour practices in the 
shipping industry all caused by wider social and economic developments affecting not just 
this industry but businesses globally. The impact of such influences was however more 
acute in this industry resulting in such extreme consequence.  
By bringing to light the limited application of some fundamental principles of human-
systems integration, this study has attempted to expand the boundaries of research on the 
subject and contributed to the holistic understanding of the various underlying factors that 
influence technology integration in ship management processes.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The aim of the study 
This research aims to study the challenges and potential of technology integration in 
modern ship management practices that is increasingly becoming available for deployment 
in the operation and management of ships.  
 
The main task of shipping is to offer efficient transport services; and improvement in 
transport service quality is critical in achieving a differential advantage over competitors 
(Thai, 2008; Greve, 2009). Technology deployment through innovation is a great enabler 
that increases the possibility to improve operational performance, productivity and life 
cycle optimisation of the assets, as seen in other industries (Frankel, 1991; Nikitakos and 
Lambrou, 2007). In particular, information communication technology (ICT) has become a 
strategic asset which can help improve business processes and change the function of 
markets. Thus, it is necessary for organisations to continue their efforts in developing and 
implementing up-to-date technology (Yang et al. 2007). In the maritime field too, 
technology and ICT capabilities now exist to increase integration of vessel plant data with 
the business management systems ensuring optimised asset management and operation of 
each vessel in particular and the whole fleet at a corporate level (Lorange, 2001; Panayides, 
2003; Lyridis et al. 2005).  
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1.2 An overview of the shipping industry service 
1.2.1 A significant mode of transportation service 
Shipping plays a very significant role in underpinning international commerce providing 
the most effective delivery mechanism for the vast majority of world trade (IMO, 2010). 
More than 80% of international trade in goods is carried by sea, making maritime 
transportation the single most important transportation mode. As a matter of fact, the world 
seaborne trade mirrors the performance of the wider world economy, as reflected in figure 
1.  By the beginning of 2011, the total world merchant fleet (of size above 100 gross tons) 
had expanded by 8.6% over 2010 to reach 1.4 billion deadweight tons, numbering 103392 
seagoing commercial ships in service (UNCTAD, 2011).  
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Indices for world GDP, the OECD Industrial Production Index, world merchandise 
trade and world seaborne trade (1977-2011) (1990=100). 
 
Figure 1: Significance of maritime transport. Source: UNCTAD, (2011). 
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1.2.2 Challenges in the service of shipping 
The shipping industry like any other service industry grapples with the challenges of global 
competition and growing demands for efficiency. Along with the concerns for human 
safety and environmentally safe operations, the key dimensions of its service quality 
include operations and management efficiency which are characterised by the outcomes of 
service performance and enabled by technology applications for process efficiency. 
However, in the maritime field there is very little evidence of any academic research on 
management systems and the factors that make them or prevent them from working 
optimally (Lyridis et al. 2005; Barnett et al. 2006; Thai, 2008). Greve (2009) compares the 
shipping industry with other service industries and points out that the shipping firms deliver 
transportation services, and as in many other service industries the service delivery not only 
requires substantial investments in capital goods but also the service needs to be built for 
efficient operation, and customised to deliver specific transportation services. Furthermore, 
Cetin and Cerit (2010) who studied “organisation effectiveness” in seaports through a 
systems approach acknowledge it as a rather new concept in shipping which generally is a 
uniquely structured social and technical organisation. Its most important effective measures 
include productivity, efficiency, service quality, adaptability, information and 
communication management, profitability, human resource quality and customer 
satisfaction. 
To be a truly world-class organisation, any company needs to work as a team and all the 
functional areas of the business need to be properly integrated, with each understanding the 
importance of cross functional processes. The advent of technology and connectivity now 
makes the remotest of ships at sea just another node in the corporate intranet. This assists 
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the ship board management to work closer as a team with the shore based management and 
thus could render ship management effective (O’Neil and Sohal, 1999).The available 
technologies are assisting in bridging the physical gap between land and sea by virtual 
means, making the crew of a ship as a node in a distributed network and as transnational 
teams. Customised personnel and technical management software for maritime markets are 
available and being employed to improve operational efficiency leveraging this 
connectivity and ease of data transfer. The effects of technological change and information 
technology are now changing the processes involved in ship operation and management, 
and are seen to be so dramatic that it can be compared to the effect brought about by change 
from sail to steam that changed the management structures, the technical aspects and the 
staff development needs of processes (Collins and Hogg, 2004). 
Such a change is bound to bring with it its own challenges and issues. Besides the issues 
relating to human-machine interacting environment, there would be typical automation and 
technology related constraints like information integrity and security, and automation 
reliability, which too would need to be studied concurrently (Roumboutsos, Nikitakos and 
Gritzalis, 2005). 
1.2.3 Can proper technology integration improve the services of shipping? 
The development and deployment of technology is intimately bound with the notions of 
progress and a natural societal advance from a lower state to ever higher ones, a necessity 
characterised by integration or change from less coherent to more coherent forms. For 
example, the shipwrights and naval architects have over centuries created a variety of 
watercrafts exhibiting the same fundamental properties such as the hull proportions that we 
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see in the modern ships today (King, 2001). Lately, the shipping industry has also seen 
induction of technology as in other industries like electronics or process industries. Being a 
safety-critical industry, the deployment of technology focused more on its capability to 
enhance safety; and since safety management is an integral part of overall ship 
management, this area was inter alia partially addressed through technology interface, but 
lacked a holistic approach. Knudsen (2009) empirically finds that efforts to reduce 
accidents in seafaring have led to proliferation of procedures such as workplace 
assessments and checklists which not only increase avoidable work load but also are 
perceived by many seafarers as counteracting the use of common sense, experience, and 
professional knowledge epitomised in the concept of seamanship.  
Cheng et al.’s (2011) review of cases found that technology, organisational structure and 
business processes impact one another, and in today’s technology-intensive environment, 
organisational structures and business processes need to be developed in coordination with 
technological development. They claim that in doing so, organisations will gain the 
potential to harvest benefits from technology-organisation- process integration. 
Furthermore, technological advances have now seen deployment of communication and 
information technology which has increasingly rendered obsolete the traditional operational 
environment with the lone ship at sea being a self-reliant unit due to its geographically 
distant location.  Interconnectedness and ease of reporting allows shore management to 
monitor what is occurring on-board the ship. In theory this forces the shore management to 
share responsibility for important aspects of ship performance that have traditionally been 
seen as out of their control once a ship leaves port.  
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These advances are seen to have significant impacts in the way shipping operates as it alters 
the traditional pattern of operating and managing ships in as much as it threatens to displace 
many of the practices that have characterised the seaman’s art through the ages. As Yang et 
al. (2007) state, technology often transforms the landscape of an industry and widely 
impacts processes. Mullins (2002) while conceptualising technology advocates 
Orlikowski’s (1992) model of distinguishing the scope (what is defined as comprising 
technology) and the role of technology (how the interaction between technology and the 
organisation is defined). Orlikowski (1992) goes on to infer that the duality of technology 
allows us to see technology as enacted by human agency and as institutionalised in 
structure of the organisation. She concludes, 
The on-going interaction of technology with organisations must be understood 
dialectically, as involving reciprocal causation, where the specific institutional 
context and the actions of the knowledgeable, reflexive humans always mediate 
the relationship. This view of technology encourages investigations of the 
interaction between technology and organisation that seek patterns across certain 
contexts and certain types of technology, rather than abstract, deterministic 
relationships that transcend settings, technologies and intentions. As the field of 
study shows, there are strong tendencies within institutionalised practices that 
constrain and facilitate certain developments and deployment of technology. In 
particular, understanding how different conditions influence the development, 
maintenance, and use of technologies would give insight into the limits and 
opportunities of human choice and organisational design (pp. 423,424). 
The situation becomes more complex when automation designed to be used in high hazard 
domains like shipping proves detrimental when errors are introduced through its improper 
use without the holistic understanding and deployment of the technology – organisation – 
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process interactions. Macrae’s (2009) analysis of common patterns of errors at sea finds 
influences of the organisational context and situational factors in provoking and shaping 
errors with situational factors such as inappropriate equipment or clumsy procedures 
providing error traps. Likewise, organisational factors, such as production pressures or lack 
of training that leave crew under-resourced. As automation and technology are decision 
support systems and are designed to assist human operators to reduce the risks, the human 
element remains a prevalent factor. Perrow (1983) in his discourse on human factors 
engineering in an organisational context specifically brings out the contrasts between what 
he describes as the “error-avoiding air transportation system and an error-inducing marine 
transportation system” (p.525). According to him, the air transportation system has high 
visibility, and performance failure affects profits and reputation immediately. There are 
stricter regulations and open investigations as well as various cross checks and balances. 
But in marine transportation, nations have conflicting interest and regulations are weaker. 
The human losses are restricted predominantly to crew as opposed to passengers in the air 
transport industry. Shipping remains largely a business-to-business activity and the 
consumers’ interaction with the industry is minimal. The analyses of accidents are also 
impeded by national and other interests. 
The reflections on factors underpinning ship operations and management raised many areas 
to be explored. Is the economics of robust technological change an impeding factor? Are 
there influences of the strong “community of practices” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, p.141) 
of the very traditional and unique work environment of the shipping industry? How have 
the impacts of automation been experienced in other industries and are there any lessons to 
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be learnt? What are the benefits and challenges with technology and automation 
deployment in the maritime industry?  
1.3 The objectives of the study 
Against this background, this study seeks to understand the various challenges of 
automation and technology applications in ship operations and management along with 
their causal factors. It also seeks out the potential for optimisation through effectiveness of 
technologically integrated management processes. Importantly, it keeps one open to 
learning in research to the extent of refuting or falsifying what one seeks, and engages in a 
scientific study of technology integration in ship operation and ship management processes 
and practices. 
Chary (2005) cautions that high-tech solutions are not the only panacea for the 
improvement of businesses particularly when advocated without proper domain knowledge. 
Anybody attempting process reengineering must have a thorough knowledge of the 
business. While the basis of competition still remains cost and quality but perhaps now 
includes flexibility and responsiveness, the value of process management is now being 
recognised as a tool that can help create sustainable competitive advantage. The redesign of 
management process and accompanying practice is a unique way to support the 
organisational performance via improving the effectiveness and adaptability of key 
managerial issues (Celik, 2009).   
The principal aim of this study is to deepen understanding of challenges and potential of 
technology integration in modern ship management practices and explore opportunities for 
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process optimisation in alignment with contemporary management theory and practice, and 
fill the void in academic study conducted in this field. In order to achieve the objective 
effectively, the thesis delves into relevant literature, follows a qualitative methodology and 
presents and discusses extensive findings from empirical research before drawing 
conclusions and making recommendations. The layout of the thesis is described in detail 
below.  
1.4 The thesis layout 
The thesis has a further seven chapters.  
Chapter 2 discusses the course of technology in shipping, from its economic perspectives to 
its inevitable advancement and then traces briefly the evolution of automation architecture 
in ship operations and its management. In the process it also delimits the boundary of the 
research project and provides the scope of coverage as the technical management processes 
within the modern ship management functions that have the greatest bearing on modern 
ship management practices. It then progresses to review the enabling technology in this 
specific area of technical management of ships that lies at the core of ship-shore interface 
thus making it the most contributing factor. 
Chapter 3 then presents the thesis’s theoretical foundation of technology-organisation-
human interface and later delves into the skilling dilemma triggered by the technology 
integration. It then attempts to make out a case for the need to look at enhancing 
optimisation of the potential of technology application with its scientific integration into the 
shipping management practices. 
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Chapter 4 examines the challenges and limitations of automation and technology in ship 
operations and ship management. It then summarises the discussions, notes the lack of 
adequate research in the industry so far and goes on to enunciate the main and subsidiary 
research questions. 
Chapter 5 then delineates the research methodology and presents the research strategy 
adopted as case-study. It includes a discussion of various data sources, the methods of 
collecting and analysing data and the limitations and challenges of the research design and 
fieldwork, including ethical considerations. It discusses the four case studies in the context 
of the research activity that explores alike situations across more than one entity, with 
constant cross-vetting, verification and comparison of facts. The explorative integration 
methodology helped generate facts in the field to create an integrative view of the enquiry 
response findings. This would enable formation of an opinion on the trustworthiness of the 
findings. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical field data with application of diligence and judgment and 
puts forth the various challenges with technology integration in ship operations and ship 
management. It shows overwhelming evidence of lack of any scientific integration backed 
by proper research. It reveals that the economic logic of low costs dominates the operations 
in the industry. The attitude of reactionary and minimal compliance to regulations leaves no 
room for proactive value creation in optimised operations with technology integration. It is 
these very issues that seem to become the root cause for all the challenges with technology 
integration encountered in various phases and circumstances of ship operation and 
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management enumerated in this chapter. This then leads logically to identifying the 
potential that exists to be harnessed for better practices. 
Chapter 7 analyses the data and engages in locating and confirming the underlying causal 
factors of the persisting challenges and the tardy approach to optimisation in the shipping 
sector. It does so with the help of extant studies and relevant sociological theories and 
rationalises the debate. It further describes the optimisation potential with process 
reengineering of a specified process believed by case study participants to deliver 
maximum results from such an effort.  
Chapter 8 finally presents the main assessment and conclusions of the research findings 
bringing together the theme of the empirical chapter and the analysed data in order to 
address the research question. It also makes policy recommendations on key issues 
challenging the optimised technology integration in ship management practices. Any 
research study is bound to have its own limitations and these are listed next, followed by 
suggested areas of scope for further research, and final concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2: Technology induction in ship operations and ship 
management 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the subject of application and integration of automation and 
technology in the areas of ship operations and ship management and traces the course that it 
has followed. 
Maritime transport serves world trade. The driving force that guides the efforts of any 
transport system is the quest to win more business by providing cheaper transport and a 
better service (Stopford, 2009). Thus the economic considerations of technology up-
gradation needs be first considered. The first section delves into shipping economics and its 
nuances before understanding the economics of technology change and up-gradation. With 
the objective to delimit the research project the architecture of ship management system is 
traced and the function having greatest influence on the ship management practice is 
scoped. The evolution of technology and its application in the delimited function of 
technical management is then discussed. With this base, the advancing technology 
specifically in the area of technical management in modern ship management practices is 
then reviewed. 
2.1 The course of technology application in shipping 
The shipping industry has not been very responsive to change. It tends to play safe and rely 
on a hands-on approach to management and operation, in spite of reliable technology 
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having made inroads into and been integrated with safe ship operations. Sharma (2008) in 
his study of the understanding of a service management framework in the ship management 
industry finds that it primarily runs on heuristics and rules of thumb. As the industry has 
some unique occupations set in a relatively isolated environment, it tends to believe that 
they are managing well by themselves and not requiring any external interventions. In spite 
of being a capital intensive industry, some basic management models are found to be 
conspicuous by their absence. Knudsen (2009) affirms that shipping and seafaring has the 
reputation for being conservative. In her empirical research on seafarers’ reluctance against 
written procedures exemplified by the concept of seamanship, she finds that innovations are 
often met with much scepticism. The possible reasons for such feelings will be looked into 
in chapter 4 which discusses the challenges with technology and automation. 
Technology application in shipping as a strategy follows the generic fundamental economic 
logic of how it will obtain its returns. A firm creates value for its customers and returns for 
itself by either achieving lower costs than its competitors, or offering better perceived 
quality in any differentiated feature for which customers are willing to pay a premium 
(Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2001). If value creation is the raison d’être for firms 
(Woiceshyn and Falkenberg, 2008), it calls for examining the economics of shipping and 
the economics of introducing technological change in shipping and see what manifests as 
the choice of economic logic in shipping. 
2.1.1 The economics of shipping 
Shipping economics exists as a separate branch of economics typically because of the 
relationship between globalisation and shipping industry dynamics. There are (a) 
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challenges and opportunities to the international shipping industry that follow from 
globalisation and changes in economic policies as well as maritime laws, and (b) the 
different positive and negative externalities of seaborne shipping. This throws up two 
specific characteristics of shipping: (a) the well-known cycles of the shipping markets, 
which also concerns the demand for shipping services and thus also freight rate 
fluctuations; and (b) the idiosyncratic nature of shipping investment itself. The two are 
inextricably linked. Investing in ships thus becomes classified as astute, a brave or an 
insane decision depending on the state and the prospects of the shipping markets which 
rarely - if ever - fulfil the promises they seem to give (Thanopoulou, 2002). Lorange (2001) 
affirms this and comments that shipping is largely a matter of judging the markets, and of 
timing in particular. While attempts are made to understand the various underlying factors 
that create supply and demand, however, with innumerable factors, events and issues likely 
to impact the shipping markets, it becomes impossible to accurately forecast the markets. 
Stopford (2009) points out that the shipping markets have cycles of under and oversupply 
with a rough average of seven years per cycle. However, the cycle length is sufficiently 
variable to make a strategy of ordering ships ahead of an up-turn very difficult to 
implement. He further claims that ship owners are cost conscious because the return on 
investment (ROI) in shipping is lower than in most other industries, averaging less than 10 
% per annum. He compares the returns from shipping with that of the all-companies index 
in the UK over a select period ranging from 1970 to 1990 where shipping gave an ROI of 9 
% (of which only 4.4 % came from trading and balance from asset play), others gave an 
average of 11.2 %. 
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Stopford in his earlier work (2000) had highlighted that the cost reductions that shipping 
could achieve and contribute to the lower cost of freight was due to four major factors: 
(i) a revolution in international communications typified by electronic data interchange 
(EDI); 
(ii) economies of scale achieved by the growing size of ships;  
(iii)  unitisation and containerisation with automation extensively used to reduce unit cost; 
and, 
(iv)  deregulation of international shipping leading to flagging out
1
and change of control to 
third party managers. 
The last factor was arguably the most significant contributor to cost reduction. 
Globalisation provided the opportunity to take advantage of all the economic benefits 
offered by new and more efficient market factors. While earlier the ship owner would 
register his ship in his own country of domicile and fly its flag, and crew it with people 
from his own country, today the ships fly the flags of foreign nations and are crewed by 
seafarers of different nationalities. There are typically three key players in the shipping 
industry today: asset owner (ship owner), asset user (charterer), and the asset operational 
manager (ship manager). The interest and motivation of these three key actors are different. 
The ship owner wants highest return on investment, while the charterer wants most the cost 
effective service with highest reliability. The ship manager makes efforts to integrate these 
diverse interests with efficient service management. He makes sure the ship has efficient 
                                                          
1
moving the  ownership to countries and flags set up for the purpose to avoid tax, employment regulations , 
company regulations and disclosure 
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crew to man it, adequate quality standards to run the ship safely and meet international 
quality regimes, and that the asset value is maintained (Sharma, 2008). It is thus not hard to 
see that the choice of economic logic for value creation in shipping has been lowering of 
costs.  
2.1.2 The economics of technological change 
Technological change poses some of the most important concerns for shipping management 
in the current time. A shipping industry that was largely controlled by cargo shippers and 
shipping companies existed in closely controlled regimes and was carefully supervised by 
charterers. This elicited close interest in investments and operational performance. Now 
shipping has evolved into an aggressively competitive market driven regime. Charterers are 
often replaced by traders who take a short term view and prefer to hire ships they need from 
the spot market rather than charter long term (Stopford, 2000).This is also the case with 
ship owners who are more asset players and may sell their vessels and buy new ones or 
move them in and out of third party management, depending on fluctuating market 
situations, making it difficult to plan investment in technology (Shea, 2005). 
Mitroussi (2004a) finds that third party ship management has now evolved into an industry 
in its own right and has made a critical contribution to a fundamental restructuring of the 
shipping business. It is estimated that more than one-third of the global shipping fleet is in 
the hands of third party managers. Professionals run assets they do not own and take 
decisions, while the owner has neither time nor information or commitment, and becomes 
more concerned with the dividends than the operation of their company. The basic 
objective for a third party ship manager becomes asset preservation for the owner offering 
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cost savings that he derives from economies of scale from technical support. Thus the 
fundamental nature of the business of shipping today, under severe pressure from the 
international shipping economic environment, lends volatility resulting in short term 
relationships between the ship owner, charterer and the manager, making technology 
change decisions more difficult. 
Ship owners may also come from a conservative background which views technology with 
suspicion from the investment return optimisation perspective. However, as the technology 
keeps changing frequently, this inflicts a wait-and-watch approach in ship-owners’ decision 
making, rendering the task more difficult. Vlachos and Nikolaidis (2002) have provided 
empirical evidence that ship owners’ concern for quality is strongly related to the operating 
cost levels. This ranges over five levels, which they class as: optimum, good practice (high 
level of expense), standard practice (medium level of expense), common practice 
(minimum level of expense) and minimum (ship owner operates a sub-standard ship).  
The highly competitive business environment of the shipping industry along with 
international regulations, directs the companies’ strategies to operational cost reduction and 
to produce low cost services. Since manning expense represents as much as 50% of the 
operation costs, the owner tends to employ cheap labour at the cost of quality, who may not 
be able to handle the advanced technology (Progoulaki and Theotokas, 2010).With the 
slicing of the maritime value chain as discussed before and the activities such as crewing, 
technical and commercial operations being performed by separate entities it has influenced 
the incentive structure in the industry in many ways. The industry grapples with issues of 
split-incentives now well recognised as barriers to the diffusion of new and efficient 
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technology. The ship owner faces the dilemma between minimisation of operating costs 
with crewing costs to his account as against his capital costs of new or retrofit of equipment 
to existing tonnage where charterers or commercial operators draw the benefit.  
Frankel (1991) points out that technology change decisions are usually made on the basis of 
economic and performance advantage, but the choice, timing, scale of introduction, and 
utilisation of old as well as new technology is becoming more difficult now as new 
technologies become increasingly available long before the expiration of the economic life 
of existing technologies. 
The problem of technological change is also different whether one is an early or late 
adopter of existing technologies, in as much for large and financially powerful versus small 
and growing transport companies considering a new technology. Their perception of value 
and risk are quite different, which in turn affects their technology change decisions.  
Jessen (2003) cautions that while there is a clear dependency between technology-led 
innovative practices and profitability in business it is not always profitable to invest in 
innovation. The failure rate is very high and many innovative initiatives never create profit. 
Therefore, the question always remains, as to what makes an innovation profitable. 
Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007) reviewed current practices and emergent patterns regarding 
digital shipping in Greek owned tonnage. They observed that while Greek-owned shipping 
is financially robust, there is very low level of technology usage. They cite empirical 
evidence on e-readiness and maturity related to e-business models, as well as perceptions of 
key barriers and incentives in the Greek-owned shipping sector. 
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The Greek-owned ocean-going fleet in particular is ranked in the first place globally in 
terms of real ownership by country of domicile (ISL, 2010). However, in the field of 
communication and e-business applications, investments have not followed the same trend. 
The reasons accounting for the major obstacles in the adoption of electronic services are 
start-up costs or costs of acquisition, lack of reliability and efficient technical support, as 
well as the high cost of satellite communication services. Additional reasons have been 
compatibility and interoperability problems in the present framework of processes, the lack 
of standardisation in digital forms and documents that constrain the advantages stemming 
from the adoption of e-business applications. This study has further examined the perceived 
obstacles for the adoption of electronic applications by shipping companies, and found 
them to be primarily, (a) initial cost of acquisition, (b) lack of efficient technical support, 
(c) annual operational cost, (d) lack of compatibility with the present state of business 
cycles, (e) lack of standards, (f) need for expert employees, and (g) lack of sufficient data 
security. 
While the above study was drawn from a Greek example, the concerns are likely to be 
similar across the industry.  
2.2 The inescapable use of technology in advancement 
Technology stems from the acquisition of new knowledge and is as a result of scientific 
enquiry. Aerospace, electronics and pharmaceuticals are all industries that depend heavily 
on scientific research for the creation of new product and their research and development 
costs are substantial (OECD, 1992). Just as in any other industry, an increased application 
of the latest technology and automation is also seen in the shipping industry. 
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While tracing the course of technology in shipping, King (2001) comments that 
technologies can be observed to proceed through three distinct stages: (1) innovation when 
a new means is first conceived but remains largely unacknowledged; (2) intermediate when 
its potential is clear and it becomes established at an increasing rate and (3) mature when 
the scope for further development is almost exhausted. The time gap that intervenes is 
getting reduced increasingly. While it took 70 years for the steam engine to get established, 
the evolution and establishment of the diesel engine in the 20
th
 century has been much 
faster. Technology has created the means to do things that were inconceivable before and 
presently even in the traditionally conservative maritime field, technology change is now 
keeping apace. Advances in information communication technology (ICT) now pose the 
potential to fundamentally alter the course of shipping. Sophisticated systems and 
equipment with embedded software for fault diagnosis as well as multiple means for 
communication with shore-based units are being installed on newer sophisticated vessels. 
Rensvik et al. (2003) have traced developments in maritime industrial information 
technology (IT). They report that in automation in industry, a shift in technology related to 
integration of real time control and monitoring systems for operation management was 
initiated in the mid 1990’s mainly driven by process industries like chemical plants, oil and 
gas, pulp and paper. According to them, the use and availability of web technology as a 
means of communication increased significantly in the 1990’s. This enabled e-business and 
remote monitoring and control capabilities of equipment, systems and ships and fuelled the 
desire to achieve online interactions. They provide the example of the Norwegian maritime 
cluster that has earnestly embarked on several research programs involving maritime 
industrial IT for ship operation and management. 
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Technological innovation has now underpinned transformation in the shipping industry. It 
is now possible to operate bigger, faster, safer, and more specialised ships with fewer 
people on-board. The last few decades has seen deployment of a range of new equipment 
developed as a result of technological innovation aboard ships, which includes automated 
engines and cargo control systems (Tang and Sampson, 2011). 
The development and deployment of integrated automation systems with capability to 
monitor and control all the system parameters from the engine control room, bridge, cargo 
control room, day-rooms etc. is the order of the day, especially with the ship-owners who 
believe in technology led operations.  Typical systems include alarm, main engine control, 
bilge-ballast, generator engines control and power management, hull stress monitoring, 
tank gauging and monitoring, bridge manoeuvring, fire monitoring, conning display and 
reefer monitoring. 
Automation and IT now form an integral part of all new vessels, whether it is a  small ship 
or a highly sophisticated LNG carrier, with on-board installation as complicated  as a petro-
chemical complex ashore; and with the added capability for transmitting ashore all the 
critical parameters for monitoring and advice purposes, if so desired (Jensen, 2009). 
Allen (2009) concludes that the use of ICT is growing in the maritime industry as more 
systems become monitored remotely and new technologies are introduced to aid 
environmental awareness and increase safety. 
The following section lays out the architecture of modern ship management systems in the 
context and also limits the scope for the research project. 
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2.3 The ship management system and scope of the project 
In terms of scoping the challenges and potential of technology integration in modern ship 
management practices, it will first be necessary to examine the architecture of a ship 
management system and delimit the boundary for the research project that would have the 
greatest bearing on modern ship management practices. 
Figure 2 with its key describes comprehensively the ship management system:  
 
 
Figure 2: The ship management system. 
Key to Figure 2: Ship management system 
[1] Expectations of the stake holders (that defines the objective functions for process 
control). Example: maximisation of sailing time (when the propeller turns the ship earns), 
Stake 
holder 
Shore 
Based 
Mgt. 
Ship 
Based 
Mgt. 
 Ship 
Annual 
Report 
1 
2 
3 
4a 4b 
5 
24 
 
minimisation of turn-around time, minimisation of port stay, maximisation of safety on- 
board, etc. 
[2] Technical Management Process (work flow, cooperation etc. between shore based 
management and ship board management). 
[3] Management control strategy for the ship operation process; i.e. the strategy to achieve 
the desired stated objective function, derived from the stakeholder expectations.  
[4a] Constraints, which for shore-based management may include (a) commercial 
constraints, like the contractual business commitments, (b) technical constraints such as 
budgets for repairs and maintenances, (c) constraints of supplying competent personnel, 
their availability, trade union agreements, (d) constraints imposed by compliance to 
regulatory requirements. 
[4b] Constraints for ship-board management may be like (a) weather, (b) 
machinery/equipment limitations, (c) compliance with regulatory requirements. 
 [5] Performance of the ship 
From figure 2 it can be seen that the ‘Ship Management System’ is made up of several 
subsystems, like the stake holder subsystem, the shore-based management subsystem, the 
ship -based management subsystem and the ship itself.  
The technical management process comprising the shore based management subsystem and 
the ship based management subsystem which is shown in the figure with inter connections 
in stipple, is the scope of this research project, as it forms the core of ship management and 
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operations and links up the shore based management with its productive unit i.e. the ship, 
which is geographically remote. 
It would now thus necessitate tracing briefly the advances in technology and automation 
over the years that have had greatest bearing in the scoped area of technical management 
and operation of ships. 
2.4 The evolution of automation architecture in ship operation and 
management 
Butera (2001) notes that the main components of technological advancements and 
automation in most industries are: (a) control systems based upon closed-loop control 
mechanism of feedback (on standards) and feed forward (on goals), performed by any kind 
of technological device;  (b) integration of different devices, processes into a unitarian 
architecture at the level of a factory, firm, network, achieving continuity of processes and 
management control; and (c) system adaptation and innovation, through rapid detection 
both of the internal state of the system and of the environment (technical, economic, 
commercial, etc.). Application of the above in ship technical management and operations 
translates as below:  
2.4.1 Advances in instrumentation and control 
By the mid-1950s, pneumatic transmission of process data, pneumatic controllers and valve 
actuators had become highly developed forms of automated control. Most instrumentation 
was located in a unit control house, with significant savings in operating personnel 
achieved through these early process automation steps. The majority of such systems 
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employed automatic closed loop control systems, which, without human intervention, could 
control the actual value of the controlled condition, such as level, pressure, temperature, 
and flow, by comparing it with the desired set value representing the required operating 
condition, with corrective action being taken should a deviation or a difference occur 
between two values, this being called Process Control (Roy, 1987). Presenting the data to 
the operator though was elaborate with full graphic panel boards displaying the process 
pictorially in the control room with process indicators and controllers mounted at their 
appropriate locations on the display. During this period, process analysers for on-stream 
analysis became available, providing operators with more specific and timely information 
than just process flows, temperatures, pressures and levels. The classical control theory 
began to be developed by academic institutes and the major control companies. 
From the late 1950’s to the early 1960’s, electronic instrumentation became more prevalent. 
Later some experimentation with digital control computers was initiated on select process 
units (Baillieul and Antsaklis, 2007). Through the joint efforts and through internal 
developments in large industrial organisations, computer control systems software began to 
evolve rapidly (Astrom, 1985). Computer control benefits gained recognition, and 
computer control became an established technology in many organisations; however 
significant organisational realignments in operating, technical, and mechanical areas were 
often necessary to take full advantage of computer control opportunities (Fragidis and 
Tarabanis, 2005).The Microprocessor Era then ushered in digital instrument systems. The 
advent of low-cost microprocessors spurred instrument companies to incorporate them into 
their products, thereby providing considerably improved functionality and flexibility. This 
development was made possible by the integrated circuit chip, and chip technology has 
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evolved to the point that today’s chips contain the equivalent of millions of transistors 
(Bhattacharya and Chatterjee, 1995).  
This era gave birth to the architecture of the modern control system, consisting of several 
major building blocks. These were the microprocessor-based digital controllers, the 
operator workstation, the host process control computer and a communication link that 
connects them all together. The operator’s looking glass into the process became the 
cathode ray tube (CRT) at his workstation and the integration of instrumentation and 
control computers into a cohesive control system progressed rapidly. 
This architecture also permitted extending the processing of information from many other 
systems, located in other parts of the plant. Integrated information systems were installed 
that extracted and archived data, permitted technical calculations and reporting on process 
units, utilities, machinery monitoring and laboratory systems. Many organisations now 
consider advanced process control as one of the best current opportunities for improving 
their profitability. With predictive capability, a controller can now make the moves 
necessary to prevent any constraint violation before it occurs, rather than reacting later 
(Gopinath, 2006). As the ability to precisely control the plant improved, interest shifted to 
optimisation as a control objective. The ability to apply rigorous optimisation techniques 
and carefully select the optimum solution from among the multiplicity of feasible 
alternatives provides the vital ingredient for excelling in highly competitive environments. 
One of the vital plant operational decisions is the selection of the most economic utilisation 
of process facilities. The industry leaders in advanced process control started installing on-
line real-time optimisers to selected processes, which were successful and well accepted. 
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Rameback (2003) comments that as the boundaries between process control and 
optimisation blurs, such applications will increase together in a highly interrelated pattern. 
2.4.2 Evolution of information systems 
The systematic use of information to guide commercial and industrial decision making is as 
old as commerce itself. When written records became available in China, India, Persia, and 
the Middle East many centuries ago, they were used to track and inform on sales, 
production, inventories, accounts receivable and logistics. By using these records, people 
made decisions on how to manage their affairs to gain advantage and to minimise 
undesirable outcomes (Mukherji, 2002). 
Over the centuries the sophistication and dependency on information systems may have 
increased but nothing as extensive as the dramatic changes that have taken place since the 
introduction of the computer. People are thinking more in terms of systems as a network of 
related data, information, and procedures that are organised to help accomplish the 
organisation’s tasks (O’Brien, 2004). Many paper-based systems became well-structured 
and systematised using predefined forms and records and the computer began to automate 
many routine operations, particularly high volume, labour-intensive transaction processes 
in the financial and administrative areas, for example payroll accounting. These early 
efforts at automation emphasised the processing of data and the generation of reports that 
only summarised the transactions. But management reports needed for making non-routine 
decisions were still compiled manually. 
As the power of computers became greater, the sophistication of their use increased. 
Systems were implemented to directly support operations in areas such as inventory 
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control, production planning and optimisation, and preventive maintenance. This concept of 
data warehousing with a single entry of data became the fundamental organising principle 
for many modern information systems. Later the concept of decision support systems 
(DSS) became increasingly accepted and a number of specialised systems were developed 
to provide decision information for management at different levels and for different 
functions (Shim et al. 2002). Since more systems were integrated, the timeliness of the 
information was also improved which allowed management teams to change the way 
business was being performed. With timely information, less errors, and more 
comprehensive decision information, managers were able to increase the efficiency of their 
operations, improve their service levels to customers, and reduce reaction time to 
competitors’ actions. It was concluded that the key to sustainable performance 
improvement is better decisions. Mere data logging, monitoring, or reporting does not 
equate to profitability (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008).  
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems as business software packages that enabled 
organisations to integrate their business functions such as sales, production, human 
resources, financial, purchasing, etc. throughout the enterprise, using integrated application 
modules based on business processes of best-business practices then started appearing on 
the scene (Bingi, Sharma and Godla, 1999).Companies however learned that corporate 
implementation of ERP systems was not easy. They learned by experience that a high level 
of corporate readiness was required to conserve money, time and resources. Project success 
can be assessed by both usability and functionality. Without sufficient practical usability, a 
system will fall into disuse or certainly limited use that falls far short of the system’s 
potential (Sarker and Lee, 1999).  Continuous business performance monitoring methods 
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were evolving as performance benchmarks as the key performance indicators got updated 
on a management dashboard, and on employees’ computer screens to keep a high visibility 
and focus on progress of the company towards the most important goals (Lebas, 1995). 
With the advanced process control and information systems converging, there is now great 
appeal in the idea of total enterprise optimisation (Shobrys and White, 2002). As 
technology becomes pervasive, how people use and sustain the technology and tools, would 
be the key success differentiator. The ability to marshal the talents, knowledge, and 
creativity of human resources would be the logical source of sustainable competitive 
advantage even in a technological, interconnected world. This truth may as well be a vital 
consideration in mapping all fundamental technology paths (Bingi, Sharma and Godla, 
1999). 
2.4.3 Marine communications – from semaphore to Sat-Com 
Early ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore communications consisted of flag signals called 
semaphore and bells or foghorns. However, these had severe limitations such as requiring 
clear line-of-sight or having a limited audible range. The invention of marine radio 
radically improved communications on and over the water. The names of Marconi and 
Titanic are synonymous to marine radio. These radios did indeed use Morse code. 
Telegraphy is the long-distance transmission of messages without physical transport of 
written messages and radiotelegraphy or wireless telegraphy transmits messages using 
radio. 
In 1912 the Titanic hit an iceberg and sent the first SOS signal which was heard by a nearby 
ship that came to the rescue of many survivors. It was later learned that another ship was 
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closer, which would have resulted in more lives being saved, but that ship only had one 
wireless operator on-board who happened to be off-watch at the time the Titanic went 
down. That resulted in the Radio Act of 1912, requiring that two operators be employed on 
all ships with constant watch (Rhoads, 1996).  
In 1944, the first successful radio teletypewriter transmissions between ships were 
completed. Inevitably, the Second World War provided a spur to developments of radio 
technology in general, including VHF communications, marine radar and radio based 
position fixing systems. It is at this stage that we start to see how technology begins to 
serve seafarers and improve safety and operational efficiency on-board. The first successful 
use of radiophoto (facsimile) occurred in 1945 with the transmission of the surrender 
document signing that ended World War II (Naval Electrical and Engineering Training 
Series, Module 17, 2007). 
On the commercial shipping front, the transatlantic liners provided a high volume of traffic, 
all using radiotelegraphy (Morse code) transmissions during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
As automation increased telex became the absolute cheapest form of long-distance 
communication, and it was an advantage that telex directly produced written documents. As 
the U.S. space program grew in the 1960s, the Department of Defence began developing 
satellite communication systems that would address the special requirements of military 
operations. Collins and Hogg (2004) report that the new satellite communication 
technologies now applied in commercial shipping are providing an economical method of 
transferring data between ship and shore, with ship being another node in the corporate 
Intranet or wide area network (WAN), thus providing seamless connectivity. They inform 
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that there are satellites in geo-synchronous earth orbit (GEO), 35,785 kilometres above the 
earth. These appear to be stationary in relation to the earth, but in reality have an orbital 
period of exactly 24 hours and so rotate at exactly the same speed as earth. Due to their 
height above the earth, they have a wide coverage area and only a few are required to 
provide complete global coverage, but antennae must be very precisely located and focused 
to maintain contact. Inmarsat is the operator in a maritime context to provide such GEO 
coverage. 
By contrast, low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, orbit the earth at between 100 and 1000 km 
and provide far smaller coverage than those in GEO, but it is far easier to maintain contact 
due to their reduced height, enabling even mobile telephones to access them. Iridium is the 
main provider of this in maritime sector. 
Another satellite technology available in the maritime context is very small aperture 
terminals (VSAT) that allow reception to and transmission from ships at broadband 
capacities of up to 2 mb/s, but only over specific areas of the world and not globally. In 
order to use VSAT, a shipping company has to conclude a lease with a satellite service 
provider (Sorribas et al. 2009). 
The recent introduction of mobile packet data (MPD) through Inmarsat Fleet 77 (a 
management support system designed to enable access to primary vessel data on-board and 
from ashore) is a vital addition to the satellite ICT infrastructure, as it at last makes Internet 
access from sea financially viable. Users only have to pay for the amount of data sent, 
rather than for the length of time connected and an always on connection is provided 
(Yong, 2010). 
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2.5 Review of advancing enabling technology concerning technical 
management of ships 
It was seen in section 2.4 that the integration of instrumentation and control with computers 
into a cohesive system progressed rapidly which permitted processing of information from 
many other systems, located in other parts of the plant. Developing on the above, a review 
of technical literature was carried out of technology advances very specific within the scope 
of the project, of areas pertaining to technical management, as this lies at the heart of ship 
management practices and encompasses the vital ship-shore interface of operation and 
management. In the area of process automation it was found that the environmental push 
and the economy pull caused by high fuel costs had rendered technology advancement in 
vessel performance systems, where fuel performance vis-à-vis engine performance and 
energy management was now possible. Fuel performance monitoring rendered torque
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measurement and improved information and understanding of total fuel consumptions. 
Continuous measurement of fuel consumption and engine power output was also measured. 
Engine performance monitoring provided the operator with guidance on engine tuning and 
maintenance planning. Generally it involved main engine and auxiliary engine cylinder 
performance monitoring. Energy management was another area where much advancement 
had taken place and systems existed that could measure, record and analyse the complete 
energy usage on the ship and provide decision support for reduced energy consumption. 
With the help of distributed and modular automation technology, which is a system that 
connects together separate components and facilitates adding or replacing any one 
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 force acting causing the propeller to rotate 
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component without affecting the rest of the system, integration of the above three areas to 
local operator station and to centralised watch station with user friendly human-machine 
interface panels was now possible. Automated monitoring of relevant performance 
parameters, its analysis and taking of enabling corrective actions was now also possible for 
optimal operations. Additionally, advice could be available to the ship operator on enabling 
conditions that can further improve performance, if he so desires to adopt those conditions, 
for example trim
3
, draft
4
, speed, RPM
5, ship’s heading, etc. 
Pomeroy and Tomlinson (2000) claim that things can now be done that would have been 
impossible without this technology, such as building of an engine that does not require a 
camshaft
6
, or optimise performance on a continuous basis to enhance overall fuel efficiency 
through a sophisticated power management system. 
Section 2.4 also traced the advances in marine communications and noted that the new 
satellite communication technologies are providing an economical method of transferring 
data between ship and shore, thus providing seamless connectivity. This assists in effective 
management of the ship and the seafaring workforce as a virtual team (Collins and Hogg, 
2004). Further to these tracings, it is now seen that the dial-up narrowband connection 
speeds of about 56 kbps has given way to broadband connectivity of greater than 1 Mbps 
between ship and shore communications. Thus increased bandwidth and transmission 
speeds and reduced cost of communications have now enabled vessels to communicate 
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the incline by stern of the underwater part of the ship 
4
 depth to which the ship is submerged 
5
 revolutions per minute of the propeller 
6
 used in internal combustion engines to operate the valves used to control the timing and quantity of gas flow 
into the engine 
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seamlessly and cost-effectively with their land based corporate networks across oceans 
(Yong, 2010).  
It is further seen that advanced process control and information systems that have all 
developed along independent but complementary paths, have reached the point where these 
paths clearly seem to converge and intersect (Shobrys and White, 2002). Integration is now 
thus possible between process network and administrative network with firewall security 
measures enabling presentations in normal web browsers. The system architecture is based 
on distributed processing units (DPU – a parallel computing enabler that uses multiple 
processing elements simultaneously) that communicate with each other on redundant high 
capacity process bus (a subsystem that transfers data between components inside 
computers). While the DPUs carry out all monitoring and automation functions, the 
operator stations provide the human-machine interface. This enables display of automation 
data anywhere on ship and even on to shore based locations on-line and real-time, thus 
making it feasible to build a network management system enabling technical managers to 
view and provide up-to-date information on vessel location and its performance, fuel levels 
and consumption rates and engine performance in real-time.  
Neef (2008) finds that it is possible to capture most of ship’s performance data 
electronically and automatically from its original equipment source. On-board electronic 
systems these days can record exact real-time data in a multitude of areas: on engine 
performance, navigation, wind speed, fuel usage, tank-levels, valve openings and many 
other key indicators. The data can be now collected on ship’s local area network (LAN) and 
stored in a server database. This data can be extracted and viewed through easy-to-use 
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software dashboards and sent from ship to shore using satellite communications and 
broadband technologies. The shore based management can be aware of every ship’s 
performance – anytime, anywhere (Figure 3).    
  
37 
 
 
 
                                                        Shore-based administrative network 
 
ship-shore communication 
 
                                                           Ship based administrative network 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                           Process Network 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Ship-shore communication architecture.                                                                 
Source: Yong, (2010); Sorribas et al. (2009). 
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Thus real-time monitoring including raw data normalisation (i.e., accounting for the effect 
of waves, wind and current) is possible. For example, minute-by-minute fuel consumption 
of vessels can be assessed against values in charter parties.  
Charterers have often been frustrated by discrepancies between fuel consumption day rates 
included in charter party and the actual performance, given the higher fuel costs and lack of 
transparency. Real-time access to fuel consumptions by charterers directly will address 
transparency issues and help build healthy business environment. 
Electronic logbooks for logging vital navigational, engine, radio and other operations are 
yet other developments where data recorded from ships instrumentations can be combined 
with manual inputs. They also comply with the specific reporting requirements as laid out 
in relevant statutes. The formats can be modified to the needs of various end users and can 
be accessed ashore. 
Such automations designed for marine applications need to fulfil demonstratable Class and 
Flag requirements on safety, reliability and security, which are most stringent. It needs to 
support redundancy at all levels including communication, process controllers, serial lines 
and power supplies. Usually there are built-in self-diagnostic facilities that monitor the 
entire control system and include extensive monitoring of field circuits. Both the hardware 
and the software have to be type approved by major classification societies’ requirements 
for periodically unmanned engine room operation. It was noted that the regulators have also 
geared up to certify these marine automation applications for ships in as much as users have 
started developing faith and trust in them, given these certifications and approvals 
(Pomeroy and Jones, 2002). 
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Summary 
This chapter traces the course of technology application in shipping and finds that the 
economic logic of low costs as value addition dominates this form of transportation sector. 
The technology change decisions hitherto enforced mandatorily that aid enhancement of 
safety and environment protection, are more proactively being considered to make vessel 
operation more efficient. However the nature of shipping business due to its volatility 
increasingly makes the technology change decisions more difficult.   
Be that is it may, as is in any other industry change in shipping technology has become all 
pervasive and inescapable. The review of the evolution of automation architecture in 
general and its deployment in the shipping industry environment that this chapter 
undertook, gives the perspective on technology inroads in shipping.  
There is however a lack of scientific study on application and integration of technology in 
shipping, and appreciation of the potentials of such scientific integration of technology that 
can make ship operations and ship management services yet more effective and efficient. 
Chapter 3 attempts to investigate further these aspects and their relevance to the shipping 
industry.  
40 
 
Chapter 3: Theory and potential of scientific technology integration 
in shipping 
Introduction 
This chapter in its first section discusses the theory of interaction between technology and 
organisation to provide the fundamental basis for the deeper understanding of optimum 
technology applications in industry. This will provide the theoretical framework of 
reference and set a platform for addressing the aims of this research comprehensively.  The 
second section looks at the skilling issues in the wake of the above discussion and further 
pursues theory to unravel the skilling dilemma triggered by the technology-human 
interface. The third section then attempts to make out the case for need to study the 
potential for optimisation leveraging technology application in the marine industry 
environment. 
3.1 Theory of interaction between technology and organisation 
Most rational decisions are based on some form of theory. Theory helps in building 
generalised models applicable to a range of organisations or situations. It further provides a 
conceptual framework and gives a perspective for the practical study of the subject. Thus 
theory and practice are inseparable. Together they lead to a better understanding of factors 
influencing patterns of behaviour in work organisations and application of the process of 
management (Billbsberry, 1996). 
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As technology has become pervasive within contemporary organisations, it is therefore 
essential to have an understanding of the nature of technology and organisational and 
human resource dimensions and circumstances of its use. 
3.1.1 Technology and organisation 
The theoretical models that examine the interaction between technology and organisation 
have evolved over a period of time. Nevertheless, technology has always been the central 
variable in organisational theory, guiding research and practice (Orlikowski,1992). 
Blau et al.’s (1976, p.21) definition of technology deployed in the factory and office is 
given as “the substitution of equipment for human labour”. This set of studies that focused 
on technology as hardware emanated from the stream in the tradition that is represented by 
the Marxist account of technology and view on capitalism, such as those of Braverman 
(1974), where technology is devised and deployed to further the political and economic 
interests of powerful actors. Braverman draws his thesis from the scientific management 
principles of Fredrick W. Taylor an American mechanical engineer and a management 
consultant of early twentieth century, when capitalism organised new forms of labour 
management, among which Taylorism was a highlight. Around this period not only did 
capitalism come into a monopolistic phase, its dependence on live labour in manufacturing 
was an obstacle to the empire of capital (Heloani, 1994 as cited by Peci, 2009). Taylor 
proposed disassociating labour process and workers’ specialty; separating conception and 
execution, using knowledge monopoly to control each phase of the labour process and the 
way it is carried out (Braverman, 1974).Taylor however attempted to minimise the 
contradiction between employer-employee interest, and in trying to conciliate stated that: 
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“Scientific management has for its very foundation, the firm conviction that the true 
interests of the two are one and the same; that the prosperity for the employer cannot exist 
over a long term unless it is accompanied by the prosperity for the employee, and vice 
versa; and that it is possible to give the workman what he most wants – high wages, and the 
employer what he wants – a low labour cost for his manufacture,” (Taylor, 1947). 
Woodward’s (1980) empirical study of 100 manufacturing firms and relationships between 
the application and principles of organisation and business success theorised that industrial 
organisations which design their formal organisation structures to fit the type of production 
technology they employ are likely to be commercially successful. 
The work by Woodward was extended by Perrow (1983) who drew attention to human 
actions and interventions. He argued that the role played by technology in these early works 
assumed technology to be an external force that would impact the organisation properties 
such as structure. However, it had its limitations in the notion of application of human 
agents, where only managers or designers of technology had the power to shape it, and its 
viability only in organisations that employ machinery in their production activities  
The technology concept was thus extended to social technologies which then included the 
generic tasks and knowledge utilised by humans, thus making it a meaningful variable in all 
types of organisations and acknowledging the fact that there was more to technology than 
just hardware. The focus got extended to human action and technology being seen as a rich 
mix of shared interpretations and interventions. The workers portrayed as relatively 
powerless, found recognition in their participation having implications for organisations. It 
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was recognised that technologies are socially constructed and can be changed by those 
using them (Perrow, 1983; Wynne, 1988). 
Charsley (1989) also cautions about managing technical change in that failure to match 
technical change to concomitant human and social considerations means staff may become 
resentful, suspicious and defensive. People’s cognitive limitations and their uncertainties 
and fears may result in a reluctance to accept change. Managers need to develop working 
practices based on integration of people’s needs with organisational needs. He further 
points out that it is prudent to remember it is extremely dangerous to place more 
importance on the workers’ tools than the workers themselves. 
3.1.2 Process – centric theory 
Further developments led to technology being incorporated into a strategic choice model 
suggesting technology as not immutable and a product of on-going human interaction, 
design and appropriation. It led to socio-technical studies of optimisation with the premise 
that outcomes such as job satisfaction and productivity can be addressed through re-
examination of processes around the potential of information technology, thus taking a 
more process-centric approach (Markus, 1983; Markus and Bjorn-Andersen, 1987). 
Processes are a sequential flow of tasks that systematically complete organisational 
missions (Chandy and Lamport, 1985; Van de Ven, 1992). Zuboff (1988) distinguishes 
between the “automating” (the replacement of actions of the human body by the machine) 
and “informating” potential of IT (the simultaneous generation of new information about 
organisational activities). She suggests that because information technology can be 
designed with different intentions, for example to automate or to informate work, it will 
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have different implications for workers which in the first case would be “controlling and 
deskilling” and in the latter case “empowering and up-skilling” them. It is the latter which 
presents the transformative possibility to organisations through the transparency which it 
offers. 
Porter’s (1998) model which includes technology and managerial processes in a value chain 
framework takes a process-centric view. Technology is positioned as a key supporting role 
facilitating processes creating value for operational system (Woiceshyn and Falkenburg, 
2008). Research on value chain theory that is consistent with supply chain management 
concepts is taking a leading role in developing research in strategic management (Cheng 
and Grimm, 2006). However, Jayaraman and Luo (2007) suggest the limitations that such a 
linear view of operations in a sequential manner positions technology as a transitional 
factor and business processes evolve with minimal association with underlying technology. 
Narasimhan et al. (2010) confirm that linear thinking ignores simultaneity among other 
dimensions and hence lacks insight into the role that technology plays in developing and 
transforming business processes.  
3.1.3 Organisation-centric theory 
Another perspective provided by Barley (1986, 1990) portrays technology triggering 
structural changes such as increased decentralisation, thus leaning towards a more 
organisation-centric theory. Organisations are administrative structures that govern an 
entity with a hierarchy of authorities (Blau, 1968; Ouchi, 1998). While technology is 
considered as a social object defined by context of its use, its physical form and function 
remain fixed over time. Organisation-centric theory encourages a resource based view that 
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suggests firms need to develop strategic resources that sustain competitive advantages 
(Barney, 1991; Olvarrieta and Ellinger, 1997). Resource based view theorists state that to 
be qualified as a strategic resource, it needs to be scarce and difficult to imitate (Mata et al. 
1995).  Technology is considered as a key resource for competitive advantage and is 
distinguished as stand-alone construct (Stieglitz and Heine, 2007; Liang et al. 2010). New 
technology entails developing new procedures for bringing about interconnectedness of 
technology and business systems and possibly reengineering for operational processes 
(Valorinta, 2009). 
However, there are limitations on the organisation-centric view relative to managing 
technology. Da Silveira (2002) points out that such a view considers organisation as a 
dominant factor in determining operations and performance, and technology remains a 
separable and non-integrative variable.  Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) confirm that 
technology once implemented becomes a dormant entity and such a view cannot precisely 
capture the dynamics between technology and organisation. 
3.1.4 Technology-organisation-process integration 
More recently Arvanitis and Loukis (2009) point out that while technology plays a key role 
in an organisation, extant literature in operations management still holds an organisation-
centric or a process-centric view when studying business entities. Zammuto et al. (2007) 
and Helper and Sako (2010) also remark that despite the significant impacts of technology 
the three way technology-organisation-process interaction has largely been neglected in 
literature.  
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Technology, organisation structures and business processes are closely integrated and in 
any technology-intensive environment, organisation structures and business processes need 
to be developed or modified in simultaneity with technology development application 
(Cheng et al. 2011).The three do impact each other and these encounters do not necessarily 
take place in sequential manner (Hempell and Zwick, 2008). There is need for all these 
factors to be studied simultaneously (Pentland and Feldman, 2007; Zammuto et al. 2007). 
Figure 4 below shows the trinity view model that easily lends itself to simultaneity and 
dynamics where technology, organisation and processes co-exist and these dimensions are 
systematically integrated into an entity (Yang et al. 2007; Cheng et al. 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Technology Centric Framework with simultaneous technology-process 
                -organisation view. Sources: Yang et al. (2007); Cheng et al. (2011). 
 
Mullins (2002) conveys in typical textbook style that the main trends in the development of 
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The Classical approach emphasised technical requirements of the organisation and its 
needs, while the Human relations approach emphasised the psychological and social 
aspects and the consideration of human needs. The Systems approach reconciles these two 
earlier approaches and focuses attention on the total work organisation and the 
interrelationships of structure and behaviour, and a range of variables within the 
organisation. The Systems approach encourages managers to view the organisation both as 
a whole and as part of a larger environment. The idea is that any part of an organisation’s 
activities affects all parts. 
3.1.5 Discussion 
The study of interaction of technology and organisation highlights some key issues (Noble, 
1984; Perrow, 1983; Zuboff, 1988; Powell, 1987): 
Technologies are products of their time and organisational context. While it has flexibility 
in interpretation, design and use; it is a function of hardware, organisation context and 
human factors that can be summarised in the following maxims: 
a) The temporal and spatial distance between construction of technology and its application, 
affects its flexibility. The greater the distance, the lesser the flexibility.  
b) The workplace culture and interacting human element also plays a key role in deployment 
and application of technology. 
c) There is a simultaneous mutual impact among technology, organisation and process. 
d) Technology today is a driving force that stimulates changes within organisations. 
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A goal now exists for organisational managements to identify the optimal integration of 
technology, organisation and process. 
3.2 The skilling dilemma 
A key issue that comes to light in the evolving technology-organisation-process integration 
in shipping is about the skilling of people. While on the one hand it can be argued that 
merchant ships are now so automated and sufficiently reliable for little skill to be demanded 
of those who control them, on the other hand it can also be argued that today’s merchant 
ships are so complicated that only those who fully comprehend their complexities should be 
entrusted with their operation.  
At the heart of this conundrum lie the contrasting theories of technological change 
implications that support the notions of up-skilling and deskilling theses, both with equally 
strong convictions. 
3.2.1 The deskilling theory 
Arguments favouring the deskilling theory concern the notion that the seagoing personnel 
are no longer expected to possess high calibre diagnostic skills, as they can now rely on the 
automation, but they do need to be able to quickly assimilate information provided by the 
systems.   
The engineering and brainwork involved in the design and construction of digital 
technologies facilitates task simplification and standardisation of work processes to the 
extent that less skilled workers with minimum training are able to perform the same jobs 
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earlier assigned to high skilled workers. There is thus actually deskilling of high skilled 
jobs which previously demanded educated workers and where work processes were 
difficult to capture because of the unpredictable and uncertain nature of work. The 
management strategy aimed at is - the codification and routinisation of knowledge work 
particularly in high skilled jobs. This is amply manifested in the 2010 revision of the 
International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and Watch-keeping 
(STCW) that sets the standards for competency of seafarers internationally, where the 
education component for marine engineers is drastically reduced from earlier 30 months to 
just 6 months now.  
The deskilling theory has its roots in the Scientific Management principles of Fredrick 
Winslow Taylor.  Taylor’s (1947) principles of scientific management consisted of a 
rigorous and scientific study of work, the use of scientific methods in the training and 
management of employees (rather than relying on intuitive knowledge of workers), 
fragmentation of work into discrete tasks through detailed instructions and supervision, and 
division of labour consisting of a clear distinction between those who manage work and 
those who actually perform the work (Anand, 2011).  
According to Braverman (1977), Taylor proposed to dissociate labour process and workers’ 
specialty, separating conception and execution, using knowledge monopoly to control each 
phase of the labour process and the way it is carried out. Taylorism related strongly to the 
dynamics of capitalism which came into a monopolistic phase, and the dependence of 
capital on live labour in manufacture was an obstacle to the empire of capital. The role of 
management was to relocate the knowledge of workers into machinery. Once the 
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knowledge and skills of workers can be reduced in the labour processes, less skilled 
workers can be employed at cheaper rates thus reducing costs for the employers. 
However, be that as it may, it is acknowledged now that as the level of complexity of 
automated systems increases so the human element becomes more deeply embedded 
amongst the physical elements. As machinery and equipment are left to operate unattended, 
the monitoring systems detect warning signals and production control systems to take 
immediate action. The deskilling thesis thus gives due importance to just the knowledge 
gained through experience, observation and on-the-job training.  
3.2.2 The up-skilling contradiction 
The up-skilling thesis however considers this knowledge of marginal importance in post-
industrial societies. The experiential and intuitive knowledge is rather replaced with the 
theoretical and scientific knowledge gained through formal education and training.  
The up-skilling thesis suggests that the knowledge and skills of workers is a dominant 
source of productivity. It is argued that as work processes are fragmented into simplified 
tasks the machines take over the repetitive work while the workers should move towards 
furthering innovations. The passive-monitoring mode encourages deskilling, tedium, and 
low system comprehension, leading to low morale, low output, and lack of skills to cope 
with emergencies or even unexpected variations in system state. Designing operators out of 
the control system through automation reduces their system comprehension and ability to 
intervene in emergencies or when conditions are abnormal, which is more a norm than 
exception in the shipping industry. 
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Perrow (1983) and Charsley (1989), as discussed earlier in section 3.1.1 suggest perceiving 
technology as more than mere hardware; it being a rich mix with human actions and 
interventions, thus conceptualising social technologies, with shared interpretations and 
interventions, and further cautioning against placing more importance on the worker’s tools 
than the workers themselves. Hence, it calls for exploring the cognitive underpinning of 
work and importantly decision-making under different conditions such as limited time, 
uncertainty and unstable conditions. 
3.2.3 The tenable position through cognitive behaviour in decision making 
Exploring and understanding the human cognitive behaviour in system operations in light 
of the skilling dilemma posed with handling of automation resolves the dichotomy.   
Rasmussen’s (1983) qualitative model describes the behavioural structure of human when 
working with control systems. He suggests that people perceive information (visual 
perception), then remember what is needed to carry out the task (memory), and then make 
decisions. Key elements of decision making are the skill-rule-knowledge (SRK) model – of 
human decision making as shown in table 1 below: 
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SBB Skill based behaviour is a nearly automatic response of 
operator handling well known situations. This produces best 
performance in terms of speed, accuracy and error rate. 
RBB Rule based behaviour, where the operator follows a 
reasonably well known process and procedures. Performance 
is usually good although not as fluid as SBB. 
KBB Knowledge based behaviour, where operator must resort to 
his or her fundamental knowledge of the process to solve a 
problem. This is slowest and error prone, normally used in 
novel tasks, or abnormal / emergency situations. 
 
Table 1:  SRK Model of human decision making. Source: Rasmussen, (1983). 
In novel cases, operators over time pass on to RBB and then SBB. Hence the idea to train 
operators in these two types of behaviours. 
Typically, decision-making includes identifying known successful recipes that correspond 
most closely to the present situation, adapting the best-matching recipe, simulating it 
mentally, and then implementing it. That is where simulator training helps. Only when there 
is no existing recipe, one goes through KBB, with its associated difficulties and potential 
errors but it is the only resort in novel tasks or abnormal and emergency situations which is 
more a norm than exception in shipping environment. 
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Rasmussen’s model appears rather grainy but is generally well accepted in human factors 
literature as it offers a good break down of cognitive functions and their interrelations, as in 
the figure 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5: Example of human – machine system. Source: Rasmussen, (1983). 
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the times of high pressure and high workloads in the critical phases of the tour of duty, 
emergencies and maintenance. During the long routine phases of duty, passive monitoring 
reduces tasks and is characterised as deskilling even to the extent of automating functions 
(in engineering vernacular this is "removing the man from the loop"(p. 535). 
Fewer control activities are required than in the past because most functions get carried out 
by the automatic systems, leaving a largely supervisory role for the watch-keeper during 
normal system operation. At other times, for example during high traffic density in 
confined waters or failures of automated systems, or when just the management of many 
sub-systems (navigation, engine control, cargo control) are allotted to a single operator, 
workloads and high skills demand increases. Polarising of such skills demand and 
workloads in itself constitutes a threat to performance (Sauer et al. 2002). Nonetheless both 
extremes need to be considered. For delivering high systems performance, it would be 
easily expected of the mariner to be altering the roles as the situation demands. 
Hammond et al.’s (1987) cognitive continuum theory premises that cognitive activity is not 
a dichotomy between intuition (deskilling theory led) and analysis (up-skill theory led), but 
rather a continuum marked by intuition at one pole and analysis at the other. 
Working separately in the same naturalistic decision (NDM) domain but reaching similar 
conclusion as Rasmussen was Klein’s (2008) recognition-primed decision (RPD) model as 
depicted in figure 6. The NDM movement based on advances in cognitive psychology 
expanded decision-making process to include a prior stage of perception and recognition of 
situation as well as generation of appropriate responses as seen in Rasmussen’s model. 
Klein’s RPD model describes how people use their experience in the form of repository of 
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patterns. These patterns highlight the most relevant cues, plausible goals and suggest 
typical types of reactions. When people need to make decisions they can quickly match the 
situation to the pattern they have learnt. In newer situations mental simulation is 
analytically carried out to see how the decision will play out in current situation until a 
comfortable and satisfactory option is reached. Klein acknowledges that a purely intuitive 
strategy relying only on pattern matching would be too risky so also a completely analytical 
strategy too slow. 
Hence, for all risks associated with marine operations, an integrated approach and 
consideration of totality of marine engineering systems, that includes technology as well as 
people and their behaviours, is fundamental to effective ship management. 
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Figure 6: Model of recognition-primed decision making. Source: Klein, (2008). 
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3.3 An argument for favouring enhancement of optimisation potential of 
technology integration in shipping 
3.3.1 Case for learning from other industries 
A measure of the significance of a new technology is the extent to which it changes 
previous ways of doing things, or changes our ideas about how they ought to be done. 
Some maritime innovations can be described as highly significant because they have altered 
traditional patterns of operating ships, and in some cases, they can also be said to have 
contributed towards an essential change in the relationship between humankind and the sea 
(King, 2001). However, there is not very much evidence found in the literature on shipping 
management practices on any theory based scientific approaches to its integration, of the 
kind discussed in section 3.1; nor is much known of the metrics that enables the status of 
the shipping management system to be determined (Barnett, Gatfield and Pekcan, 2006). 
In an enhanced and a broader view of the industry, Thai (2008) suggests that increasingly 
over past decades there has been recognition from marine transport operators that 
improvement in transport service quality is critical in achieving a differential advantage 
over competition, which includes safety management given the safety-critical nature of the 
industry. However, little literature directly addresses the dimensions or determinants of 
service quality in marine transport. Since there are very few studies conducted to 
investigate what constitutes service quality in this field, its managerial implication is that 
there has never been an approach to measuring service quality in the maritime sector.  
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In manufacturing industry, production tasks have been increasingly automated and thus 
processes can be more accurately controlled. Curry, Flett and Hollingsworth (2006) 
highlight that work can be coordinated by means of networking and communication 
systems that effectively eliminate time and distance restrictions. Teamwork is more 
widespread with data, information and skills being more extensively shared and exchanged 
as boundaries of organisations get less clearly defined with regard to where work is done, 
when and by whom. The shipping industry too is characterised by similar conditions. 
Nikitakos and Lambrou (2007) postulate that the main task in shipping is to offer 
transportation services whose stakeholders are located in different geographical areas. This 
characteristic results in the foundations of a distinctive virtual organisation where the 
personnel ashore and on-board may work in virtual teams. These teams support the 
productive unit which is the ship itself, and which can be considered as a node of a network 
that cooperates and interacts by gathering, diffusing and sharing information. A great 
contribution of the network-centric concept is that it exploits the use of information to 
suppress transaction costs and risk. Shipping companies do attempt to limit administrative 
and operational cost and risk by using management information systems (MIS) in most 
operating procedures.  
Furthermore Curry et al. (2006) go on to say that to increase the performance of an 
organisation, reductionism and optimisation of the constituent parts leading to better 
performance is being adopted through a systems approach. The hierarchy of systems is 
useful in analysing the complexity of the problem - the lower the hierarchy the simpler the 
system. Organisations undertaking reengineering programs have to rely on process 
information which has to be systematically analysed and acted upon. ICT becomes a key 
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element when information systems and business strategy must be fully aligned and 
integrated to give the best strategic result. This concept can thus also be extended to the 
shipping industry. As a matter of fact Lyridis et al. (2005) have examined optimisation of 
shipping company operations using ‘business process modelling’ and report large time and 
cost savings after the application of the technology improvements. They claim that 
optimisation allowed the shipping company to even increase the number of round trips per 
year, thus indicating that very large benefits can be drawn by analysing and critically 
adjusting business processes in modern shipping companies. 
Lyu (1996), professing process reengineering, contends that although Kaizen
7
 and 
automation are generally two different approaches to improve the performance of 
manufacturers, he proposed an integrated framework of Kaizen and automation to 
reengineer a manufacturing process in the shipbuilding industry. His study concluded that 
nearly 50% improvement in labour productivity was possible with the streamlined 
manufacturing process through process reengineering. 
Communications and information technology have shifted the centre of gravity of the 
shipping enterprise away from the ship and from the people serving in it. Decision making 
by those who have authority to determine the end to which a ship is put - the cargo it should 
carry or the voyage it should make - has become increasingly remote, often in offices 
ashore. Modern shipping has come to depend for its day to day operation almost as much 
on communications and information as on more tangible inputs like fuel, comments King 
(2001).The new satellite communication technologies as described in section 2.4.3 are 
                                                          
7
Japanese philosophy of continuous improvement of work practices that underlies total quality management 
and just-in-time business techniques. 
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providing an economical method of transferring data between ship and shore thus providing 
seamless connectivity which assists in effective management of the ship and the seafaring 
workforce as a virtual team (Collins and Hogg, 2004).  
Pomeroy and Tomlinson (2000) claim, that the advance in automation technology and 
increased use of digital systems in place of traditional wired and pneumatic controls 
provide an opportunity to reduce through-life costs, which includes the larger operational 
cost components such as, fuels and crew. 
Rensvik et al. (2003) address research efforts related to application of industrial IT in the 
marine industry and report that in shore based industries systems for operational 
management such as condition monitoring and diagnostic systems, enterprise management 
systems, have increased the possibility to improve operational performance, productivity 
and life cycle optimisation of the assets. The land-based industry sector has even started the 
next step to physically and functionally integrate real time control systems. However, the 
introduction of such an industrial IT architecture (figure 7), into marine applications is still 
in the area of research and development. They lay emphasis on aspects related to 
information flow between the real time systems ensuring on-line control and the 
management systems optimising the operations and the business processes. They envisage 
that as the cost of vessel-to-land satellite communication reduces and the maritime 
information technology architecture improves, this kind of information flow can be 
expected to be working seamlessly in real-time. 
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Figure 7: Industrial IT architecture. Source: Rensvik et al. (2003). 
The shipping industry can now be viewed to be on a par with shore based industries in 
terms of technology advancement, connectivity and automation. It now calls for looking at 
optimisation opportunities where vast scope exists with the use of enabling technology, 
particularly in the ship-shore interface of shipping management which is the core of any 
shipping management operations and the scope of this research project.  
3.3.2 The competitive edge – through low costs and differentiation 
Technological change is among the most prominent of all things that can change the rules 
of competition. It has the ability to achieve low cost and differentiation through its value 
activities (Porter, 2004). 
Panayides (2003) examined the competitive strategy-performance relationship in the 
context of ship management companies, and found a positive relationship between pursuing 
competitive strategies and company performance in ship management. The companies that 
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apply competitive strategies like differentiation through technology usage, market focus 
and competitor analysis are more likely to be high performers. 
Furthermore, Lin and Chen (2000) state that in a highly competitive global economy, 
automation has been an important general approach to improve productivity, quality and 
customer satisfaction. Because shipping management today, must remain not only 
competitive, but also be able to meet the increasingly frequent challenges of users, 
regulators, and inter-modal interface suppliers to improve the quality, level, type, and 
technology of service (Frankel, 1991), it all the more makes the case for looking at low 
costs and differentiation through optimisation potentials of technology application. 
Lee et al. (2005) have proposed internet based ship technical information management 
systems in order to better accumulate, manage, share and utilise various information and 
distributed application. While the application is in the context of ship design and building, 
it however incorporates the whole life cycle from concept design to construction, operation 
and maintenance. The information managed is the documents generated at various stages 
and database integration is also achieved in a concurrent engineering
8
 environment. The 
incorporation of information and communication technology into current shipbuilding 
technology is seen to increase the productivity and minimise redundancies in sharing and 
exchange of technical information thus leading to optimisation. 
The benefits they envisaged are reduced management costs by systematic and integrated 
management of vast amounts of data, increased consistency and integrity between 
                                                          
8
Concurrent engineering is a well-defined systems approach towards optimizing engineering design cycles. 
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departments and since the systems are on the internet, information can be used regardless of 
time and place, thus reducing the time for analysis and decision making. 
According to Butera (2001), automation is a process towards integrated systems of 
processes, technology, organisation, roles and values where technology performs a large 
variety of existing and new tasks, while cooperation is designed among men and technical 
systems with the goal of achieving optimal products and services that then give the 
competitive edge. He further lists the essentials of automation as being, (a) the need for 
human work, (b) the need for collaboration among men and machines, and (c) the 
integration of technological, fiscal, organisational, and social systems adopted in any single 
case.  
The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) Report (2005) 
strongly suggests that in a shipping context, the ICT developments on-board may 
additionally increase efficiency and reduce administrative burden, depending on how well it 
is developed. 
Jenssen (2003) concludes that in the face of aggressive competition from low-cost 
economies in Asia, it is imperative for high-cost countries like Norway, to build their 
competitiveness in most industries, including shipping, on innovation and knowledge-
intensive products to create distinctive competitive advantages that are difficult to imitate. 
Such a high degree of differentiation of service would imply that they focus on 
specialisation also in the segments of standard tonnage. He further claims that for the 
shipping industry to face major challenges in years to come, impetus would be needed in 
particularly the area of ICT.  
64 
 
The following section details how the high-cost countries of the West European regions 
have led innovation through technology in the shipping sector.  
3.3.3 Innovation through technology – exemplified in West European countries 
Innovation has been largely driven through technology, which, in the maritime context, has 
been led by the economically advanced nations like the West European countries. 
Lorange (2001) when speaking of strategic re-thinking in shipping companies cites many 
examples of Nordic owned tonnage companies that embark on technological innovations as 
they move from pioneering a concept to rapid expansion and there-by be world leaders. 
A typical case that has found consonance with this researcher’s study is the MARSIKT 
(2000), an on-going research and development project funded by the Norwegian Ship 
Owners Association. Its main objective is that through innovative use of ICT, the 
Norwegian maritime cluster could strengthen their market position, and the ship owners 
would benefit from cooperation and development of ICT solutions for their business. This 
way they could also improve their capitalisation on their ICT investments. The project had 
the following principal objective: 
“To improve the competitiveness of the Norwegian maritime sector by developing new 
technology and new forms of organisation, focusing on shipping companies’ commercial 
and technical operations.” 
The approach employed was - 
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(a) To redefine business needs, and formulate relevant technology requirements in support 
of new and more efficient work processes at the shipping companies; and  
(b) The ability to understand the needs of the shipping companies and provide relevant 
products and solutions from software and system manufacturer point of view. 
In this regard Rensvik et al. (2003) reported on the progress of the above in the following 
shipping organisations: 
(a) Hoegh Fleet Services implemented preliminary ICT structure on-board and ashore which 
included Fleetmaster (a management support system designed to enable access to primary 
vessel data on-board and from ashore) and electronic logbook from Kongsberg Maritime 
Ship Systems, which currently were being evaluated by the Norwegian Maritime 
Directorate and the IMO. 
(b)  Odfjell was implementing a test module of integrated ICT structure for technical condition 
monitoring and management for vessels. 
(c) Barber International was developing BASS (Barber Software Solutions) for document 
handling and quality systems. 
(d) DNV’s concept and software package titled Nauticus that was used for information 
exchange between databases of Classification Society and shipping company, and was 
forming the basis of standardisation of work in ISO/IEC for standardisation of integration 
of automation and communication systems. 
They further saw future prospects of deployment of automation in the high end market 
segments of cruise vessels and LNG ships where complexity was on the higher side. 
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Utilisation of advanced navigational technologies in Scandinavia-owned large cruise 
ferries, operating between Finland and Sweden in the early 1980’s has been reported by 
Gronberg (2007). The route incorporates 12 hours of navigation in one of the most difficult 
areas in the world and made more difficult by adverse weather and ice conditions. 
Shea (2005) confirms that the European shipping companies who traditionally had high 
operating costs in maintaining modern fleets are increasingly coming under competing 
pressure from third world fleets and placing them in a more complex and demanding 
environment, who are increasingly resorting to technology to make that differentiation. 
3.3.4 Performance through innovation 
In their study of how innovation drives performance, Jenssen and Randoy (2006) define 
innovation as an effort to create something new, in order to create differentiation as an 
economic objective. They note that innovation had fuelled a rich and strong maritime 
cluster of the Norwegian shipping industry. They however caution that the urge seems to be 
waning for various reasons and that there is a need to reaffirm efforts in innovation again. 
Their research strongly supports the hypothesis that there is a positive effect of innovation 
on performance in shipping firms. Also a positive relationship exists between product-
process innovation and performance measured as financial results, market position and 
bargain power. They conclude that the most important factor for promoting product-process 
innovation is a deliberate strategy for innovation. Their study indicated that shipping 
sectors with high differentiation had shown high growth, for example in the offshore area, 
but argue that, innovation is of importance in low differentiating sectors too, for example 
dry bulk or liquid bulk shipping. 
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While innovations are sources of competitive advantage, research on the diffusion of 
innovations found that it is not just the capabilities of the firm that predicts early adoption 
of innovations, but also its centrality and social proximity to these innovations. Greve 
(2007) researched the role of technology in competition through diffusion of technologies. 
He based his hypothesis on cluster theory and network theory. Cluster theory predicts 
selective diffusion within a spatially bounded social system, while network theory predicts 
selective diffusion through pre-existing inter-firm relations. 
He analysed the diffusion of two innovative ship designs. His study compared the diffusion 
of post-Panamax container ships
9
 and double-hull oil tankers
10
 which were two of the most 
important recent innovations in shipping at the time, as measured by the number of 
adoptions. As containers and oil are major markets in shipping, so innovations directed 
toward these markets affect the competitive advantage of many firms. Each of these 
innovations provided advantages to the owners, though there was sufficient uncertainty 
about their value to make the adoption risky. The buyers of post-Panamax container ships 
were sacrificing flexibility for efficiency, while the buyers of double-hull tankers were 
betting on nations maintaining or tightening their rules for preventing oil spills. Greve 
(2007) further acknowledges that both have proved right as can be seen today. 
His findings confirm the hypotheses that: (a) adopters appear to build on their advantage by 
making additional orders, (b) that innovations have more rapid spread within nations, and 
                                                          
9
 Post-Panamax ships are those whose sizes are beyond the dimensions that Panama Canal can accommodate. 
Economic and operational considerations are then the ultimate barriers on vessel size as there are no technical 
reasons preventing them from getting larger. 
10
 Double-hull oil tanker is a ship designed for carriage of oil in bulk where the cargo spaces are protected 
from the environment by a double hull on the sides and bottom thus reducing risk of pollution. 
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(c) firms are more likely to imitate the innovation adoptions of other firms in the same 
network cluster in the firm-supplier network. 
Thus the prediction that the diffusion process is affected both by proximity in geographical 
and network space, is supported from each theoretical perspective as well as by prior 
experience with the innovation. 
The slow and selective diffusion of these two innovations shows that technological 
innovations can be a source of competitive advantage over a strategically significant time 
span.  
The advantage obtained by being an early adopter is cumulative because early adopters add 
to their advantage by making additional adoptions before many competitors have made 
their first adoption of the new technology. Hence, in order to study how a firm can be 
positioned to become an early adopter of a technological innovation, practices of the West 
European countries are studied. 
The discussion so far affirms the view that the technology advancement agenda serves very 
well the economic logic that dominates the shipping industry operations. It does so through 
the effectiveness and efficiency of service offered and optimised operations. However it 
seems imperative and worth investigating further that the process of technology integration 
be backed by and based on well researched foundation and an up-skilled workforce who 
can leverage the technology and drive the innovations to render competitive advantages.   
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3.3.5 Technology advancement, safety and environment protection 
Looking at optimisation issues in shipping operations, Goss (2002) postulates that, it was 
originally considered that the optimum ship was simply the most profitable one and that, in 
the long run, competitive markets would ensure that this would be that with the lowest 
costs. However, in maritime transport, as elsewhere, there has been an increasing concern 
with safety and the protection of the environment. Following a number of well publicised 
disasters, this economic approach has been extended to maritime safety in general, which 
has to be factored in beyond the lowest cost principle. Hence, the study on impact of 
automation on safety and environment protection cannot be overlooked. 
Shipping is a high asset value industry. Failure of either a technological or a human kind, 
causing a single marine accident, carries the risk to cause damage to property, loss of life 
and pollution of the environment on a scale that is unlikely to be equalled in any other 
sector of industry and almost certainly in no other mode of cargo transport. Despite 
increased efforts to better safety at sea, seafaring is still a risky profession with a mortality 
rate considerably higher than in populations ashore (Hansen et al. 2002). However, even 
with regard to the analysis of human factors in causation of accidents, this analysis is 
relatively immature in the maritime world as little scientific analysis is undertaken to 
identify the trends and patterns. Even less analysis is attempted in assessing the significance 
or frequency of organisational factors such as incidence of commercial pressure or effects 
of organisation culture ( Barnett, Gatfield and Pekcan, 2006). 
Gronberg (2007) asserts that today more and more companies understand the benefits to 
safety by the proper application of new technologies. He however cautions that new 
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technology alone will not improve safety. Ship owners need to be responsible enough to 
ensure proper processes and training in the functionality and limitations of the equipment. 
Training has a crucial role in getting the maximum benefit from new technology as 
identified in section 3.2.3.    
Allen (2009) states that, in parallel with safety advancements, technology at sea has been 
used to not only reduce crew numbers and reduce costs in an extremely competitive market, 
but also to increase efficiency at operational levels.  
Quality shipping in practice is closely related to safety and environment protection issues 
and quality management in shipping can contribute immensely to safety management (Thai, 
2008). The key dimensions and factors indicating quality in marine transportation is 
summarised with few examples, such as dimensions related to:- 
1) Resources: infrastructure and availability of equipment and facilities. 
2) Outcomes:  speed and reliability of service performance (timeliness, accuracy, safety, and 
security), and competitive pricing. 
3) Process: responsiveness and empathy, application of IT and EDI in customer service.   
4) Management : application of technology in operations, efficiency in operations and 
management 
5) Image-reputation: company’s reputation for transparency and reliability. 
6) Social responsibility: concern for human safety and environmentally safe operations. 
Psaraftis et al. (1998) while analysing the risk factors in maritime transportation, also 
include ship’s flag as a factor for marine accidents. The ship’s flag factor is considered as a 
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proxy for other variables that cannot be easily measured, such as lack of commitment to 
responsible shipping. They report that the group consisting of a great number of developing 
countries around the world, exhibited the highest risk followed by the group – flags of 
convenience. The significant registers of DIS (Denmark’s international register), NIS 
(Norway’s international register), Norway, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden and Italy appear in 
the lowest risk region. 
The “White list” of the Paris-MoU (2010) which is a key industry benchmark for quality 
shipping and a worldwide index for flag performance, has the top eight best performing 
flags as Bermuda (United Kingdom), Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
France, Denmark and Finland (Table 2). These flags have consistently low detention record 
of their flagged ships by Port State Controls of various nations. 
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FLAG Inspections 
2008-2010 
Detentions 
2008-2010 
Black to 
Grey limit 
Grey to 
White limit 
Excess 
Factor 
Bermuda UK 270 0 26 12 -1.91 
Germany 1388 14 113 81 -1.81 
Sweden 984 9 83 55 -1.80 
United 
Kingdom 
2007 25 160 121 -1.76 
Netherlands 3860 54 297 244 -1.75 
France 355 2 33 16 -1.73 
Denmark 1385 17 113 81 -1.73 
Finland 624 6 55 33 -1.71 
 
Table 2: The White list of the Paris-MoU. 
 Source: Annual report 2010, Paris MoU on Port State Control. 
The above normative listing of Flags is based on binomial calculus. The performance of 
each flag is calculated using a standard formula for statistical calculations in which certain 
values have been fixed in accordance with agreed Paris MoU policy. Two limits have been 
included in the system, the “black to grey” and the “grey to white” limit, each with its own 
specific formula. A number of detentions above this “black to grey” limit means 
significantly worse than average, where a number of detentions below the “grey to white” 
limit means significantly better than average. To make the flags’ performance comparable, 
the excess factor (EF) is introduced (Paris-MoU, 2010).  
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The above comparative performance goes on to highlight that the West European countries 
who largely excel in performance through innovation using responsibly applied technology 
as pointed out in the preceding sections of this chapter, are also seen to perform well in the 
safety and environment protection dimensions of quality shipping, thus indicating the close 
relationships between technology advancement, safety and environment protection.  
3.3.6 Technology falls short on expectation? 
Innovation not only means product or market change, it also includes changes and 
optimisation of production or service delivery or administrative and management processes 
(Jessen, 2003). 
Knudsen (2009) proves empirically that technological advancements, global competition 
and growing demand for efficiency have caused huge changes in seafaring. A growing 
amount of paper work has been implemented in a time where size of crew has been 
considerably declining. She claims that tight schedules, high workloads and long working 
days are conditions experienced by most seafarers. According to this study there remains a 
constant deficit in the reciprocal understanding across the traditional division of the ship 
and shore; and there is need for prioritising, rationalising and optimising the ship-shore 
management interface which has come to be so heavily dependent on excessive paperwork. 
At the conference of the International Federation of Ship Masters Associations (IFSMA, 
2009), the Director General of Danish Maritime Authority, commented, “Shipping has 
never been more regulated, inspected and controlled on safety issues than today and yet 
fatigue continues to be a problem!” He went on to explain that there is a need to analyse the 
actual workload on-board ships. For this purpose, the Danish Authorities commissioned a 
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study on Danish flag vessels by specialists not involved in the maritime industry (DMA, 
2011). They created a simulation model consisting of a variety of criteria that control the 
task flow on a ship and concluded that (a) Captains had a lot of redundant paperwork, (b) 
there was input (typing) of identical data in 4-5 different formats according to recipients’ 
specifications, (c) duplication of paperwork on arrival at different ports within same 
country, and (d) huge differences in total work load between crew members. The Danish 
Authorities had concluded that while shipping had seen tremendous advancement in 
technology as a result of the owners investing in meeting the challenges in this competitive 
world, however the process of operating this new technology on-board ships has not been 
adequately addressed. A resolution was adopted at the IFSMA conference to, (a) examine 
the process required for safe operations, (b) distribute the work load evenly where 
possible,(c) acknowledge that more new regulations are not wanted, the need was just to 
implement the existing ones, (d) this would require all Flag States and owners to study the 
process on-board and to take responsibility with regard to safe manning levels, and (e) to 
reduce the paperwork burden on-board ships today. 
Thus, the key outcome of the conference was to urge the International Maritime 
Organisation to take into account the administrative burdens on-board and recommend 
reducing paperwork by (a) eliminating duplication, (b) driving for standardised 
international forms, and (c) development and use of internationally accepted form of 
documentation. The latest IMO guideline (IMO, 2012b) on development of Ship Energy 
Efficiency Management Plan is noted to have a very specific recommendation on limiting 
any additional administrative burden on ships staff to the minimum necessary. 
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The above discussion confirms the notion of unsatisfactory technology integration into 
modern ship management practices (even those of the West European fleet) that seem to 
fall woefully short on expectations thus leaving a large room for optimisation and 
improvement.  
Summary, conclusion and way ahead 
This chapter in its first section focused on the theory of technology and organisation 
interaction to provide a way of understanding and predicting the effects of this interaction. 
Maritime research is found to be lacking in explicit reference to such theory thereby 
hindering efforts to generalise findings from one context to the other. Theory not only 
enables better understanding but also helps guide development and evaluation of 
implementation and mechanism of action. The section concludes that when taking a 
technology-centric view for managing entities, a three way interaction of technology-
organisation-process framework provides the holistic construct.  
The second section examined the skilling dilemma initiated in the exploration of 
technology-human interaction process and debated the up-skilling versus deskilling 
positions. It again backs arguments on theory prepositions and arrives at a tenable position 
through cognitive behaviour in naturalistic decision making.  
In the third section, the enhancement potential of technology application was discussed 
through provision of several perspectives; drawing on  lessons from other industries, 
evidences of competitive edge through its proper application, and success stories from 
pockets of segments from the shipping industry itself. It concludes that despite the 
76 
 
investments in technology and automation in ship operation and ship management thus far, 
the industry is realising that its real impact on management styles and practices are actually 
well below expectations. There is thus a need for leveraging technology advancements in 
shipping for optimising operations, which seems to be underutilised and where a large 
scope exists. The lack of substantial research on process automation and optimisation, and 
the current level of business process achievements falling short on expectations suggest 
that, there is a potential for further enhancements of overall performance. 
Samaranayake (2009) affirms that business process optimisation has its principles in waste 
elimination, simplification and integration, and automation seems a suitable option. This 
process has been suitably researched by Lyridis et al. (2005). In their exercise for 
optimising shipping company operations of a Greek liner company they developed and 
used process models of activities and integrated the organisation with ICT systems and 
resources to reengineer the process for delivering the defined strategic objective. Business 
processes were seen to find visibility through process models thus enabling reengineering, 
and the classical hierarchical model of macro to micro processes was followed with 
increasing level of detail. The specific application to a liner shipping service between 
Madrid and Athens in terms of cost and time was analysed, and technology including ICT 
leveraged with real time connectivity among interested parties, thus delivering 
improvements in a number of operational functions. 
Pomeroy (2006) confirms that systems engineering methods provide an approach that 
permits the designers to select the best solution while ensuring that key requirements are 
satisfied within a given context. However, he states that there is actually very little evidence 
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to suggest that a systems engineering approach is being adopted when designing shipboard 
applications and operations methods. It may be noted that the theory as in section 3.1.4 also 
advocates a systems based approach to technology integration. 
With the ship as its productive unit being geographically remotely located, for the ship 
manager the process interface between the shipboard management and the shore based 
management, which is the scope of this research project, thus becomes of prime 
importance. An objective for optimisation of this vital interfacing process leveraging 
technology application is envisaged to deliver enhanced value addition and business 
opportunities to ship owners through increased efficiency and effectiveness in management 
and operation, better safety and environment protection, and to improve the working 
environment. 
There are however various challenges which need to be recognised with making the 
technology integration systems, especially those interfacing the ship and shore,  robust, 
reliable and secure, in the ship operation and management with automated systems. 
Chapter 4, details these challenges in technology integration in ship operation and its 
management practices.   
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Chapter 4: Challenges with technology integration in ship operation 
and management practices 
Introduction 
The June 1995 incident of the passenger vessel Royal Majesty running aground with 1509 
passengers aboard near Nantucket Island on a voyage from Bermuda to Boston is widely 
referred to as the classic case of the automation induced accident. The incident is 
reproduced here briefly and forms the general basis for highlighting the various challenges 
with technology integration in ship operation and management practices. 
 Soon after the departure of vessel, with a straight course set for Boston, there was a cut-off 
in the signal from GPS
11
antenna to its receiver. The GPS, on losing the signal, defaulted to 
DR
12
mode, sounded a brief aural alarm and displayed the code. These alarms and codes 
were not noticed, in spite of the code being on plain view for 34 hours. The navigation 
command system and autopilot were thus using the inaccurate DR position inputs, without 
any warning. This was a system deficiency.  The basic seamanship practice of cross-
checking, in this case with Loran-C
13
was not followed. Even when approaching landfall, 
the crew ignored and failed to recognise the warnings and indications that the vessel was 
not on its intended track, including not positively identifying the first buoy marking the 
entrance channel , ignoring the un-sighting of the second buoy, ignoring the reports of the 
lookout man and also the warning broadcast on VHF concerning their vessel.   
                                                          
11
 Global Positioning System which uses satellite data to calculate positions, course and speed.  
12
 DR means that the position is estimated – deduced (ded.) reckoning, also known as dead reckoning.   
13
 Loran-C is a radio-based navigation system, which in this case provided more accurate positions closer to 
the US Coast.         
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When the vessel ran aground east of Nantucket, she was 17 nautical miles from the planned 
and presumed position on the course. 
The accident, investigated by the U.S. National Transport Safety Board (NTSB, 1997), 
concluded that automation when designed properly and used by trained personnel, can be 
helpful in improving operational efficiency and safety. However, when designed poorly or 
misused by undertrained or untrained personnel, automated equipment can be a 
contributing cause to accidents. 
Another analysis of the same accident was carried out by Lutzhoft and Dekker (2002), from 
the perspective of the crew, with the aim to understand the role of automation in shaping 
crew assessments and actions. Using the local rationality principle of human factors which 
states that “people do reasonable things given their knowledge, their goals, and their limited 
resources” they converted the search for human failures into a hunt for human sense-
making; why did the action or assessment make sense to people at that time and place, and 
tried to understand why they did what they did.   
They suggest that accidents are the result of multiple factors that may all seem necessary 
and then become jointly sufficient to lead to the accident. According to them, focusing on a 
single point failure as labelled by the official accident report on Royal Majesty critically 
misses the evolving, building, escalating signature that lies at the heart of problems related 
to human-automation interaction. They claim that research shows that humans are not only 
poor monitors of automated systems, but also tend to rely on warning systems and not 
manual checks. Automation is often introduced because of quantitative promises that it will 
reduce human error and workload; and increase efficiency. But as demonstrated by the 
80 
 
Royal Majesty, automation has qualitative consequences for human work and safety, and 
does not simply replace human work with machine work.  
They concluded that automation only changes the nature of human error. It creates new 
human weaknesses, and amplifies existing ones. They further noted that with increasing 
automation the error only gets displaced into the future, thus further compromising 
opportunities to recover. Finally Lutzhoft and Dekker (2002) recommended that proper 
guidance is required to support the co-ordination between people and automation, not only 
in foreseeable standard situations, but also during novel, unexpected circumstances. The 
need is to find ways and means to turn automated systems into effective team players. 
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency of UK initiated a research study and reported on 
“Development of guidance for the mitigation of human error in automated ship borne 
maritime systems” (MCA, 2006). This report identified a range of human related issues, 
like over-reliance on automated systems, its poor maintenance and calibration, lack of 
situational awareness, and poor ergonomic design as contributory factors. 
While it is useful to differentiate between the safety and productivity implications of the 
use of technology on ships, it is inevitable that in a high risk work sector such as shipping 
the benefits of productivity cannot be considered if there is a minimal possibility that by 
bringing in new technology safety could be compromised. 
This chapter examines the challenges of technology integration in the maritime domain 
with particular reference to ship operations and management practices which lies within the 
scope of the project. This it does comprehensively even at the design stage, in the operation 
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stage, in the management of, and with new technology, the influences of the unique work 
culture and work environment and its contributing factors, before summing up the 
limitations. 
4.1 Issues involved at the design stage 
4.1.1 Poor human factors consideration at design stage 
The potential for error-causing behaviour related to automated systems has not been 
addressed adequately by the marine industry. The National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) 
Report (1997) on the grounding of Royal Majesty also stated that there have been little or 
no unifying efforts to integrate the human element into marine engineering or the 
manufacturing sector. The best place to do this is at the design stage. The human factors 
engineering concept (HFE) is about the comprehensive integration of human characteristics 
into the definition, design, development and evaluation of the ship to optimise 
human/machine performance under specified conditions. This concept of HFE is now being 
acknowledged as an essential component to meet the challenges of automation in many 
industries (Perrow, 1983). Pomeroy and Jones (2002), who also analysed the Royal 
Majesty, traced errors related to design, manufacture and installation of automation 
technology apart from operational errors. 
A joint initiative of The Nautical Institute and Lloyds Register, the International Maritime 
Human Element Forum defines the human element concept as a critical feature of all 
aspects of ship or system design and operation. Poor ship design, bad ergonomics, 
equipment prone to failure, differing equipment designs and lack of proper training in the 
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operation of equipment, leads to fatigue, stress, boredom; all affect the way in which a ship 
is operated (Squire, 2004). 
Lin and Chen (2002) empirically examined the effect of social factors on the success of 
automation and found that social factors played an essential role in the success or failure of 
automation. They suggest that although users may be psychologically ready to accept 
technical changes, system designers should adopt a socio-technical systems approach and 
familiarise themselves with the entire business process including its social factors in order 
to implement a successful automation program, and that it must not be solely a technical 
task. 
Interestingly, with regard to the investigation of accidents and incidents, the school of 
thought that supports the deskilling preposition tends to back the idea of having more 
automation or computerisation than what exists. This arguably, is to design the “man out of 
the loop” (Perrow, 1983, p.535) and thereby compensate for the human error. Lutzhoft and 
Dekker (2002) however caution that this could be a premature countermeasure as the 
qualitative implications of automation on human work particularly in the maritime domain 
is only lately being understood. 
4.1.2 Design being technology-led rather than design-for- use 
Pomeroy and Tomlinson (2000) noted that advances in technology which were technology-
led rather than being designed-for-use, have a major influence on the frequency of 
occurrence of human error in ship operation. They suggest that the options available to 
systems designers have expanded as the capability of electronic systems has increased 
remarkably which is coupled with progressive reduction in the cost of the programmable 
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devices. This encourages the design and construction of more complex systems that offer 
the purchaser more options. However, the downside of this trend is that the user is left with 
a system that may possess unnecessary properties well beyond the understanding of an 
average well-trained user. The situation is made more complex by the interconnectedness 
of systems using networking, resulting in interactions and dependencies which become no 
longer obvious as with older systems. 
It is important that the design-for-use principle is followed, that rationalises the 
information-intensity that the crew faces. Since human operators are unlikely to understand 
all of the characteristics of a total hybrid system such as the modern bridge or engine 
control room, the designers must ensure that the systems hardware is useable by an 
averagely competent operator. 
Allen (2009) also raises concern about how technology is designed and introduced. He 
suggests that the processes of selecting and automating tasks are at risk of following 
machine-centred rather than user-centred principles. He cautions that as technology 
becomes increasingly more sophisticated, it is important that the understanding of how 
human-computer interaction takes place keeps apace. Technology developed without 
reference to key human factor principles has the potential to be counter-productive, 
particularly so in safety-critical industries like shipping, where mistakes can lead to 
disastrous consequences. 
The problems are compounded when the system is procured from many suppliers of 
individual items of equipment. Suppliers of individual items use their own standards, so 
when it comes to user interfaces the system as a whole lacks consistency. Manuals and 
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instructions for component parts provide little assistance in understanding the complete 
installation. CHIRP
14
 (2006) reports emphasise that the style and presentation of operations 
and maintenance manuals should be subjected to review and a set of minimum standards 
should be agreed and imposed by classification societies, as the lack of it poses a potential 
safety related latent defect in the underlying processes. Integrated systems pose particular 
challenges which are not always met. 
Lack of standardisation of equipment is another of the shipping industry’s dilemmas. The 
equipment manufacturers in their effort to innovate incorporate new features and then 
maintain exclusivity for gaining inimitable competitive edge. These often contradict the 
seafarers’ perception of how things should work. Although designing equipment that may 
be considered universally intuitive may be a challenging task, as Gronberg (2007) suggests, 
the IMO consider type rating of integrated navigation systems just as in the airline industry. 
The IMO (2008) has been engaged through its E-navigation Correspondence Group in 
discussions of potentially allowing innovation along with standardisation through an S-
mode or standard mode. The concept behind S-mode is that different pieces of equipment 
from different manufacturers will have a default mode, which can be switched to at any 
time. This will allow manufacturers to continue innovating and adding new features to their 
equipment, whilst also maintaining a standard mode that seafarers will be able to revert to 
should they wish. The implementation of such a concept would also be likely to reduce 
training demands as it would bring in uniformity in operations. 
                                                          
14
 Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Program; the aim is to contribute to enhancement of safety by 
providing a totally independent confidential reporting system.    
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Another factor that is often overlooked at the design stage is the shipboard operations 
environment where background noise, vibration and lighting levels do not provide an ideal 
working environment for the crew, particularly at times of abnormal or emergency 
operations. Osterman (2010) confirms that occupational ergonomics and the interface 
between humans and technology in shipping is an area of potential yet uncharted. 
Ergonomics produces and integrates knowledge from the human sciences to match jobs, 
systems, products and environments to the physical and mental abilities and limitations of 
people. In doing so it seeks to improve health, safety, well-being and performance (ISO, 
1997). However, the operating procedures are rarely considered at the design stage, 
resulting in badly designed interfaces that encourage mistakes which no amount of training 
or management intervention can mitigate. 
The user inputs must be solicited at the design stage to influence the design of component 
parts and also the whole system along with its documentation, standards, and codes of 
practices and rules that are referred by designers. It may be argued that the causal factors 
for the superior performance of the West European countries’ flags, on a comparative scale, 
is because these countries are known to have a long tradition of cooperation between 
employers and employees towards a good working environment and employee participation 
in planning of new or altered work places is legally enforced, for example the Swedish 
Code of Statutes on Work environment (SFS, 1977:1160). However, it cannot be denied 
that when a West European owner flags out a ship to a flag of convenience, then such 
obligation is not mandated and may not be observed (Alderton and Winchester, 2002).  
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4.1.3 Limitations in assessments and type approvals 
It is a well-established practice that ship systems are protected by strict design standards, 
redundancy and by a feedback process that will activate alarms or even take corrective 
action. However, as the systems get more complex with interconnected and interactive 
equipment, exhaustive assessment and testing gets unviable. Traditional type approval and 
certification examines a product against an agreed standard or set of rules, usually 
involving some form of demonstration through a test program. For a more complex system, 
it is likely to be too late to correct faults that are found, and even if rectified, the correction 
involves only temporary fixes or expensive rework. The assessment procedure also does 
not incorporate ergonomic factors or human consideration (Pomeroy and Tomlinson, 2000). 
This aspect had also been commented upon earlier in a report from a Select Committee of 
the UK House of Lords (1992) which concluded that modern science and technology are 
not being adequately applied in many of the fields that affect the safety of ships, the lives of 
those who travel in them, and the marine environment; and that there are new developments 
in marine technology affecting the design, construction and operation of ships which the 
regulators constantly struggle to keep up with and constantly fall behind as technology 
develops. 
Lutzhoft (2004) further confirms this from her interviews with four representatives of major 
maritime technology manufacturers that most of their tests data relate to technical issues 
such as tolerance to vibrations and temperature, but when it comes to ergonomics and 
human factors it becomes difficult. 
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Standards for integrating human elements in design process exist as noted below from the 
ISO standards, and are being applied in other industries. This needs to be extended to 
marine applications as well. For example, some of the standards which can be used in the 
maritime sector are: 
(a) Human-centred design processes for interactive systems (ISO 13407); (b) Ergonomics 
of human-system interaction and life cycle process descriptions (ISO/TC159/SC4); (c) 
System lifecycle processes (ISO 15288). 
What needs to be appreciated is the interconnectedness of an operation safety culture of 
shipboard operations and its working environment; and the complementary design and 
development process of the easily-usable advanced technologies. For safety to be improved 
further, ship design has to be looked at as a hybrid human-technical construction with 
active inclusion of the human element. 
CHIRP (2006) highlights another area of inconsistency and limitations of assessment, 
which is in the area of operations and maintenance manuals. Other safety critical industries 
and transport modes have recognised the importance of technical/operational 
documentation and established controls to ensure adequate and consistent standards.  While 
IMO has recognised its importance, it has not applied these principles more generally. As a 
result the determinant in manual production may not necessarily be end-users, but may be 
“defensive engineering and liability practices”. While port state control authorities have 
powers to audit this area, their effectiveness is constrained by the absence of an auditable 
standard. The absence of agreed standards means good quality documentation is a cost 
option invested in by a discrete sector, when it should be provided to all. The adoption of 
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standards for technical/operational documentation offers the potential to provide an element 
of consistency through a diverse equipment/personnel environment, thus reducing the risk 
of human error and promoting operational integrity and consistency. 
4.2 Challenges in the management of information 
4.2.1 Information clutter in management 
This section highlights how the evolving information systems architecture has impacted 
adversely upon the ship management function. 
Ships are no longer isolated and out of company control as soon as they leave the port. 
Interconnectedness and automated reporting allows shore management to monitor what is 
occurring on-board. This forces the shore management to share responsibility on the 
important aspects of ship’s performances that traditionally have been seen as out of their 
control, once a ship leaves port. 
However, more control begins to get exercised by the shore based management, making it 
necessary for them to be involved in managing information from the ship. In the process, 
too much information is required of, and is available to the shore side management today, 
rendered so by the ease of information communication technology. While application of 
computers, communication and software technology comprise for the management, 
processing and dissemination of information; the human element in the information 
management system gets neglected (Slesinger, 2009). 
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Jones (2007) comments that communications with the shore has improved dramatically in 
technical terms in the last few years, and this has turned the whole industry into a 24/7 
operation, but the information flow with the (ever smaller) crew has not been managed in 
terms of distraction from the primary task. 
Knudsen (2009) points out that the perceived distance between the ship and the company 
has become both greater and smaller. Due to the growing opacity in ownership and a 
growing disintegration between owner and flag, and between owners, operators and 
managers, the link between owners and those responsible for the crew is blurred. Thus the 
seafarer expresses a feeling of being a pawn in the game which they believe is more and 
more about money and less and less about their working conditions. The perceived distance 
seems smaller because of the enhanced means of communications, which, notwithstanding 
the improvements they have caused, have also resulted in loss of autonomy on-board. 
“Some seafarers claim they can hardly hit a nail without asking for a work instruction from 
an unskilled clerk ashore” (p.297). Thus while the shore administration has become more 
distant, it has developed a panoptic grasp on the vessel, operating outside its field with 
long-term planning and including the ship in its strategy. “The problem seems to be related 
to the form of control seamen are subjected to, and thereby the perceived need to “cover 
one’s back” or “wash one’s hand off”. This is an area where ethical considerations are 
sometimes mixed with tactical cunning. This form of control is perceived by the seafarer as 
having less to do with enhancing safety than with fixing legal accountability. Thus one of 
the most widespread and serious objections against paperwork has its root in a dilemma 
between legal and moral responsibility” (p.321). 
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The abuse of such disparate systems with little integration or coordination between them, 
runs the risk of proving detrimental to the ultimate objective, which is the safe conduct of 
the ship, and the safe and timely delivery of the cargo as identified in section 2.3, the 
performance of the ship being the goal of any ship management system. 
It is vital that the data provided by the ship must be sorted, analysed and understood 
properly for it to be used optimally. Shipboard staff are often left wondering why they are 
being asked to provide certain pieces of information, and what is done with it. Such 
opaqueness in communications can lead to frustrations and resentment in the seafarers 
(Knudsen, 2009). 
Slesinger (2009) also cautions against unnecessary use of the much eased 
process/information bridge between vessel and shore. It can increase information clutter as 
any amount of data transaction contracted for can be sent at a fixed price, so the attitude of 
“we have paid for it so let us use it” comes into play to justify the expense. Hence care is to 
be exercised to see that only required and appropriate data is sent from shore to vessel and 
vice versa. 
Shipboard staff are also burdened with an overwhelming number of paper based logs, 
reporting forms and information requests from regulators, ports, agents, charterers, and 
other interested parties. If an on-board electronic systems that can record exact real-time 
data and be transmitted ashore and shared with relevant users can be used, then this will not 
only reduce the crew’s paperwork burden, but also will make logs accurate and unalterable, 
rendering improved transparency and behaviour. There is better compliance to the 
company’s policies. According to Neef (2008), seafarers feel protected against unfair 
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pressures to commit violations, in as much as company officers feel protected from their 
own prosecution or ending up costing the company money or damaged reputation. Such 
good behaviour has long been appreciated in commercial aviation or even monitoring of 
good laboratory practices in pharmaceutical companies. 
The use of the mobile phones has also made communication between ship and shore so 
much easier, but at times it has resulted in excessive demands being placed on the master 
and his officers who have to deal with enquiries from a wide range of organisations and 
individuals who have business with the ship, such as ship owners, operators, charterers, 
chandlers, port officials and shipping agents (Nautical Institute, 2012). 
4.2.2 Information clutter in operation 
This section highlights the adverse effects of un-optimised overloads of information in ship 
operations. 
E-Navigation deals with management of maritime information. IMO defines e-Navigation 
as: “the harmonised collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of maritime 
information on-board and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth-to-berth navigation 
and related services, for safety and security at sea and protection of the marine 
environment” (Lemon, 2009). 
The officer of the watch has to manage an ever-increasing amount of information, and has 
to take his decision after properly accessing, prioritising and analysing the same primarily 
because of lack of integration between navigation equipment.  
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There is also the risk of over-saturating the untrained seafarer with information that may be 
replicated through different means. The seafarer is presented with a plethora of information, 
from a variety of stand-alone systems having differing user interfaces, with the potential for 
confusion and information overload, particularly if he is not properly acquainted with the 
operational parameters of one or more of those systems. 
Even in highly integrated systems, what the developers and manufacturers choose to 
integrate into screens or systems is not always what the seafarer would choose. Mariners 
are then left to perform integration work themselves and adapt to such mistakes (Lutzhoft, 
2004). 
E-Navigation is a move to provide the benefit of optimum information to the officer of the 
watch. Much work is being spearheaded in this direction by the IMO and Nautical Institute 
(UK). IMO’s decision to make Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) 
mandatory, with sensor information from radar and Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
shows great potential for enhancing the situational awareness of the watch-keeper, provided 
human engineering factors   are taken into consideration adequately. 
With the advent of Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) the presence of 
a radio operator is no longer a requirement on-board ship. The communication tasks get 
coupled with navigational responsibilities. The GMDSS system senses critical navigation 
situations and activates alarms on different consoles situated on the bridge causing 
communication information clutter and the officer of the watch grapples at consoles to 
cancel them. There is also a plethora of communication systems to be handled by the same 
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officer of the watch as compared to earlier times of 2-3 radios with a separate radio 
operator taking care of them. 
Jones (2007) cautions that ships today have too many alarms. He also points out that 
external alarms are being generated more from traffic and more types of sensors – the 
relatively recent introduction of GMDSS and AIS having added dramatically to the number 
of spurious and distracting alarms. He professes the judicious use of alarms and highlights 
the Royal Majesty case as best known for alarm problems; the ship went from navigation 
by GPS to dead reckoning when the antenna cable got pulled off. This triggered aural 
chirps similar to those of a wristwatch alarm for a total duration of just one second and a 
display DR on a liquid crystal display (where visibility is not high) measuring just 3 inches 
high by 3.5 inches wide. Even its fathometer alarm was set at 0 meters, which was not reset 
from the position set in port to prevent alarm from being continuous.  
While acknowledging the criticality of effective response to alarm indications for safe 
operation, Jones et al. (2006) also point out that particular problems do arise if the design, 
management and operation of alarm systems do not follow ergonomic principles. These 
include: 
- Frequent spurious alarms, causing distraction to the watch-keepers (and risk of genuine 
alarm being ignored or discounted). 
- Long standing alarm lists, where it can be hard to distinguish real problems from on-going 
issues of lower concern. 
- Cascades of alarm when there is an incident, causing difficulty in diagnosis and excessive 
workload (e.g. cancelling alarms becomes a full time job during the incident) 
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- Alarms that are difficult for the operator to interpret, or where the correct course of action 
(or even the degree of urgency) is hard to determine. 
Thus increased marine automation and modern instrumentation bring with them increasing 
numbers of alarm channels which can distract and confuse the ship’s staff at critical 
junctures. Automation rather than freeing up resources is seen to create new vigilance 
demands, which may be extremely taxing. Allen (2009) contends that complex new 
automated systems may therefore give the illusion of reducing workload and introducing 
redundancy, in reality this may not necessarily be the case. Also, the task of controlling 
multiple remote systems may require high levels of cognitive ability and skill distinct from 
those originally learnt during qualification, even negating the deskilling argument that is 
based on the role of humans having changed from operator to monitor highlighted in 
chapter 3. 
Pomeroy (2006) also suggests that as the level of complexity of automated systems 
increases so the human element becomes more deeply embedded amongst the physical 
elements. As machinery and equipment are left to operate unattended, the monitoring 
systems detect warning signals and prod control systems to take immediate action. The 
crew member that eventually gets called in to deal with any resulting major problem enters 
a situation which is part through. Without the time to gear up, it becomes easy to misjudge 
the situation in the confusion and to initiate action that exacerbates the situation. The 
tenable position of the skilling dilemma in section 3.2.3 proves right. In the new situation 
the seagoing engineers are no longer expected to possess high calibre diagnostic skills, as 
they can now rely on automation in routine situations, but they do need to be able to 
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quickly assimilate information provided by the systems and fall back on the knowledge 
base to handle the information clutter effectively and efficiently in abnormal, non-routine 
and emergency situations. This affirms Rasmussen’s (1983) and Klein’s (2008) models of 
naturalistic decision making in a technology integrated environment, as discussed in 
chapter 3. 
The following section also reflects issues that have a bearing on the skilling of seafarers in 
the light of integrated technology. 
4.3 Challenges in the operations with automation 
4.3.1 Reduced and inexperienced crewing 
Improvement in the reliability of equipment and extended intervals between routine 
overhauls has resulted in a significant change in the demand for and of the ships’ staff. 
(a) The decrease in maintenance and repair work causes reduction in employment of 
number of crewmembers; 
(b) It significantly reduces the exposure of sea-going staff to the learning experience that is 
associated with these tasks, which reduce their effectiveness when dealing with abnormal 
or emergency situations. The familiarity with items of equipment gets reduced by the 
reduction in routine intervention.  
The lack of opportunity to learn from precursor events may reduce skills required during 
handling a hazard. Pomeroy (2006) suggests that the environment that provided the 
experience for dealing competently with all manners of abnormal situations has been 
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changed by the advances in technology which has increased reliability and reduced 
maintenance. Allen (2009) also confirms that once the crew becomes used to working in an 
automated mode of operation there is concern about how they will respond should the 
requirement be made to switch back to manual operation in an emergency situation, which 
creates more complex consequences. Some maintenance tasks such as repairing machinery 
after failure, simply cannot be handled by the number of people available, who are also 
rendered inexperienced by the lack of learning opportunity, thereby presenting an 
additional potential hazard to the ship. Often the operator is faced with an increased 
dependence on marine electronics, generally with no specialist electronics engineer 
available on-board. Where repair is necessary the owner has to resort to servicing by 
specialists, usually from the original supplier which has implications of costs and delays. 
Reduced and inexperienced crewing creates stressful work of operating a modern complex 
vessel that often leads to the growing problem of fatigue. Wrana (2007) confirms that this 
only adds to the other contributory factors of long hours of shift work without proper rest 
and administration tasks that pile up. Knudsen (2009) also reports that while physical 
conditions on-board as well as the means of communication have improved a lot, crew 
levels have declined and workload increased. Thus, in spite of technological advances, the 
seafarer has benefitted very little from the positive sides of globalisation due to increased 
connectivity and enhanced communication.  
4.3.2 Suspension of traditional seafaring skills and reduced situational awareness 
Barnett (2005), in searching for root causes of maritime casualties, identifies failures of 
situational awareness and situation assessment, as overwhelmingly dominating.  
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The reliability of automation has to some degree reversed roles. Rather than control and 
alarm systems assisting the human operator to identify malfunctions at an early stage, the 
operations get controlled automatically with human supervision. The reliance on the 
system, with the human relegated to monitoring the progress of the ship, encourages a 
suspension of the traditional seafaring skills of the crew. The officer of the watch tends to 
get so absorbed in technology that his awareness of the situation around him gets confined 
to the displays rather than looking out of the window on the bridge or sensing the 
machinery spaces. Awareness and observation of the environment that give vital clues, such 
as noise, vibration, touch, smell, appearance, weather changes, that are traditional seafaring 
skills used in making decisions gets dulled (Barnett, 2005). 
King (2001) points out that in a ship an expert system might be used for fault diagnosis or 
collision avoidance where it could be described as an aid to operational decision making, 
but the more complex the context, the less freedom the human operator has to deviate from 
the advice or assistance offered by such technical aids. Today, knowledge-based 
information technology is limiting seafarers’ scope to exercise initiative even in those areas 
where their sea-sense has traditionally rendered them qualified. The author concludes that 
technology challenges people to exercise moral judgment in the realisation of whatever is 
advantageous. In doing so, it limits the capacity of humankind to act freely. It symbolises 
human potency and power while simultaneously disguising the extent to which humankind 
is its subject. 
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Baker and McCafferty (2005) reviewed accident databases from the USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia and Norway, and confirmed that human error continues to be the dominant factor 
in maritime accidents and drew the following conclusions: 
1. While the total number of accidents is declining, human error continues to be the dominant 
factor in 80 to 85% of maritime accidents. 
2. Failures of situational awareness and situation assessment overwhelmingly dominate. 
3. Human fatigue and task omission seem closely related to failures of situational awareness.  
The effect of automation on airline pilot skills has been reported by Flottau (2011). An 
Associated Press release in Washington, USA, developing on this study noted that while 
federal regulations require greater reliance on computerised flying, the aviation industry is 
suffering from “automation addiction”.  This study examined 46 accidents and major 
incidents, 734 voluntary reports by pilots and others as well as data from more than 9000 
flights. It found that in more than 60 % of accidents, and 30% of major accidents, pilots had 
trouble in manually flying the plane or made mistakes with automated flight controls. 
Hundreds of people died over the last five years in “loss of control” accidents in which 
planes stalled during flight or got into unusual positions that the pilot could not correct. The 
Federal Aviation Administration Committee on pilot training warns that pilots use 
automated systems to fly airlines for all but three minutes of flight: which is the take-off 
and landing times. The pilots are mostly engaged in programming navigation directions 
into computers rather than using their hands-on controls to fly planes. They thus have few 
opportunities to maintain their skills by flying manually. Safety experts worry that they are 
seeing cases in which pilots who are suddenly confronted with loss of computerised flight 
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controls do not appear to know how to respond immediately, and they make errors – 
sometimes fatally. 
For the shipping industry there could be parallels to draw from the well-documented studies 
conducted in the aviation sector. It shows that suspension of traditional skills and reduced 
situational awareness are potentially detrimental especially in safety-critical environments. 
Hadnett (2008) argues that the relentless drive within the shipping community to introduce 
technology-aids to merchant ships had the principal stated objective of improving safety by 
enhancing situational awareness; however, it is proving counter-productive as reduction in 
core competencies has arisen due to the unforeseen effect of a human trait where the 
equipment engenders over-confidence in situational awareness. This encourages individuals 
to take far greater risks than in previous times. Ship staff tend to become more and more 
reliant on electronic systems with scant regard for the vulnerability of the systems in terms 
of their accuracy, reliability, availability and integrity. 
Pyne and Koester (2005) in their analysis of the grounding of Royal Majesty also reported 
over reliance on technology. The crew on-board the fishing boats realised that the Royal 
Majesty was heading towards danger and tried to call it on Channel 16, referring to ‘cruise 
boat’ at a position in English. But the crew of Royal Majesty were convinced that they were 
in another position, so did not respond.  
It is also alleged that the owner in a bid to cut costs, instead of investing in crew training 
substituted the fundamental skills of watch-keeping to a third party which in this case was 
the electronic aids. Alongside this, the introduction of electronic equipment has unwittingly 
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compromised safety with commensurate reduction in watch-keeping standards due to an 
over-reliance on navigational aids as the principal means of safely conning the ship. 
4.4 Influences of the work culture and the work environment 
While the benefits of automation may result in improved quality, efficiency, and flexibility, 
the failure rate of automation is also high. This is because social factors were ignored in the 
implementation of automation programs report Lin and Chen (2002). Their major findings 
suggest that a technical system with a high extent of automation is associated with an 
increased extent of complexity and flexibility of social factors, and that management 
support to these issues exhibit significant effect on the success of automation. They suggest 
a socio-technical systems (STS) approach must be adopted. They further state that in an era 
of immense competition, automation is a process en route to high productivity for 
manufacturing and the service industry alike. Hence concurrent change in both technical 
and social systems is crucial to the effective exploitation of the performance potential of 
new technologies. 
In this context it is pertinent to study the United States Coast Guard (USCG, 2005) report 
that has identified the following endurance risk factors for maritime crew, which pertains to 
individuals and their work/rest environment: 
- Individual risk factors as described in the decision support software tool: 
sleep duration, sleep quality, sleep fragmentation, synchronisation with circadian rhythm
15
, 
change of work/rest schedule (irregular hours), extended work hours, opportunities to make 
                                                          
15
 Pertaining to rhythmic biological cycles recurring at approximately 24-hour intervals 
101 
 
up sleep (nap), diet (type of food and eating times), workload, work-related stress, 
opportunities to exercise, sense of control, external environment (including motion 
sickness), family stress and isolation from the family. 
- Environmental risk factors – Work environment that includes light intensity, noise 
intensity, temperature, air quality, vessel motion/ vibration; Sleep environment – that 
includes all the above factors again; and Vessel operating environment– temperature 
(humidity, extreme heat or cold), marine operating environment (wind, weather changes, 
sea state, tides, current, high low water), operational demands ( down time, work load 
surges, routine vs. dynamic schedule), and operating policies (courtesy to crew sleeping 
off-watch, allowing napping, vessel manoeuvring, alternate meal and/or shower times).   
Added to the above risk endurance factors, there are also the problems of occupational 
attractiveness. There is a present level of shortage of skilled crew and it is likely to only 
increase in the future. Occupational attractiveness is on the decline and the ability to recruit 
the required quality of fresh entrants is reduced even in the developing countries that are 
today in the most supplying the crew to the global shipping industry. Competition among 
the companies for qualified crew is intense and the labour market now operates almost on a 
spot market (BIMCO/ISF 2005, 2010). This throws up challenges for the companies – viz. 
how to attract, retain and build a committed and competent pool, and how to become a 
good service provider enabling handling of advanced technologies. 
Often too much reliance is placed on a few highly skilled individuals in senior positions. 
Operational safety requires experience in depth from all individuals that form part of the 
ships’ crew. The operations management is pre-dominantly dependent on quality of crew 
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and operating philosophy of the company. Crew turnover can thus encumber the 
application of any systems, and leads to frequent loss of resources and tacit knowledge. 
There remains very limited repair and maintenance knowledge on-board and crew 
computer literacy varies from enthusiastic hacker to absolute novice. The contractual 
employment pattern causing seafarers to move from one ship to another even in the same 
company, where each has different equipment fit, makes it impracticable for them to be 
properly trained in the use of different manufacturers’ equipment. Furthermore, such 
contractual appointments, fluid labour markets, and high crew turnover, also result in lack 
of commitment by a transient workforce, in as much as employers being indifferent to them 
resulting in the workforce lacking adequate training, familiarisation and experience. 
Progoulaki and Theotokas (2010) confirm that in such special conditions of seafarers’ 
occupation and employment relations the seafarers consider the agent or the third party 
manager that intervenes to secure his employment as employer rather than the principal that 
employs him.  
CHIRP (2006) also notes that in the shipboard automation scenario, there are limitations on 
working with technology on account of the work culture and pattern. Seafarers move from 
ship to ship types with few restrictions and this flexibility is essential for the efficient 
management of human resources. As such, they are expected to assimilate different 
equipment quickly and perform to high operational standards, even when they encounter 
equipment on which they have not been specifically trained. 
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4.4.1 The ship–shore divide 
Different objectives drive the ship and shore management, missing out on the ultimate 
objective of transportation of goods promptly from place A to B. While the ship works to 
this objective under its constraints of safety given the hostile environment, the shore 
management decisions get weighed heavily from an economic perspective. Technical 
decisions ashore get taken more with a financial point of view and maximisation of returns 
from the ship has become the prime focus now even in the ship owner managed companies. 
Insular mind-sets thus result in avoidable misunderstandings and fuel the classic ship-shore 
divide. Masters feel that their authority gets undermined by (a) increased interference from 
shore based management, and (b) increase in volume of management standards and 
procedures (Krishnamurthi, 2005). 
MCA (2006) have reported that commercial pressures have become intense, and with 
minimum manning levels and increased demands for reporting and paperwork, the crew are 
led to putting in longer working hours and consequently being fatigued.  
In this regard, Bielic (2008) states that when the communication from shore management is 
dominating in nature and against the belief system and at cross purposes to shipboard 
objectives, it casts a very negative influence among the ships’ crew in inducing 
complacency, which can be detrimental to a healthy work environment. Thus, active 
knowledge, creativity and motivation are gradually suppressed, and the crew feels inhibited 
to use them. 
Knudsen (2009) provides empirical evidence to show that there largely exists among 
seafarers, a feeling of being misunderstood, undervalued, or even forgotten by people 
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operating maritime business from the shore side, both, the administration of the company 
and the concerned Maritime Authorities. She suggests that the seaman’s aversion to 
introduction of new rules and demand on written procedures has to be understood against 
their experience of enhanced control, mistrust and disrespect of their seamanship.  
Krishnamurthi (2005) indicates that many times the situation even escalates to a “them and 
us”, when each of the shore and ship side tries to take the credit when fleet operates 
efficiently and blame the other when things go wrong. It also creates a perception among 
the seafarers that while all the responsibility tends to rest with the ship, the authority gets 
snatched away to the shore side and this creates a wide chasm reflected in mutual distrust.  
He further suggests that modern shipping operations have become extremely complex and 
the sole responsibility thrust on the ship needs to be replaced by a shared chain of 
responsibility across teams that run the ship directly and remotely. In such a responsibility 
matrix the ultimate onus has to finally be that of the ship owner. 
The underlying reasons for such a ship-shore divide can best be rationalised by examining 
the concept of a “community of practice”. Wenger and Snyder (2000) define community of 
practice as a group of individuals that are held together by informal relationships through 
which they share identity, unity of purpose and meaning. Moreover, the people in these 
communities share experiences within a particular domain of knowledge, which allow them 
to develop perspectives, practices and particular approaches as a group. “Master under 
God” was a term used until relatively recent times to describe the role of a ship’s captain, 
who retained both authority and responsibility from the age before instant communications. 
While maritime law still recognises the Master as the alter ego of the ship, the rapid 
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advances in information communication technology is somewhere along the way turning 
him from a commander to a technical expert, then to a manager and now even to an 
executioner of decisions made ashore. These developments are in complete conflict with 
the seamanship practices over ages that signified a blend of professional knowledge, 
professional pride and experience-based common sense. What creates aversion is the fact 
that whilst the ship and the master finds his authority abdicated, the responsibility and 
accountability is not allowed to be cast away. “Master’s overriding authority” even though 
mandated in the ISM Code (2010) remains an empty rhetoric. 
The pervasive ICT is the new paradigm that has paved the way for better shore based 
management and needs to be accounted for in the evolving community of practice. This is 
however not simple because of the very strong influence of the community that relies upon 
practice based execution of tasks, and views ICT as encroachments. The reciprocal trust 
between the traditional division of the ship and shore can possibly be restored by giving 
more autonomy to the crew through goal setting and giving more space for local shipboard 
redesign, thereby providing sense of ownership. 
4.4.2 Mariners’ readiness to uptake technology? 
Lutzhoft (2004) claims that mariners on their part want to use new technology. They want 
to have better control at their work stations and they want to be able to use tools they 
believe can provide them with this control. Mariners also feel that appropriate human-
machine systems can relieve them of certain kinds of work and uncertainty, without 
technology being a burden on them. However, most of the time, they find there is a gross 
misfit between humans and machines, and mariners have no choice but to “reconstruct” 
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(p.75) the integration in terms and ways they understand. This entails only more work and 
effort and consequent disdain. Added to this is the fact that they get no or only on-the-job 
training for new technologies due to the constraining conditions of employment patterns 
noted earlier in this section.  
The more recent work by Allen (2009) provides empirical results from a survey on British 
seafaring officers where he notes little generalised resistance to new technology. They 
however also feel that training is an area where not enough is being currently done to 
support them. Comparative analysis highlighted that resistance to technology may be 
related to age, number of crew and level of computer literacy. 
Yet more recently, Tang and Sampson (2011) express encouragement that the majority of 
their respondents felt confident with shipboard equipment. They also express concern about 
the small percentage of respondents, whose answers indicated lack of confidence, 
considering the safety-critical nature of the shipping industry.  
Hence, with the changing times and given the younger generations’ affinity to technology, 
it may prove a myth that there is general reluctance to the adoption of technology. It is 
inappropriate implementation and the not so user-friendly deployment and application 
which could possibly be creating the barrier.  
4.5 Technical limitations of automation 
New technologies have improved efficiency and productivity in shipping. Yet, they also 
have limitations and may be prone to technical error, which has safety implications (Tang, 
2009).The hostile and arduous marine environment, coupled with the peculiarities of 
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shipboard phenomena of vibration, movements due to wind and sea forces which could at 
times be violent, pose yet more limitations on the reliability and functionality of the 
automation equipment.  Automation although capable is not infallible.  
There are also information security risk factors in ICT as identified by Khidzir et al. (2010). 
Critical risk factors identified were systems error and ICT failures, unauthorised access, and 
information leakage. 
Psaraftis et al. (1998) analysed marine accidents using Det Norske Veritas’s “DAMA” 
database structure (a structure developed for both statistical analysis and fault tree 
analysis). He concluded that advanced technology systems if in place could have reduced 
the risk of accidents. However, this would not happen automatically just because these 
systems exist, but because of the assistance to the human operator that these systems would 
provide. So, again the human factor would be the prevalent factor, but in this case the 
ability of the human element would be enhanced due to these systems.  
Pomeroy (2006) comments that the achievement of safety at sea depends on the availability 
of both dependable systems and competent people and the effective management of safety 
can only be achieved by considering these two aspects together. Dependability of hardware, 
and the embedded software, infers not only availability and reliability but also a measure of 
functional correctness in the context of the application.   
The biggest advantage of machines over humans is that they can work at extraordinary 
speeds, perform repetitive tasks with ease, and not get tired and affected by fatigue as much 
as humans do. However, technology does not exist on its own. To deliver any value it must 
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be integrated and therein lies its biggest limitation. Automation supports humans with 
information, but it takes common sense, knowledge, and experience to make informed 
decisions. It is the humans that exercise decisions and are able to take calculated risks, 
particularly in abnormal and emergency conditions. Automation needs be used as a 
decision support system and not allowed to dictate situations. 
Hence, for all risks associated with marine operations, an integrated approach and 
consideration of the totality of the marine engineering system, that includes technology as 
well as people and their behaviours, is fundamental to effective ship management. Figure 8 
aptly explains this integrated relationship in the marine business environment. 
 
Figure 8: Maritime business environments. 
The research carried out by Lutzhoft (2004) on Maritime Technology and Human 
Integration on the Ship’s Bridge reports that several recent maritime accidents suggest that 
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modern technology sometimes can make it difficult for mariners to operate, and that 
technological remedies designed to prevent maritime accidents can be ineffective and 
counterproductive. When humans and technology have to work together, the humans have 
to coordinate resources, cooperate with devices and integrate to get work done, including 
representations of data and information, rules, regulations and practices. When technology 
is used to replace human work, this is not necessarily a straight-forward and simple process. 
It often means that mariners have to work hard to construct a co-operational human-
machine system. She further claims that trying to fix human error by incremental 
improvements in technology or procedure tends to be largely ineffective due to “adaptive 
compensation by users” (p. iii). Hence she advocates that a systems approach is necessary 
to make changes to a work place. A systems approach is also advocated by Ropohl (1999) 
who claims that a systems model can be an effective tool to bring together both sides of 
social and technical phenomenon: “the technisation of society and the socialisation of 
technology”.  
4.6 Discussion, summary and conclusion leading to research questions. 
It is clear that when installing new technology in a new building or a retrofit, the ship 
owner should work hand in hand with the shipyard and supplier to ensure a layout of 
equipment that enhances and encourages its safe use. 
IMO in Chapter V Regulation 15 (2000) of SOLAS, attempts to produce an integrated 
approach on the impact in design and operation of automated systems. Furthermore, with 
regard to safe use of automated control systems there are other circulars and guidelines 
issued by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Some prominent ones are: 
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(a) MSC/ Circ.1091 (2003) – Issues to be considered when introducing new technology on-
board ships. 
This circular alerts the stakeholders of the various aspects of how seafarers interact with 
technology and issues to be considered when assessing their training needs. Emphasis is 
given to the effects on non-standardisation of controls and displays, the challenges in 
training for technology, and the need to take the human element into account when 
introducing new technology. 
(b) IMO Resolution A.947-23 (2003) - Human Element Vision, Principles and   Goals for the 
Organisation. 
(c) MSC/Circ.982 (2000) - Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and 
Layout. 
(d) MSC/Circ.1061 (2003) - Guidance for the Operational use of Integrated Bridge Systems  
(e) Model Courses -   Operational Use of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems  
(ECDIS) 
- Operational use of Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS)  
- Operational use of AIS16. 
The voice of the seafarer who is at the sharp end of working with technology must be 
heard. For instance, his objections to paperwork must be taken seriously, and not reject 
them as mere ignorance, conservatism, or indolence. The gap between procedures and 
practice, and the fact that sticking to procedures can lead to ineffective, unproductive or 
                                                          
16
Automatic Identification System is a mandatory requirement whereby information about the ship gets 
provided automatically to other ships and to coastal authorities.  
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unsafe local action as for instance appears in the tactic of work-to-rule that appears to serve 
shore based control have to be acknowledged and understood well.  
Allocation of matching resources must also be done. Fatigue is the most common factor 
found in accident investigation and stress levels are often amplified by constant exposure to 
noise, vibration, fumes, lighting, ship motion and temperature. Hence, the man-machine 
interface is another area of focus that must be addressed, specifically in the areas of: 
•The effects on non-standardisation of controls and displays 
•The challenges in training for technology, and 
•The need to take the human element into account when introducing new technology. 
Situational awareness is compromised due to over reliance on technology, and the feel for 
the work environment gets missing. This fact must be taken into account in designing and 
operating with automation. Good practices must be emulated from the airline industry that 
has matured with handling of computerised controls.  Introduction of computer-controlled 
systems impose new demands on operators of safety-critical applications. It must be 
acknowledged that even the most professional person is capable of making the worst 
mistakes, and the most capable of machines cannot be 100% relied upon. The practice of 
team-based interactions rather than one watch-keeper alone with no redundancy needs be 
more widely taken up. It provides a barrier against individual human error and co-workers 
can monitor and intervene to support interaction between colleagues and increasingly 
complex systems. It aids in exercising caution against complacency and assumptions that 
colleagues or automated systems will perform tasks in a reliable manner.  
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The unique shipboard environment with nearly isolated occupational groupings, work sites, 
multinational crew resourcing, and changing composition of shipboard teams further throw 
up challenges and impediments to quality ship management and operations that benefit 
from technology investments. 
This chapter hence underlines the fact that while automation and technology hold great 
promise in modern shipboard operations and management, it cannot be relied upon as the 
ultimate panacea without duly considering its many limitations in its design and 
deployment . 
4.6.1 Enunciation of the research questions 
This section now reflects on the discussions in all the four preceding chapters on issues 
related to technology interface in ship management and operations and arrives at the main 
research question.  
Shipping as the principal service providing industry in transportation, with truly global 
context in all its dimensions, needs to be effective and efficient. It produces this service 
with the ship as its core constituent unit that operates geographically remotely and in a high 
risk environment. Technology including information communication technology (ICT) 
infrastructure is now seen to be increasingly rendering ship manager capable of holistically 
managing ship operations to this end. However, as noted in chapter 3, its impact in 
improving service performance is well below expectation. Contributing factors for this are 
noted to be the lack of adequate scientific approach to technology integration in the 
business process, in as much as lack of any lessons drawn from success in other industries 
that indicate large potential for optimisation for the further enhancement of performance.  
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Sharma (2008) concludes: 
Shipping industry provides a relatively unexplored site and sample for searching for 
better services management practices. Its global and multinational nature coupled 
with technical dominance and manpower focus gives unique opportunities to explore 
services management from multifunctional angle. The literature within the industry 
is scant and industry had not generated or retained researchers over time to provide 
opportunity to make fundamental contribution in ship management in general and 
shipping services management in particular. Ship management industry in its totality 
integrates the art of managing HR, technical operations management, and supply 
chain management at global level. And therefore offers unique opportunity to 
compare, contrast and learn from it in managing services management (p.09). 
In the wake of the above discussions, this thesis therefore seeks to answer the following 
question: 
What are the challenges and potential of technological advancements for its 
application/integration in modern ship management practices? 
This would typically involve examining the current ship management practices and 
eliciting the perceptions of the ship management team in shore based offices. At the same 
time, perceptions of shipboard staff involved in the operations of the ships that are 
geographically remotely located yet forming the productive unit for the ship management 
company would need to be examined. Inter-alia the experiences with the introduction of 
new technologies and the resulting changes in ship management and ship operation 
practices would need to be captured, giving due importance to the social factors of 
employment that underpin the shipping operations in the unique shipping industry’s 
community of practices.  
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To be able to answer comprehensively the main research question, some key subsidiary 
questions were needed to be answered based on the discussions in the preceding chapters: 
a) What are the drivers for uptake of technology in the ship management industry? 
b) Is there any scientific approach adopted in the technology application/integration in ship 
management practices?  
c) How well is the human-machine interaction addressed in the application/integration of 
technology in ship management practices, and what are the gaps if any for it to meet the 
objectives of enhanced performance, safety and user satisfaction? 
d) What could be the underlying reasons for the challenges persisting yet and the tardy and 
decelerating progress on satisfactory technology integration in the shipping industry?  
As noted in the discussions, vast potential apparently seems to exist to exploit technology 
to increase the added value to ship owners and managers through an increase in the 
efficiency in management and operation, without compromising or rather even enhancing 
safety and environment protection, and improving the working environment. Furthermore, 
as Graham (2004) notes that to apply any improvement procedure, it is first necessary to 
gather facts of the current system and challenge them with improvement indices in a 
holistic environment, hence a  cautionary approach needs to be adopted taking due 
cognisance of the various constraints and challenges in making the system robust, reliable, 
secure and acceptable. 
It is with these research questions that the thesis turns to the next chapter to discuss the 
methods of data collection and analysis. To be able to address these research questions 
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effectively it is important that this research took an appropriate methodological approach 
which is described in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Research methodology 
Introduction 
The aim of the research was to study and present the challenges and potential of technology 
integration in ship operations and ship management and to enable to answer the research 
question: What are the challenges and potential of technological advancements for its 
application/integration in modern ship management practices? 
On the basis of the discussions so far and the main and subsidiary research questions 
arrived at, a conceptual model that would be able to effectively answer these questions was 
formulated. This chapter enunciates the model and describes the research methods that 
were followed at different stages of the empirical work, while justifying the choice of 
research methods and the data analysis techniques.   
Research being an organised endeavour, it requires proper planning of issues to be studied. 
To start with, a broad framework of approach needs to be planned to systematise the 
research work that will eliminate aimless intellectual wandering and give direction. The 
determination of the exact information needs through this specific focus prevents blind 
research and indiscriminate data gathering, thus saving the researcher from becoming lost 
in a welter of irrelevancies.  
A qualitative, exploratory research approach with case study as strategy was considered 
appropriate to address the broad scope as will be adequately described in this chapter. 
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5.1 Strategy - Case Study 
A case study is an appropriate research strategy of empirical enquiry to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life and natural context as demanded by the 
enquiry at hand. The focus is on in-depth understanding without involving explicit control 
or manipulation of variables. Case studies typically combine data collection techniques 
such as interviews, observation, questionnaires, and document analysis (Yin, 2009). These 
techniques are particularly suitable as the focus was on examining how the shore based 
managers and ship board staff at the two vital ends of the technical management process 
perceive and cope with the changing nature of work and skills as a result of the technology 
integration into the management and operation practices. A qualitative enquiry with such 
methods of research relies upon opinions, perceptions, interpretations and experience of the 
participants which was planned to be sought. 
Benbasat et al. (1987) suggest that case study research is considered to be particularly 
useful where research and theory are at their early and formative stages. The literature 
review had revealed that this indeed was the case in the shipping industry. Furthermore as 
Gummeson (2000) comments, case study research is becoming increasingly accepted as a 
scientific tool in management research, particularly in areas where one wants an in-depth 
understanding of mechanisms of change, and one need not study a large number of cases. 
Hence, efforts were directed to first understand in-depth the current practices of ship 
management and the change experience of the technological advancements in its 
application/integration, followed by investigation of its optimisation potential. 
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Case study research is also a flexible approach and the flexibility provides for an inductive 
or deductive approach to theory or even an integrated one; one can focus on one case or 
many, can describe, explain or evaluate; and the methods used are pragmatically driven. Its 
use is well established in social sciences (Yin, 2009), and is most commonly applied in 
areas where the phenomenon of interest is complex and highly contextualised, with 
multiple variables unsuitable for control (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009).  
Macpherson, Brooker and Ainsworth (1999) add that case study research is capable of 
creating in-depth descriptions and rich understanding of social context that have relevance 
and resonance across sites, shore-based and ship board in this context. It also leads research 
participants to take a proactive role in shaping policies and to determine norms and values 
that direct their social practices. As envisaged this helped in finding enthusiastic 
engagement with the participants. 
Schwandt (1997) summarises the conditions for case study research: “... a case study 
strategy is preferred when the inquirer seeks answers to how and why questions, when the 
inquirer has little control over events being studied, when the object of study is a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, when boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clear, and when it is desirable to use multiple sources 
of evidence” (p.13). 
A disadvantage often cited is the difficulty of generalising from the single case. Simons 
(1996) revisits this problem in case study research and explores the paradox that is at the 
very heart of case study. She argues that by focusing in depth and from a holistic 
perspective, a case study can generate both unique and universal understandings. Flyvbjerg 
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(2006) examines and corrects some common misunderstandings about case study research 
and concludes that; (a) concrete (context-dependent) knowledge as is generated from a case 
study is more valuable than general theoretical (context-independent) knowledge with 
predictive theories and universals that do not seem to fit in the study of human affairs; (b) 
one can often generalise on the basis of a single case study and may be central to scientific 
development. Regrettably, formal generalisation is overvalued as a source of scientific 
development whereas “the force of example” is underestimated; (c) a case study contains 
no greater bias towards verification of researcher’s preconceived notions than other 
methods of inquiry. On the contrary, he says, “experience indicates that the case study 
contains a greater bias towards falsification of preconceived notions than towards 
verification” (p.237). 
Surveys as opposed to case study are carried out generally on the conditions of the 
researcher. Informants have no choice but to react to the wording of the questions as they 
are put to them, however inadequate some of the terms may appear to them. 
Likewise, subjects embarked on a classical experiment have to act within the confines set 
up by the researcher. 
Drake, Shanks and Broadbent (1998) report that case study research is the most widely 
used qualitative research method in information systems research, and is well suited to 
understanding the interactions between information technology-related innovations and 
organisational contexts; which is predominantly the context in which this research 
undertakes to answer the research questions.  
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Stuart et al. (2002), further make a strong case for a number of case studies being of no 
relevance as any number would still be small. One single case study may be appropriate 
when it represents a critical case where it is extreme or a unique case: If this is (not) valid 
for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases. But it is very difficult to identify a critical 
case.  Maaloe (2010) advocates a strategy of having more than one case study fearing that 
the longer one stays within an organisation the likelier one may (unknowingly) be to accept 
what they take for granted. Thus, at least one more supplementary site is needed, yet may 
not be studied in the same detail as the first. Hence for this project four case studies were 
selected, three of which were company settings undertaking technical management of ships 
in a mutually varied structure of constitution and the fourth case a set of interviews with on-
board staff with sailing experience on ships of all the above three structured companies. 
Multiple case designs allow cross-case analysis and comparison, and the investigation of a 
particular phenomenon in diverse settings. Multiple cases may be selected to predict similar 
results or to produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (Yin, 2009). Multiple-case 
studies can strengthen research findings, however statistical generalisation to a population 
is not the goal of case study research as cases are not sampling units and rather a theoretical 
or analytical generalisation is appropriate (Benbasat et al. 1987). 
With the context necessitating a strategy for an in situ in-depth methodology, which was 
well afforded by a case study strategy, this became the basis for careful design of the 
research project and defining its scope so that an appropriate unit of analysis and number of 
cases can be determined. The unit of analysis identifies what constitutes a case, and a 
complete collection of data for one study of the unit of analysis forms a single case. The 
unit of analysis may be an individual, a group, or an organisation (Yin, 2009). For a 
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thorough understanding of phenomena with respect to their presence or variance across 
groups or cases, a rich mix of four case studies was chosen, with specific focus on strategic 
selection of cases. 
5.2 Selection rationale of case studies 
Of the four case studies selected, the first (Case A) is an in situ examination and interaction 
with the management of a large third party management company that has in its basket the 
management of ships belonging to various ownership companies.  
Third party ship management companies are defined as professional, independent 
organisations which, for a negotiated fee and with no shareholding ties with their clients, 
undertake responsibility for the management of vessels in which they have no financial 
stake. This sector has now been in existence for over 50 years and has evolved into an 
industry in its own right with a critical contribution to a fundamental restructuring of the 
shipping business by facilitating and promoting the division of labour between countries 
(Mitroussi, 2004a). The third party manager specialises in the operations involved in day-
to-day running of the ship, which are tightly connected with cost control and thus with 
profit maximisation. The specific trends that had a positive effect on the growth of third 
party ship management as reviewed by Mitroussi (2004b) are: (a) the globalisation of 
shipping, rendering taking advantage of all the opportunities offered by the development of 
new, more efficient factor markets, especially the sources of manpower, (b) use of 
information technology with heavy investments in specialised equipment and skilled 
labour, (c) the quest for economies of scale, particularly in crewing and technical support, 
thus cost saving to owners that cannot enjoy such advantages on their own, (d) increased 
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legislation and difficulty to cope with the burden of stringent regulations, (e) shortage of 
manpower for timely supply of qualified crew, (f) increased liability in case of disastrous 
marine accidents and pollution, (g) provision of wide range of main and value-added 
services by the ship management companies.    
The second case study (Case B) is a similar examination and interaction but with the 
management of a single ownership company that manages and operates its own ships and 
does not use the services of and divest managerial control to third party ship managers.  
Such ship owners hold the view that cost savings and cost control in general are made 
possible only by retaining close relationship with the ship and its technical support. They 
would then hold abundant technical expertise. The commercial management of ships that 
directly connect to the basic income of the company like chartering are in general always 
retained with the owner. Mitroussi (2004b) in her empirical research lists the reasons for 
ship owners not using third party ship management as (a) availability of in-house expertise; 
(b) desire to retain overall control and personal contact with all markets and shipping 
organisations. Particularly noteworthy in the finding is the result shown that the lack of 
confidence in ship management scored low. This further establishes the justification for 
selecting a case A type of company as well in the study.   
    The third case study (Case C) has a profile completely different from that of cases A or B. 
Case C is a state owned company, and while fulfilling obligations for the various 
government departments, the company was noted to have maintained a strong presence in 
the international shipping business with a fleet profile of modern, young and diversified 
vessel types to serve different and specialised trades. The company was a profitable 
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commercial venture of the state. Since the company has had a track record of profitability 
since its inception about five decades ago, it enjoyed enhanced autonomy and delegation of 
powers towards capital expenditure.   
    Thus, while case A was that of a company undertaking the management of third party 
vessels, and case B was that of a company managing its own vessels; case C was a 
company that was partly managing its own fleet, partly that of the fleet of other government 
departments and was also giving out some of its own vessels to third party managers which 
enabled them to carry out peer review and benchmarking of its own services.  
   The fourth case study (Case D) comprises interviews with purposefully selected senior 
sailing staff who have had long sailing experience that included sailing on-board fairly 
modern ships that were equipped with modern technology to enable give a meaningful 
insight and inputs to the subject of research in context. While this would generally be the 
type of ships operated by the above types of business enterprises in case A, B or C, it was, 
for reasons explained later in the chapter, ensured that the sailing staff were not in the 
current employment of these companies. The on-board staffs who are at the core of 
operations in a shipping company would give vital input from their perspectives which may 
not be available from the staff ashore in the previous three cases. 
To enable counter variations and obtain information about the significance of various 
circumstances for process activity and its outcome, the different dimensions of the case 
study chosen were on the nature of business operation as below: 
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(a) Privately held third part ship management versus privately owned ownership company 
managing own business versus state owned company exercising both own as well as third 
party management. The structure and purpose of the three business models as elaborately 
described earlier in the chapter may influence the practices. 
(b) Interviews with people working on-board versus people working ashore in offices, however 
keeping to the market segments that appreciates the use of technology and its enabling 
innovation and also has the wherewithal to provide for it, yet are fraught with their own 
challenges of operating with new technology. Here again, the account of a shore based 
employer and the seafaring employee could give a biased perspective respectively on the 
common issues of process management that interfaces both the entities as has been 
highlighted in chapter four when discussing the challenges with automation and 
technology.  
A comparative statement on the three case companies and their structure is noted below in 
table 3:- 
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 Case A Case B Case C 
Ownership Private Private Public 
Type of 
operation 
Management of 
Ships owned by 
third parties 
Management of 
Ships owned by own 
company 
Management of 
own as well as 
of third party 
ships. 
Number of 
ships 
handled out 
of visited  
location 
 
 
Close to 100 
 
About half that of 
Case A 
 
About three 
quarters of that 
of Case A 
Types of 
ships 
handled 
Tankers and 
General/Dry Bulk 
Carriers 
 
 
Tankers 
Tankers, Bulk 
carriers, Liners, 
Passenger , 
Offshore supply 
vessels 
Total office 
Staff  
 
Close to 200 
About half that of 
Case A 
About three 
times of Case A 
 
Table 3:  Comparative details of Case Companies A, B and C 
The fourth (Case D) was mainly semi-structured interviews with ship’s officers 
purposefully selected with rich and varied experiences on-board ships and were on leave 
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ashore. Given the clear division between the nautical and engineering departments on the 
ship and the fact that perspectives could be different in these divisions, interviews were 
conducted specifically with two sets of persons at the senior-most rank of Chief Engineers 
and Masters. Being at senior management levels on ship who direct and control the 
shipboard functions at its highest level and are the sole contacts for the shore based 
management team, they would have had a good overall management perspective balancing 
the shipboard operations with its various constraints and the shore-based directions, control 
and expectations; delivering on the ship performance that is at the core of the business 
enterprise function. They thus become the key informants who can also provide the how 
and why of what happens, selected for their first-hand knowledge about the topic of interest 
which is so essential for good qualitative interviews (USAID, 1996).  
In choosing purposefully their profiles it was ensured that: 
(a) They were not in the current employment of any of the case companies because the 
employer-employee relationships in the first place and the differences fuelled by ship-shore 
divide as discussed in chapter four, would possibly render the responses restrained and 
biased. 
(b)  They should either be in the employment of on-board ships or, have only recently given up 
on on-board duties and taken up shore based professions so that their sailing experiences 
were current and contemporary. 
(c)  One set of Master and Chief Engineer would be relatively young bringing in the 
perspective of the younger generation, and the other set would be relatively senior in age 
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and have a long experience in sailing, who would have seen and experienced technology 
transformations on-board ships. 
Furthermore, it was recognised and well considered that the age profile of the ships and the 
crew culture would have considerable impact on the findings. It was noted that all the four 
cases had in their experience a mix of ships with varying age profiles as well as exposure to 
various crew nationalities. It was ensured that the impact of both these aspects would be 
specifically queried during the course of interviews and data collection.  
Such a strategy on the choice of the above four case studies would give enough breadth 
without compromising the depth of the study, and best help answer the research questions.  
5.3 Profile of the four case studies 
This section profiles the four case studies. It maps the ship management structure and 
profile of the three case companies A, B and C with particular reference to the technical 
management department that has the greatest bearing on the research undertaken and is the 
defined scope of the project. It also describes the profile of the ship’s staffs in case D.  
5.3.1 Case Company A 
Company A was a privately held third party management company that belongs to a West 
European group which is in its fifth generation into shipping business. It offered highly 
integrated maritime services and had in its portfolio the management of a diversified and 
large fleet size that afforded versatility.  Its infrastructure of offices is spread over many 
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countries around the globe that maintain operational and safety integrity over a managed 
fleet of more than 700 ships. It has over 17,000 employees on-board and ashore. 
Its branch office, in the location visited provides the full spectrum of ship management 
services and solutions, including: crew recruitment, fleet management, loss prevention, 
new-building supervision, and safety and quality. This office employed about 200 staff and 
manages close to a 100 vessels. The office is headed by a CEO who had two General 
Managers one for the General/Dry Bulk Carrier fleet and other for the Tanker fleet 
reporting to him (Figure 9). The General Managers in turn had the Technical 
Superintendents, Marine Superintendents, Quality & Training Manager, Accounts 
Manager, and Crewing Manager reporting to them.  
The Marine Superintendents were required to closely monitor the commercial performance 
of vessels and manage the commercial risks faced by their Principals during the course of 
employment of their vessels. 
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Figure 9: Organisation structure –Company A. 
 
It was the Technical Management department directly under the supervision of Technical 
Superintendents that had the responsibility to ensure that all managed vessels operate in 
accordance with their principals’ (the ship owners’) requirements and also meeting 
optimally the design parameters. The department had to ensure that ships must at all times 
be complying with the requirements of the flag state where the ship was registered. They 
must also be complying with the requirements of the Classification Society that certifies its 
sea-worthiness; and additionally meet the requirements of its charterers’ who paid the ship 
owners’ for the optimum use of the vessel (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Compliance obligation of technical managers to stakeholder requirements. 
Each set of Technical Superintendents were allocated a group of four to five vessels and 
were responsible for monitoring the vessels' condition and all aspects of their performance 
and operation, including: 
- safe and efficient cargo handling and cargo conditioning. 
- planned and project maintenance. 
- regular condition assessment. 
- dry-dock planning and supervision. 
- budget control. 
- certification and vetting by prospective charterers. 
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The department had to maintain relationships with suppliers, workshops and marine service 
providers to ensure that it is able to provide consistently reliable and high-quality service at 
the lowest possible price to its principals as part of its responsibilities. 
5.3.2 Case Company B 
Company B was the branch office of a privately held ship owning company based in 
Western Europe. This branch office carried out the crewing and technical management 
functions of about 50 ships owned and operated by the owners. The location afforded the 
advantage of equally competent skills albeit at much lower costs. The organisation structure 
was much the same as in case company A with a CEO heading the branch. The technical 
management department had two Fleet Managers dividing about 25 ships among them and 
each having set of Technical Superintendents handling about five to six ships. The 
Technical Superintendents had similar responsibilities as those of Company A. Although 
Company B was managing its own ships, its ship management division had to regard the 
head office as its principal who benchmarked the activities of this crewing and management 
division with that of any other established and reputed third party management 
organisation. 
5.3.3 Case Company C 
Company C is a State owned publically held limited company owning as well as managing 
a diversified fleet of ships including tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo ships, passenger-
cum-cargo ships and off-shore supply vessels. While it managed the vessels of other 
government departments that depended on Company C for providing technical expertise, as 
a strategy to remain competitive, Company C also gave out few of its vessels to third party 
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ship managers to benchmark its own efficiencies. The Bulk carrier and Tanker division of 
this company was chosen for this research project to maintain the similar profile of vessel 
operation as that of Company A and B - yet provide the necessary variance of ownership 
structure to study if this variance mattered in the management and operation of ships 
operating in the similar global scenario.  
While the technical management function in this division was found to have similar 
organisation structure as that of Company A and B, being a head office location its overall 
structure was in slight variance as below (Figure 11): 
 
Figure 11: Organisation structure at Company C. 
The difference with the previous cases were (a) the chartering function that in previous 
cases were handled by the head office at a different location, in this case, the head office 
location, the Director who was akin to the CEOs of previous cases also had to oversee the 
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front end chartering function, (b) his relationship with crewing, finance and quality function 
here were lateral rather than hierarchical.   
5.3.4 Case D - Ships' staff 
In accordance with the rationale explained about the methodology and profile desired of the 
ships staff in section 5.2, interviews were conducted with the following two Chief 
Engineers and two Masters:  
Chief Engineer 1(CE1): A relatively young gentleman, who had served right through on all 
types of ships including bulk carriers and tankers owned by a major West European owner 
and only recently shifted to another major container ship owner of North America region, 
who charter their ships out to big liner service companies. He keenly pursues academic 
interests and has registered for part time doctoral research that keeps his analytical mind 
alert and open to developments giving him a wider and deeper perspective of the industry 
functioning. 
Chief Engineer 2 (CE2): A faculty member at a maritime university who is very senior on 
age and with long experience at sea. He has just given up sailing and for last few years of 
his sailing career he had been sailing on the very modern tanker and container fleet of 
South Asia based owners. He too pursues his doctoral research in offshore wind energy and 
is easily regarded as most knowledgeable and learned faculty among his peers. 
Captain 1(M1): A young Master, who is sailing on the modern tanker fleet of an Oil Major 
company from Western Europe. He has had the recent opportunity to actually experience 
some modern ICT technology as well as automated machinery operations. The company is 
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well known for its high levels of safety consciousness and modern processes in tanker 
operations and an exposure to such systems makes him well suited for giving the needed 
perspective.   
Captain 2 (M2): A senior Master who until very recently, has been sailing with tanker 
owner companies in the South Asia region. More importantly, he holds a senior position at 
a renowned international professional association and interacts at global policy making 
level on technology applications. Such a combination of active sailing and representing the 
user (seafarer) interests into technology integration conceptualisation at global policy level 
who is privy to such proceedings is very rare to come by easily. 
5.4 Data collection - an overview 
Figure 12 below depicts the Explorative Integrative form of case study approach that was 
adopted in this project. 
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Figure 12: Explorative Integration as process. Source: Maaloe, (2010). 
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Explorative integration embraces both theory-driven research and an explanatory bottom up 
approach. It is an inherently cyclic design of several phases, explanatory, explorative, 
interpretative and understanding. As analytical endeavour it aims at generating facts in the 
field in order to create an integrative view of the case (Maaloe, 2010). 
The practice of theory test that embraces top-down approach and typically works within the 
explanatory mode, often has too much invested in the belief, thus contra evidence is either 
brushed away as irrelevant or simply explained away. It excludes identification of 
relevance of events of dimension outside the theories initially embarked upon. Also, 
because of the uncertainties and impossibility to control the environment, theory testing 
remains a researcher-controlled affair and it is up to the case designer to determine what 
and how to measure, sticking to initially chosen theories. However, some features of this 
approach are incorporated in explorative integration as cases are excellent media to test 
mini-level theories, example validity of rival theories, and evaluating minute 
generalisations (Yin, 2009). Chapter 3 had provided the theory base for test in this research 
project highlighting the skilling dilemma and the trinity view of technology-organisation-
process integration. Falsification that forms part of critical reflexivity is one of the most 
rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected to (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Grounded theory on the other hand emphasises internal validity with greater rigour. Being a 
bottom-up approach which may result in explanatory format, it is yet nested within the 
interpretive mode making sense of observances and interviews as text. The researcher thus 
can be more faithful to his data, rather than forcing it to fit a theory. Research becomes an 
explorative venture of discovery rather than one of verification (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
137 
 
However, grounded theory may not move much beyond the entity under study, as the 
investigation is grounded in the local, and so may be the theories derived from it. There is 
also the assumption of non-bias, and that the data from which the hypotheses emerge are 
indisputable. Corbin & Strauss (2007) amply demonstrate that intentionally or 
unintentionally we cannot help attributing meaning to what we see. 
Explorative integration encourages the order to be able to question one’s abilities as an 
observer and be able to play with different interpretations in situ. It facilitates a way both to 
explore reality and to test one’s own initial assumption about it. It advises to approach the 
field with full awareness of preconceived ideas from theories or experience while 
consciously recognising how others may still be hidden from us. Thus the study is 
explicitly set up as a continued cyclic of tentative integrated drafts, nurtured by exploration 
of the field and the awareness of the people involved. Integration helps to identify biases, as 
well as benefit from them; and also identifies gaps due to lack of coherence between 
statements and thus issues which still need to be explored. Thus the main feature of the 
explorative-integrative choice of approach is an effort to sensitise us to question the limits 
of our own theoretical foundation and personal bias. 
After several interchanges of phases of draft and continued fieldwork, a sense of wholeness 
to the research outcome occurs leading to the final report (Figure 13). Thus the explorative-
integrative method is the cyclic integration of three approaches: deduction and theory 
testing, induction and theory building and the hermeneutics
17
 of creating a sense of 
wholeness (Maaloe, 2010). 
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Figure 13: Researcher and his experiences and theories. Source: Maaloe,(2010). 
5.4.1 Pre-visit preparations 
Effective and efficient data collection for case study research requires careful planning and 
judicious use of both the case participants' and the researcher's time (Drake, Shanks and 
Broadbent, 1998). Preparations before on-site visits included understanding as much about 
the case companies as possible beforehand and developing a list of themes to be explored 
with prioritisation along a scale from ‘need to know’ to ‘nice to know more about’.  
Access is a main issue for the researcher (Gumesson, 2000). It was borne in mind that 
research questions indeed need to be interesting and important to the potential participants 
to gain their support. If the research is particularly relevant to an organisation and the 
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specific research question is one which the organisation needs or wishes to address, then it 
becomes more likely that they would provide access to their people and resources. It also 
takes a long time to create a reasonably open working relationship with staff to gain 
sufficient insight into a company’s situation. With these preparatory cautions contact was 
established with the CEOs of companies in cases A and B, and with the Director (Bulk 
Carriers & Tankers) of case C (access letter format annexed as Appendix 6). A specific 
initial visit was made to the three case companies for this purpose. Appendix 5 details the 
timetable of all site visits. At the initial visit the CEOs called in the heads of technical 
departments for this meeting. The prime purpose of the study was explained to them as 
being purely academic in nature and that confidentiality and strict adherence to the basic 
ethics of research would be always maintained. It was also put to them that the process 
would give an opportunity for the staff to have a relook at the management practices which 
in itself would be value-adding to the organisation. Organisations need to be clear about the 
research outcomes and how their organisations would benefit from involvement. Reassured, 
they then readily agreed to render full cooperation. Thus gaining of their trust and 
acceptance by them paved the way for smooth data collection. 
5.5 Interviews 
Interviews are essential sources of information for case study research and are arguably the 
primary data source, as it is through interviews that researchers can best access case 
participants’ views. Kvale (1996) describes the qualitative research interview as a 
conversation with a structure and purpose. Meeting people leads to conversations giving 
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insights and new understandings and it is possible that both researcher and informant may 
change when reflecting over what has previously been seen as obvious.  
5.5.1 Semi – structured interviews 
Individual semi-structured interviews were held with select staff in the three case 
companies as well as the ships’ staff of case D. For the major part single face-to-face 
interviews were conducted that are characterised by synchronous communication, the 
answers are spontaneous and without an extended reflection. E-mails were followed up for 
any additional data missed out or specifically for situations needing to allow them more 
time to respond to the developing dialogue (Opdenakker, 2006). Considerable preparations 
had preceded these sessions including identification of the respondent population who were 
recognised as process experts and had a range of process management responsibilities. This 
was done at the initial on-site visit to the companies at the meetings with the CEO and 
General Manager - technical management. The timetable of the various interviews and site 
visits performed is annexed as Appendix 5 to the thesis. At the three case companies A, B 
and C typically participants from the technical department as well as the operations 
functions were requested. For instance, in company A, participants included the General 
Manager in-charge of Tankers, one Technical Superintendent, one Marine Superintendent, 
the Quality and Training Manager and the Technical Assistant. At company B, being 
smaller the CEO himself participated along with one Fleet Manager and his Technical 
Assistant. At company C, the Director responsible for Bulk Carrier and Tankers operation, 
Senior Vice President –Technical and Senior Vice President – Commercial were the 
participants. The interviews were followed up with the scrutiny of documents and records. 
Flow charts as graphic elicitation technique further assisted in understanding of the 
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processes. These are annexed as Appendix 1 to Appendix 4 which also served to get the 
respondents’ confirmation on correct understanding. Copeland (2012) suggests graphic 
elicitation techniques are particularly useful in helping participants to express complex or 
abstract ideas and can greatly supplement interview data. It provides visual data 
representing personal understanding of concepts, experiences and beliefs and can be highly 
useful in qualitative research studies. Case D selected ship staff were also engaged in semi-
structured interviews and followed up on e-mails.  
With specific reference to semi-structured interviews the main advantages include effective 
time management and the fact that they are “structured” enough to provide a reasonably 
defined scope of exploration but “open” enough to allow a reasonable depth and breadth of 
exploration of the set topic (Denzin and Lincoln, 2007).  
In a semi-structured interview, a thematic guide (see Appendix 7) was used as framework, 
allowing for flexibility to probe for details or further discuss issues (Williamson, 2002). 
Since the questions follow the flow of the informant rather than being asked in the order of 
the guide, it calls for being flexible and sensitive to the informant. By using semi-structured 
interviews, it is feasible to compare the answers from several interviews and, to a certain 
extent, make some generalisations.  
After careful assessment of the other qualitative interview approaches, including in-depth 
and structured, the semi-structured interview offered the best option considering the need to 
balance reasonable structure and substantial flexibility. 
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The fieldwork was guided by the explorative method. The protocol served as a guide and 
not to confirm notions. After each interview the interviewees were asked if they were 
surprised that something was not asked or if they had something of greater importance for 
the researcher to be aware of. Analysis of interviews and observations, ranging from brief 
and ad hoc to exhaustive depending on the scenario, as a preparation for the next activity 
was always adopted, whether it was the next set of interviews or analysis of documents or 
sightings of records; thus each analysis serving as cross reference and even confirmation of 
work-in-progress with the company. The strategy adopted was to listen and let one be 
guided by the field as well as the interviewer’s own reflections, thus making a tight-knitted 
web of cross interrelated well-substantiated facts and not merely stumbling around and 
waiting for something to turn up or be just satisfied to get the interviewee to talk.  
Cautions in the process of interviewing were exercised, for example reading of the body 
language, noticing indications of tensions between what is said and what is expressed but 
not openly said, handling second hand information, etc. Furthermore, interviews were kept 
objective and not emotional. 
Interviews were carried out in the small conference rooms and were digitally recorded with 
the permission of the participants. Also copious contemporaneous notes were taken of 
salient points noted during the interviews. There were only two instances when the 
interviews with the Technical Assistant in company A wished that it not be recorded, in 
which case notes were expanded immediately after the interview. Each interview lasted 
between forty five and ninety minutes. Posing open questions helped in the respondents 
being articulate and expansive in responses and shared their experiences, opinions and 
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views comfortably. It probably gave them an opportunity to reflect on their work process 
objectively which rarely comes by in the din of their daily routines, thus providing a 
therapeutic effect. The participants reflected that the whole exercise was found to be very 
value-adding to them. The subject was also contemporary and pertinent with issues that 
they themselves had been grappling with.  
In the three case companies a total of three rounds of interviews each were conducted over 
a period of 12 months. The beginning was made with group interview as explained in the 
next section and this was followed with individual interviews with the same participants. 
The site visits to the three companies were made with a gap of approximately three months.  
This gave the opportunity to first understand the macro-level processes and slowly get 
down to micros of the processes and the interlaced issues with intervening time to reflect, 
assess, analyse, and validate the understandings on the next rounds of interviews and 
document scrutiny. Similar methodology was followed in an earlier case by Lyridis et al. 
(2005) as reported in the summary section of chapter 3. It also afforded the understanding 
of practices as they varied and matched amongst the three companies with different 
profiles.  
With the carefully selected four ships staff in case D, only one round of interview was 
possible given their availability on leave; however the follow up was maintained on e-mail 
correspondence which proved effective as it gave them enough time to reflect on the 
enquiry and come up with responses. 
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5.5.2 Group interviews 
As a support to the individual interviews in the company settings, ‘group’ meetings were 
used to commence the proceedings. This is because an understanding had to be obtained of 
various practices and processes that happen in an organisation, and in the delivery of 
process there is common interest and interactions that take place among individuals. Many 
researchers use group interviews as a means to generate information at the outset of the 
inquiry or to complement and support other data collection methods (Crabtree and Miller, 
1999). This technique encouraged greater honesty, spontaneity, involvement and 
thoroughness of responses. It provided a situation for interaction among the participants 
who stimulate each other, discuss insights and experiences, comment or elaborate on the 
views expressed by previous speakers. It is also known that a group lowers respondents’ 
anxiety and provides a more comfortable setting (Kerr et al. 2000). Thus, while 
understanding of processes that involve many individuals cutting across departments 
greatly helped me in preparing further for personal interviews, it also helped the 
participants break ice with me and were more relaxed, cooperative and forthcoming in the 
individual interviews that followed. A comfortable environment was made available in a 
mid-sized conference room with as much of round table seating as possible. The basic 
objectives of the meeting were first explained. 
The researcher assumed the role of the moderator exercising mild unobtrusive control. 
Checklists (Appendix 7), served as an aide memoire in framing suitable questions and 
keeping to the topic (Krueger and Casey, 2000). To support the interview and to triangulate 
the responses, the meeting was followed up with sighting of all records and documents 
which was assisted by the junior support staff. A one to one interview with the junior 
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support staff, with the prior permission of the seniors, was also conducted to gain more 
insight into the workings of the department not in the presence of his superiors. This is to 
overcome the perceived drawback of group interviews in which respondents may respond 
to please other members particularly seniors of the group. The documents and textual 
procedures manual as well as the records listed were sighted along with the actions taken 
by the company on reporting from the ships. A rough flow chart of processes was drawn 
out with inputs, outputs and interactions as a way of summarising and interpreting the 
content of group discussions. The group was thanked for their participation, and their 
cooperation sought for further interactions individually. 
5.6 Data interpretation, analysis and synthesis 
As expected, gradually as the project progressed and became increasingly focused on 
certain issues, the first outline of emerging outcomes began to take shape as one also begins 
to know of what is still missing. 
Stake (1995) points out that there is no particular moment when data analysis begins and 
that analysis is a matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as final completion. 
Case study relies on both direct interpretation of individual instances or categorical 
aggregation of instances until something can be said about them as a theme. Analysis of 
qualitative data is not purely an activity that happens on a conscious level after the data 
collection phase, but occurs also on an unconscious level throughout the research 
(Williamson, 2002). The conscious level of analysis and interpreting data is a process to 
bring structure, order and meaning to the data. Although techniques for analysing 
qualitative data vary with methods, theoretical positions or topic areas, three elements are 
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central: (a) a detailed description of the data, (b) the systematisation, reduction and 
categorisation of the data, and (c) the linking and connecting of the data to look for 
meanings and causes. 
Furthermore, Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data analysis as consisting of three 
concurrent activities. (a) Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the raw case data. (b) Data display refers to the organised 
assembly of information to enable the drawing of conclusions. (c) Conclusion drawing/ 
verification involves drawing meaning from data and building a logical chain of evidence.    
Every analysis requires a subsequent and complementing synthesis in order to verify and 
correct its results. Synthesis is generally defined as the opposite process to analysis and 
signifies a combination of the separate elements or components in order to form a coherent 
whole (Ritchey, 1991).   
A general data analysis strategy as part of case design was formulated to indicate what to 
analyse and why, and to ensure data collection activities were appropriate and that would 
support the ways in which the evidence was to be analysed. 
All interviews were transcribed for the purpose of analysis. Though time-consuming in 
spite of digital files allowing for data to be retrieved and examined in a more flexible 
manner (Tessier, 2012), it was comprehensive. Dissected and selected units from the 
interview transcript were assigned to the respective categories of themes and concepts. 
Although the initial orientation of empirical investigation was influenced by the theoretical 
framework based on literature review, the emerging themes of empirical findings were not 
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overlooked. Newer literature and theories offering fresh perspective were reviewed and 
tested against the findings at various stages. For example the domineering and defining 
influence of regulation and non-tariff trade barriers on the industry practices was one such 
area not estimated earlier.  Cross-thematic examination and analysis in order to establish 
links and patterns of meaning was conducted (Corbin and Strauss, 2007). Similarities, 
meanings, inconsistencies and variances were also examined, for example in the group 
meetings at the companies, what the document and records analysis showed up and what 
the technical assistant stated in his single interview. Typically, the Technical Manager in 
the group says that preference is given to quality over price in purchasing products; 
however, the random selection of a record on receiving inspection of an electrical relay by 
the ship noted “Sparks flew off when the relay was tried out in the machinery”. On 
examining the tendering process for supply of the relay it was noted that out of the three 
quotes received, order was placed for the cheapest product, and the technical assistant 
confessing that unless known, it was really the price that mattered as long as the ship 
specified specifications were met.  
It was thus also possible to analyse and compare what the companies said about certain 
themes and how the shipboard staff statements corroborated or contradicted the opinions. 
For example, on the subject of ship-shore interface while the companies asserted their 
endeavours on a “not them and us attitude”, the shipboard staff experiences were found to 
be not encouraging. Similarly when it came to the issue of reduction of crew due to 
proliferation of technology, the companies seemed to be guided by the economic constraint 
whereas the ship staff evaluated and decried it on compromising of safety.   
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Links between categories were identified, cross-referenced, and verified against the data 
before integrating the categories. For example, the companies when highlighting issues of 
technology integration touched upon themes of reduced crewing costs, ease of 
communication rendering detailed monitoring, and skill erosion. Such response could be 
grouped into at least three different categories such as economic pressures, domineering 
role of shore managers exacerbating the ship-shore divide and skilling issues.   The use of 
special purpose software tools that are available with facilities for storage, indexing and 
analysis of qualitative data was considered but as Tessier (2012) comments these are still 
difficult to use, time consuming and not user-friendly. In view of familiarity with the 
standard Microsoft Excel program to manage data, the same was used. Also, the data 
analysis methodology was not the extensive coding and theoretical development but was 
interpretive data analysis for which data reduction and data display was crucial (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). All the information from different sources of field notes, transcripts and 
recordings could be juxtaposed, corroborated and cross-examined easily. However, as 
Seidman (2006) notes, it is the craftsman skills of the researcher which counts more than 
any software when working with qualitative information as the latter is only a tool and an 
aide to the effort.     
Tentative descriptions of findings were checked again at various stages to ascertain whether 
they represented the correct picture, and further adjustments made to the findings. For 
example, the macro-level processes that are annexed to this thesis as appendices 1 to 4 were 
modelled off-site in between on-site visits with the help of transcribed interviews and field 
notes. These were verified with the respondents on the next on-site visit. Appendix 5 shows 
the timetable of when the various interviews were conducted. It is important to produce the 
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researcher’s propositional generalisation (assertions) to the respondents who know the case 
better and modify the generalisation. Thus data collection and data analysis overlapped 
allowing flexibility in data collection procedures and remaining open to new ideas or 
patterns which emerge (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Multiple sources of evidence (triangulation of data) from the single and group interviews 
for the four case studies and document analysis strengthened the convergence of 
information providing multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin, 2009) and 
corroborating the information from different sources where there are conflicting accounts 
of events and actions. It also helped in counteracting the bias if any that may have been 
introduced by the researcher himself in the collection and analysis of data (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  Confirmability is an important criterion to establish trustworthiness in 
research which is the degree of neutrality or the extent to which findings of study are 
shaped by the respondents and not researcher bias, motivation or interest (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985).Throughout the research process the researcher has been aware of this and 
employed self-reflexivity and transparency as two valuable means towards sincerity in this 
qualitative research to achieve confirmability (Tracy, 2010). 
The final picture thus slowly emerged with revisions and updated scenarios. This was 
facilitated by the 3 stage site visits and interviews with the cases, each following visit and 
interview commencing with confirmation of previous data and its correct understanding 
and analysis.  
The change from analysis to synthesis was an iterative process with the direction of the 
process moving towards a creation of entirety and the fulfilment of the research purpose. 
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5.7 Paradigm – the basis of research 
This research is based on the post-positivistic paradigm by Guba (1990). 
The paradigm, which is the basic set of beliefs that guides actions in connection with a 
disciplined inquiry, is characterised by the responses to ontological, epistemological and 
methodological questions. These are the starting points that determine what inquiry is and 
how it is practiced. Positivism is rooted in “realist” ontology, which then constrains to 
practice in “objectivist epistemology” and adopt “empirical experimentalistic” 
methodology. 
Post-positivism emerged as the modified version of conventional positivism that had its 
critic in inquiry bias and nature’s propensity to confound. However, prediction and control 
continue to be the aim. Ontologically post positivism moves from “naive” realist posture to 
“critical realism”, though realism remains the central concept. Epistemologically, post 
positivist counsels a modified objectivity, recognising that objectivity cannot be achieved in 
an absolute sense; and one strives to “come clean” on one’s own predispositions, so that the 
reader can make whatever adjustments to proffered interpretations by relying on “critical 
traditions”. Methodologically, emphasis is then placed on “critical multiplism”, thus relying 
on many different sources, which makes it less likely that distorted interpretations will be 
made at the same time redressing the imbalances that emerge from zeal for achieving 
realistic and objective inquiry by undertaking inquiry in more natural settings and using 
more qualitative methods while reintroducing discovery in the inquiry process (Guba, 
1990). 
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Thus in post-positivist research, truth is constructed through dialogue on issues raised 
during interviews, participants’ reactions and researcher’s own interpretations of these 
interwoven ideas (Ryan, 2006). 
Post positivism differentiates from interpretivism in the following way as we examine these 
perspectives on issues related to social scientific knowledge accumulation. In the 
conventional enquiry framework, theories are developed, tested, and refined through 
empirical research and the results take the form of generalised theoretical prepositions. 
While post positivism adjusts the conventional framework by embracing a social 
engineering view of role and purpose of science, interpretivism seeks not to adjust but 
replace this conventional framework. Interpretivist knowledge comprises the reconstruction 
of intersubjective meanings, the interpretive understanding of the meanings humans 
construct in a given context and how these meanings interrelate to form a whole. The 
interpretivist approach is based on an ontology in which reality is subjective. Thus any 
given interpretive reconstruct is idiographic, time-and-place bound; multiple reconstructs 
are pluralistic, divergent, and even conflictual. Hence, interpretivist knowledge resembles 
more a context-specific working hypothesis than generalisable prepositions warranting 
certainty or even probability (Greene, 1990). The evidence generated by interpretive 
research is much more likely to be of an evocative rather than a comprehensive kind, to be 
sustained, rejected or refined through future studies. The conclusions of one study merely 
provides a starting point in a continuing cycle of inquiry which may or may not over time 
serve to generate persuasive patterns of data from which further conclusions can be drawn 
(Morgan, 1983).  Post-positivism’s empirical quest for knowledge emphasises replicability 
across heterogeneous populations, settings, times, perspectives and deductive, critical 
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refutation. Scientific generalisations gain warrant only through such replication and 
criticism.    
Gumesson (2000) affirms that in qualitative research it is important to account for the 
researcher’s pre-understanding such as experience, knowledge and insights into particular 
problem areas and implies a certain attitude and commitment on the part of the researcher. 
This position is consistent with the character of social engineering in post positivism where 
the social scientist’s main job is to participate in the community where his participation is 
marked by his own values and theoretical predispositions thereby generating a critical but 
not a normative warrant for the community’s collective product of theory (Greene, 1990). 
Relevant experiences, beliefs and values that have shaped the author emanates from work 
experiences of more than fifteen years at sea in the nautical department including five years 
in command of ships. Subsequent shore job involvement in developing, implementing and 
auditing management systems related to quality, safety, environment, occupational health 
and social accountability for various shipping and non-shipping organisations for over ten 
years, enriched understandings of organisation management and its improvement. It also 
gave the opportunity for understanding how people construct and maintain perceptions of 
the world. Investigating one’s own epistemologies and understanding how they affect one 
as a researcher is an essential part of the post-positivist approach (Ryan, 2006). Caution has 
been however exercised, in maintaining the role of an academic researcher and not to drift 
into a management consultancy mode (Gumesson, 2000). 
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5.8 Ethical considerations 
Before commencing fieldwork at a case study site, it is essential to reach an agreement with 
the participating organisation concerning the confidentiality requirements relating to the 
case study data and findings, and any limitations on the disclosure of the identities of the 
case study participants and the organisation. Trust, integrity, confidentiality and discretion 
being essential to fieldwork, this was reiterated upon and assured. Data protection rules and 
research ethics policy of the university were adhered to. Ethical principles of informed 
consent, openness and honesty, right to withdraw and debriefing were meticulously 
followed. Every interview was preceded with clear definition of the objective, assurance on 
confidentiality and anonymity of the data. Before switching on the voice recorder the 
consent of the participants to the interview as well as to its being recorded was obtained. It 
was ensured that all the participants had a clear idea of what the research was about and 
how the data obtained will be handled and used. Before sighting the documents and records 
in the company settings, explicit prior permission was obtained from the person responsible 
for the process that generated the record. In case D which involved interviews with 
seafarers, the issue of anonymity and confidentiality becomes crucial because of their 
vulnerable position as employees and subordinate to the staff ashore. This was one of the 
main reasons besides solicitation of objective and unbiased views that the respondents 
chosen were not in the current employment of the case companies. They were also 
accorded the right to refuse participation if they wished to, at any time during the interview. 
The guidelines of the British Sociological Association (BSA) Ethical Procedures (BSA, 
2002) and that of the Social Research Association (SRA) Ethical Guidelines (SRA, 2003) 
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were relied upon for the discharge of responsibility concerning ethics towards the 
participants, sources, data, and the affiliating institution.     
In the case of the chosen case companies too, anonymity and confidentiality were of prime 
importance and caution had to be exercised in view of challenges of (a) headquarters of the 
companies in cases A and B that formulates policy decisions were being located remotely, 
and in that sense the employees at branch offices were subordinate to controlling head 
offices; (b) all companies being very sensitive to their corporate identity and image and the 
catching of public attention they can easily be vulnerable to.  
Furthermore, protection against distortion and misrepresentation of data and intent gathered 
was ensured by always summarising the understandings and outcomes with the interviewed 
personnel.  
The next chapter presents the findings of the fieldwork and also analyses and synthesises 
the findings based on information acquired from verbal and non-verbal dialogues and texts 
of written and spoken words as well as body language during interviews. The gained 
understanding from each research activity and empirical knowledge has been reflected 
upon using multiple levels of abstraction during the research process. Each individual study 
has contributed in the search for an understanding of the overall principle on how the parts 
interplay.  
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Chapter 6: The data: Challenges and potential of technology 
integration in modern ship management practices 
Introduction 
The research questions direct the project to explore the issues involved in the uptake of 
technology and its integration in the ship operation and management processes and 
practices - the challenges and shortfalls yet experienced, and, the potential that may exist 
towards further optimisation. As identified in earlier chapters, since technical management 
practices form the core of ship operations and ship management greatly influencing the 
vital ship-shore interface, the enquiry is scoped around this vital process. 
In this chapter, data is presented, first on the technical management processes and later on 
the experiences with technology uptake and its integration from the perspective of both the 
ship managers ashore and ship operators on-board. The summary to the chapter synthesises 
the data and draws some key findings. 
6.1 Technical management process 
It was imperative to first fully understand the processes and practices constituting the 
technical management of ships.  
The following were identified to be the core management processes and depicted 
sequentially in figure 14:  
- Budgeting for vessel operations 
156 
 
Budgeting for 
vessel 
operation 
Maintenance 
including 
supplies  
- Maintenance of ships including supplies of spares and stores 
- Certification and surveys, compliance requirements of Class and Flag 
- Inspection and monitoring of vessel's performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Technical management functions at macro level. 
The detailed modelling of the above macro level processes was done off-site with the help 
of copious notes taken and data collected during the on-site visits. These are annexed to the 
thesis from Appendix 1 to Appendix 4.  
The only variance of some significance noted among the three case companies was that 
while the process of ‘budgeting for vessel operation’ was done in all three case companies, 
company A being a third party management company additionally undertook an activity of 
risk assessment and checking out on the credentials of the ship owner before accepting the 
vessel for its management. This is not the case with company B being managers of their 
Certification 
and surveys 
Inspection & 
monitoring of 
vessel 
performance 
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own ships. Case company C too did not need to undertake this as it too was managing its 
own ships or at best those of other government departments. Again, while this process for 
company A formed the basis for negotiation of management fees with the ship owner, in 
the case of company B it was also done as more of an internal financial exercise and also 
served as its efficiency benchmark for its division. Company C too undertook the process 
for similar reasons and also to prescribe its management fee to other government 
department ship owners. 
Notable was the view expressed across the companies that financial analysis and budget 
variance reporting are some key roles performed. As the technical management contracts 
are almost always on cost-plus basis, it was crucial to estimate accurately and perform 
closely. A manager from company A said: 
Much in excess is not liked, so also, much lesser is not liked. Owners claim that 
managers have then not maintained the vessel well enough. (Company A) 
This practice also was corroborated by the ship’s staff and with appreciation. One of them, 
for instance, said: 
Good companies like ours also questioned when the allocated budgets had not 
been spent out fully, leaving a doubt about adequate maintenance and upkeep of 
the asset. (CE1) 
Commenting on the process of ‘maintenance of ships including supplies of spares and 
stores’, the ship’s staff more-or-less agreed with the process at macro levels and 
commented that the planned maintenance system (PMS) may slightly vary in formats but 
essentially they met the same objectives.  
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They were also found to be appreciative of the companies being very prompt in supplies of 
spares and stores. One interviewee said: 
The olden days of fifty % sanctions and lowest quotation supplies by 
Superintendents, is thankfully over. It was a good sign to see the Superintendents 
attach value to our requisitions. (CE2) 
The changes in the management processes involving ship-shore interface over the period of 
time as experienced by Chief Engineer 2 come out strongly here, highlighting an increased 
sense of support from their counterparts ashore. 
It can also be inferred that companies are now beginning to redefine their role appropriately 
of providing all shore based support for the ship to perform optimally.   
On the process of ‘certification and surveys, compliance requirements of Class and Flag’, 
the ship’s staff agreed that this process is mapped adequately. They also commented that 
this was followed meticulously by all companies, given the importance attached to it and 
understood so by both the ship and shore staff. The consequences of non-compliance at any 
time may mean detention and delays, which was not only a revenue loss but also a 
credibility issue as well, which better companies could ill-afford. 
The process of ‘inspection and monitoring of vessel's performance’ was one area which 
came out to be the contentious one from the view of the ship’s staff, although generally 
being agreed that that was how the practices presently existed. They lamented that this 
process involved much paperwork, reports to be sent and demanded lots of their time. They 
even wondered what the efficacy of such exhaustive reporting was, and felt that this was 
one area where a large scope for rationalisation existed.  
159 
 
Chief Engineer 1 was able to show the reports on his personal computer that were part of 
their reporting to the Technical Managers ashore. This was matched with those of the case 
companies and found to be more-or-less consistent. 
Captain 1 who had the experience on the most modern ships among the four interviewees 
of case D, also  showed the reports from his computer, and this listing was decidedly much 
less than the one shown by Chief Engineer 1. As a result Captain 1 himself had experienced 
far more ease on this ship where the process was much rationalised and automated, 
rendering minimal reporting. His (M1) comment, “This ship is possibly the most modern in 
terms of technology and automation existent in the world today…,” illustrated the point. 
In the understanding of the contemporary processes and practices of technical management 
what seemed to emerge was that: 
(a) The practices at macro levels were (i) closely conforming to the conceptualisations of 
the literature review in section 2.3 and (ii) fairly consistent across the types of companies, 
be it a third party management or ownership company and again whether it was privately 
owned or state owned. The ship’s staff had in their sailing experience, been in the 
employment of all three above types of companies which made their experience accounting 
as much richer. 
(b) The respondents had experienced an overall improvement in the practices over time 
which did result in some areas of better ship-shore interface including shore based support. 
(c) Gaps however still seemed to exist, indicating much need for optimisation of the crucial 
ship-shore interface, for example, none of the shipboard staff could comment much on the 
160 
 
process of ‘budgeting for vessel operation’ as in their opinion this was a totally shore based 
activity and rarely if ever they were consulted on such issues. However they always seemed 
to come under pressure when the superintendents’ budgets started running in excess, as one 
Chief Engineer remarked: 
The lack of experience shows up on some of these young superintendents who 
budget wrongly and then we have to suffer for their erroneous judgments. (CE2) 
The alienation of shipboard staff from this vital management process in as much as lack of 
sea experience affecting competency of shore based superintendents is noticed. 
(d) With regard to the paperwork involved in the ship-shore interface of the technical 
management process, only the form seemed to have changed from hard copy to soft copy 
enabling quicker transmission of data, but large scope seemed to exist in its rationalisation 
and also for better integration of technology as seen by the experience on a relatively 
modern ship. 
Armed with the updated understanding of contemporary technical management process at 
its macro levels, the discussion now moves to upfront identifying what drivers are there for 
the industry to uptake and integrate technology in its technical management processes. It 
draws on the data captured from both the seafarers and the shore-based personnel. 
6.2 Drivers for uptake of technology in the technical management process 
Chapter 2 discussed the technology induction in ship operations and management. While 
acknowledging the inevitability of technological advancements it traced its uptake in 
shipping. It identified the drivers to be (a) new regulations in the aid of enhancement of 
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safety and environment protection and (b) the need to be competitive. However, the 
economic logic of low costs seemed to underpin every technology change decision, be it a 
reactive compliance ideology or a more proactive stance of value creation in enabling 
vessel operation to be more efficient. Additionally, the cyclicality of shipping business and 
its volatility appeared to make the technology change decisions more difficult.   
Empirical findings from this study also revealed that competitive performance efficiency 
and compliance with regulation for safety and environment protection were the themes that 
came out prominently from the companies as well as the seafaring staff. However, 
additionally from the data what emerged were the increasing pressures of the customers of 
the business that was pushing the agenda of better performance on safety and environment 
protection as well as on efficiency, possibly also enabled through technological 
advancements that aided in closer monitoring of ships by them. The ship’s staffs were seen 
to be more candid in expressing this sentiment as noted by Chief Engineer 1 who said: 
Customer pressure is the best pressure and if the oil majors for example make such 
focus into non-tariff trade barriers then where is the escape route for the companies? 
(CE1) 
Again, the cost-efficiency of the technology itself was seen to be a critical deciding factor 
even as its inevitability was acknowledged by the managers in company B and C. They 
categorically pointed to the benefit of technology usage in their interviews. Two of the 
officers, for instance, said:  
There are expectations that the industry will be ever greener, ever safer and ever 
more efficient and it is the role of innovative shipping company to satisfy them all 
and at the same time to remain economically viable. (Company B) 
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Whenever automation can be shown to give greatly improved safety and 
environmental protection at an affordable cost there will be inevitable pressure for 
its introduction. (Company C) 
It has indeed been seen from the initiatives at the IMO such as that of a new chapter 
adopted in the MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships) Annex VI that includes a package of mandatory technical and operational measures 
to reduce Green House Gases (GHG) emissions from international shipping, with the aim 
of improving the energy efficiency for ships through improved design and propulsion 
techniques, as well as through improved operational practices. The Second IMO GHG 
Study (IMO, 2009) while estimating that international shipping would have contributed 
2.7% of the global CO2 emissions in 2007, emphasises that by together implementing the 
technical and operational measures even cost-effectively, it could be possible to increase 
the efficiency and reduce the emissions rate by 25% to 75% below current levels.  
Furthermore, IMO adopts a flag-neutral system on the principle of a ‘level-playing field’ in 
international shipping given its nature of ship owners flagging out their ships to various 
flag states. This principle is contrary to the differentiated approach based on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2012) principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” of equitable justice in view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation and their capabilities. This yet again 
underlines the technology push by the regulatory regime irrespective of the flags they fly. 
However, IMO does emphasise the principle of cost-effectiveness in the adoption of 
technology here. This is seen to be much in line with the principle of “best available 
technology not entailing excessive costs” adopted successfully in other industries(Sorrell, 
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2002), which gives a comforting notion of much homework being done before pushing any 
regulation. 
That a focus by an organisation on occupational health and safety and its environmental 
issues also contributes to the efficiency of the business of the organisation was found to be 
explicitly articulated by ship’s staff. One, for example, said: 
With the kind of awareness generated, it is today a well-known fact that what is 
good for EHS (Environment, Health and Safety) is good for business and vice versa, 
although returns may be not as tangible for companies to voluntarily adopt 
technologies contributing to it. (M2) 
A focus on environment invariably draws organisation attention to resources from nature 
and waste streams to nature. Waste is a misplaced resource through inefficient 
product/service realisation process. The measure of efficiency is the product /service 
delivered with least resource and least waste – which is also the environment agenda. 
Hence it is not difficult to see the direct relationship between efficiency and environment. 
Similar is the case with occupational health and safety, which although may not be as 
tangible for good health to be accounted for in ledger books of accounts, the costs of 
accidents are well known. Besides the visible costs of insurance related medication and 
compensation, the invisible costs could comprise product and material damage and 
downtime, production delays and interruptions, legal expenses, investigation time, and 
importantly loss of business, goodwill and reputation. As Peter Drucker (2007) the famous 
management guru puts it, “The first duty of business is to survive and the guiding principle 
of business economics is not the maximisation of profits, it is the avoidance of loss.” 
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The opinion of the companies though was more cautionary on the aspects of the technology 
push through regulatory implications. This is amply illustrated from the views of three 
interviewees from the three different companies who said: 
Progress however gets hampered by the question of ‘who should pay’ for these 
investments and there was a need to provide evidence of payback from innovations. 
Perhaps, those offering devices or improvements to efficiency might consider 
financing these on a ‘no cure, no pay’ basis. (Company A)  
Being a state owned organisation it is very difficult for us to convince our finance 
department and audit committees who are non-mariners on why we are not opting 
for cheaper technologies in our new ship buildings when they are shown to be 
equally compliant to regulations and serving the purpose. (Company C)  
 
Regulatory changes were still not always clear and industry generally is anxious not 
to be taken down ‘a blind alley’ on a range of regulation based technical changes 
that owners have to be taking on-board. For example, where is there any proper 
impact assessment data to justify the regulation demand? (Company B)  
The above statement warranted the need for regulatory agencies that if they be mandating 
such technology integration, then they must comprehensively evaluate and address all 
associated risks. Here it is encouraging to note the following trend on risk analysis and 
human element considerations adopted at the 58
th
 session of the IMO Navigation Sub-
Committee recently (IMO, 2012a): 
E-NAVIGATION 
Progress made with regard to the development of detailed on-board e-navigation 
architecture was noted. Gap analysis has been completed and the final list of gaps of 
e-navigation approved. A preliminary list of potential e-navigation solutions will be 
used as the basis for further identification of Risk Control options in preparation for 
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the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). A methodology for the Human Element 
Analysing Process (HEAP) in e-navigation was endorsed as well as that for FSA. 
Guidelines for usability evaluation of navigational equipment will be further 
developed as also will that for the harmonisation of test beds. Finally, it was 
decided to re-establish the Correspondence Group (CG) on e-navigation under the 
coordination of NORWAY. 
The CG will give consideration to the issue of software quality assurance, especially 
important given the reported anomalies that are occurring with ECDIS.    
What seemed to emerge was that while the ship’s staff to an extent welcomed the 
considered increase in safety and environment protection, probably because it concerned 
their own selves more, the companies were seen to be reticent about its need and cost 
implications, even apprehending safety used as ploy to push in more technology. 
The interviews therefore indicated that technology integration was largely because of a 
reactive stance to regulatory or customers’ directive compliance rather than a proactive 
initiative, and the myopic view on cost-benefit analysis by the decision makers ashore. It 
thus becomes intriguing to unravel the process in which technology was being integrated – 
which is presented in the next section. 
6.3 Lack of scientific approach to technology integration 
The summary of chapter 2 that discussed the induction of technology into shipping had 
pointed out that the inadequate and unscientific integration of technology into the 
management practices and operations in shipping seemed to have been the cause of concern 
resulting in its improper evolution and throwing up areas of discontentment.  
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This aspect was further probed during the fieldwork. While there appeared no direct 
admission to the cause, probably because of the lack of relevant literature in the popular 
marine industry media explicitly highlighting the issue, the tacit approval was writ large as 
noted through the many ill effects of such poor integration on the operators and the evolved 
practices that has been highlighted in the later section of this chapter. 
The interviews of the senior managers of the companies clearly pointed to their frustrating 
experience in the way in which technology was being introduced to the industry. One, for 
instance, said: 
It must be so if you say so! One would wonder in spite of the technology 
advancements and automation supposedly introduced to ease the work load is 
ending up in more fatigue and well yes! I see that the work load is only now 
different, not seem to be reduced! (Company A) 
 
Chapter 3 continued the debate and in section 3.1 dwelt on the theory of the technology-
organisation-process interface to understand what enables scientific integration. Evidence 
was thus sought on where the shipping industry was in practicing the integration of 
technology into work environment vis-à-vis the theoretical models of the evolution seen in 
other industry domains. It was noted that the shipping industry is only just graduating to 
acknowledging the phenomenon of ‘social technologies’ and gradually moving towards 
driving practices of human factors engineering into the integration as a complete systems 
approach. So far the usual solution to improve work had been to add technology and/or 
automate, leaving the operator to adapt. Technology was often used to replace parts of or 
all of human work and theoretically to make work safer, more efficient or less costly. 
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However this replacement is not straightforward which presents itself as ‘substitution myth’ 
as expressed by a ship’s staffs among others who work with it: 
Seafarers have no choice but to cope up with the situations of given technology, as 
they are bound to deliver on ships performance. This does take the toll. Well yes! It 
is probably time to question why is technology not integrated more scientifically? 
(M1)  
The same sentiment was also echoed by the CE1 who said: 
 It is a part of seafarer culture to be able to ‘handle everything!’ 
Research by Lutzhoft and Nyce (2008) showed that a lot of effort is expended to get the 
new system to work if it is not well designed or integrated, and define the term “integration 
work” as process initiated and driven by the seafarer; in particular, towards working 
proactively to construct a workplace that “works” for them.   
The data therefore conforms to the earlier studies and clearly identifies the challenges 
experienced by the managers and seafarers who are required to carry out the task of 
implementation. 
There are trade-offs then in tailoring the tasks and adaptation by the seafarers to make the 
system compatible with the operators’ cognitive strategies (Cook and Woods, 1996). The 
seafarers adapt their strategies to carry out tasks so as to accommodate the constraints 
embedded in the new technology, which is not effective in the long run. 
This leads to then seeing how the skilling issues are being taken care of by the industry for 
its staff to cope with these circumstances. 
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6.4 Skilling Issues  
It seemed quite logical that if proper technology integration has been a challenge, mariners 
in order to get the work done still have to integrate data and information, rules and practices 
and their learnt and acquired skills themselves (Lutzhoft, 2004). Skilling issues thus 
become corollary to the technology integration debate.  
The companies were also seen to suggest the same, as can be made out from what an 
interviewee remarked: 
The access to high quality professionals and their retention is a major issue for the 
industry. There is concern with accidents attributable to ‘stupidity’ and lack of 
professionalism. (Company A) 
The companies further suggested that there needs to be healthy scepticism for what the 
machinery systems tell the operators and not take them as gospel. Those extracting 
information from the system need to always ask the question ‘does my engineering or 
nautical skill and common sense tell me that that is reasonable?’ Such a credibility check 
needs to be done in the head before any action is taken rather than just press some button 
because that is what the system tells them to do.   
Even the ship staffs that were senior in ranks seemed to endorse this view, as is noted from 
what they said: 
Technology cannot solve the problems created by technology. (CE1) 
Likewise, 
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Monitoring systems only monitor problems; they don't predict them before they 
become problems. The younger generation seems to take technology for granted. 
(CE 2) 
Whether the increasingly capable technology was compensating for the reduced 
requirement of up-skilled crews or was there a need for more capable crew to handle 
advanced technology as debated earlier in chapter 3, section 3.2 was thus an emerging 
dichotomy. The ship’s staff at the operating end could also perceive this, which was evident 
from the interviews in which one Master, for instance, said:  
It can of course be argued that with increased technology there is need for higher 
qualification and skill in navigation. This is certainly so when crossing Shanghai 
TSS, Dover straits, Singapore straits etc. On the other hand the ocean passages 
are a different cup of tea - yet we have almost the same level of watch-keeping 
for both modes. Perhaps the time has come to ask if during ocean passages, the 
Master may be permitted to place less qualified persons on the bridge. (M2) 
The companies also believed that technology in harsh marine applications is getting to be 
most reliable and capable as in many shore applications. One company manager admitted: 
I can see your apprehension that automation and technology can only postpone 
the inevitable and also hide the error chain from human detection. As a 
preventive measure, two independent information systems feeding into a human 
decision process is the future. Moreover, Professor Andy Norris, the past 
Chairman of the International Electro-Technical Commission has a different 
take. His strategy is as follows: 
1. Development of Marine Technology tested to resilience and accuracy. 
2. Adequate redundancies built into the system that the machine carries out the 
cross-check and self-test functions by itself. 
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 3. All that the operator interacts with is a highly reliable ‘box’ that has an error 
probability in the range of 0.00001% or less.  
His argument is that this is several multiples better at error elimination than the 
human operator. I too can see the possibilities of this strategy. (Company B)  
The discussions based on the data so far suggest that the skills required of the mariners 
continue to evolve, not least because of advances in technology. It also shows that despite 
these changes, the Officer of the Watch (OOW) continues to be the central integrator of all 
navigational or machinery data. This human-gathered knowledge is then used to make the 
decisions to ensure safety. 
 
However, when these findings are placed in the context of the literature it suggests that in 
the immediate future there will be a need to think more clearly about the options ahead, 
simply because the technology that is becoming feasible will steadily undermine the need 
for human involvement. An item of equipment making complex decisions on behalf of the 
watch-keeper effectively ceases to be an aid but becomes an essential item. The human 
watch-keeper is removed from the particular loop, effectively losing the skills to take over 
should the equipment fail, as has been noted in the previous chapter. 
 
Such obvious concern was readily aired by the interviewees. They indicated that it is 
therefore only appropriate for the equipment to be fitted if the machine can perform 
consistently much better than a human at the specific task. Captain 2 (M2) said: 
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An example is the automatic position and motion integrity checking function of an 
INS (integrated navigation system). Such systems could become mandatory in the 
foreseeable future through IMO’s eNavigation programme.  
It appears evident that an INS and associated equipment could be designed to 
greatly outperform humans in the integrity checking of position, including reliably 
establishing whether satellite position is being compromised by interference, 
jamming or other problems. It would also be able to compare GPS position with any 
future alternative positional sensors such as eLoran and automatically make 
available the best position and motion data, with appropriate warnings, if accuracy 
has been degraded. 
The INS will be taking continuous measurements, 24 hours a day. Unlike 
humans, it will not get tired or bored with the activity, will effect a greater accuracy 
and will react faster than even the most diligent officer in alerting a potential 
problem to the bridge team. 
If this technology is proven, the OOW can be relieved of having to make positional 
integrity checks, enabling more time to be given to navigational tasks that benefit 
from being human-centred.  
The result would surely be enhanced overall safety, especially because an 
increasing number of OOWs appear to neglect this onerous and generally non 
rewarding task – ‘it’s always right so I don’t need to be particularly careful.’ 
 
The companies in their considered opinion had a more restrained view. One of the officials 
from company A said:  
 
We are encouraged to use the term ‘navigational aid’ for items of navigation-related 
equipment on-board a vessel. This helps to emphasise two important points 
concerning their use. 
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Firstly, that they are there to aid the bridge team in the safe navigation of the vessel. 
Secondly, that the loss of any one aid does not prevent safe navigation, even though 
it could result in it becoming a more demanding task. 
As the range of technologies available to navigators continues to develop, and 
bridge officers increase their reliance on the information provided, and the potential 
consequences of a machine failure will grow in magnitude. 
In the rather more distant future, the resultant limited human interaction needed may 
be best performed by shore-based personnel, perhaps culminating in the unmanned 
vessel. 
On the route to greater automation, the increasing reliance on navigation technology 
will mean that equipment design and production techniques have to evolve. The 
equipment rather than an individual will be increasingly the cause of remaining 
accidents. We currently despair that 80 per cent of marine accidents are caused by 
human error, but what would we think if 80 per cent were caused by machine error, 
even if the total accident rate were lower?  
In particular, equipment manufacturers would have to get to grips with the issues 
created by this greater liability. 
It will be a different world, but it is the direction that technology is presently 
going in all transport sectors – road vehicles, trains and aircraft – with platforms for 
warfare, such as drones, unsurprisingly at the forefront.   
The above discussion based on the analysis of the interviews leads to corroborate the 
skilling dilemma noted in section 3.2.3 that there will be many situations in the foreseeable 
future that will call for up skilled mariner to take control during times of emergencies and 
high stress and he will be required to alter roles as the situation demands.  
Another noteworthy development that supports the concern raised by the interviewees in 
this study is that the STCW which had so far not included electrical engineering 
requirements has in its 2010 revision (implemented in 2012) acknowledged this important 
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skill requirement. With so much automation on-board ships and the move towards electric 
propulsion, electric drive systems, electrical steering etcetera, it is not only the marine 
engineering skilling requirement that is redefined to include enhanced electrical 
engineering skills, but also the requirement for a new position of electro-technical officer 
on-board ships. 
The National Research Council (2007) study on Human-System Integration in System 
Development Process also identifies the problem that often automation actually creates 
more work because now the automation as well as the system itself must be monitored and 
controlled, thus calling for improved human-systems integration methods and tools.  
The study furthermore states that other problems with poor human-system integration have 
been, (a) increase in automation is often due to pressures to reduce staff required to support 
the system, however not all automation actually reduces required staffing. (b) Sometimes 
automation changes the job requirements and takes away the hands-on knowledge that has 
proved to be so useful for maintaining ‘situational awareness’. (c) Sometimes it reduces 
reliability and trustworthiness of the overall system and increases the requirement for back-
up personnel. (d) At other times people including designers can be subject to an ‘over-
confidence’ bias, focusing on the potential benefits of new technology while failing to 
anticipate the complex interactions and new problems that may emerge. 
All these issues can be seen as relevant to the concerns as found in this study and argued in 
the same way and in line with those already raised by the ships’ staffs and the shore-based 
officials. 
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The discussion so far first commenced with the appraisal of the technical management 
processes before recognising the skewed incentives of technology integration into these 
processes. It then led to the realisation of lack of any scientific approach in technology 
integration and debated upon the issues of skilling to deal comprehensively with the inept 
human-machine interface in the technology integrated operating environment. 
The following sections now proceed to dwell exhaustively on the empirical findings of the 
challenges thrown up at each stage of the operations and management practice.      
6.5 Issues involved at the design stage 
A systematic approach needs to be taken in an integrated design of human-machine 
interaction that promote the perspective that system users should no longer be add-ons to 
the engineering design but should be an integrated part of the functional design. Usually 
interfaces are organised subsequent to the equipment design with the aim of matching them 
to the users’ performance modes and mental models. Captain 2 who has been interacting at 
the global policy levels in nautical affairs expressed his view by saying:  
The mandatory phase of induction and implementation of ECDIS (Electronic Chart 
Display and Information System) is just round the corner. This is a revolutionary 
change in the way ships are navigated as it heralds the transition from paper charts 
that have been familiar to mariners for centuries to ECDIS. It is not just a new 
technology to be retrofitted into the ship in an unthinking manner as so many pieces 
of kit have been put in the past. It is far more revolutionary and requires a new 
mind-set, revised bridge procedures, and substantial training for effective use. 
Moreover, while the company ashore can take the responsibility to organise 
implementation taking up issues of system assessment, purchasing, fitting and 
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training, but planning itself of such a major project needs to have inputs and 
involvement of sea staff. (M2) 
 
His views carry many messages which require elaboration. They suggest that (a) 
technology is being driven by regulation (b) technology is bringing about a revolutionary 
change to the basic art and craft of seamanship (c) there is acknowledgement of poor and 
unscientific design and integration of technology related systems and calls for fundamental 
rethinking in the human performance and human-system integration which will never be 
effective unless it is seen by all its stakeholders as an integral part of the entire systems 
engineering process, from initial concept evaluation through to design and its operational 
use (d) identifies gaps in the process of systems assessment and calls for the companies to 
be particularly vigilant to these limitations on type approvals of a systems configuration by 
the classification societies that may lack in considering ergonomic and human factors (e) it 
suggests the need for vendor evaluation in the purchase of such highly integrated systems; 
and (f) it calls for stronger user interface at the design stage to make the development more 
user-led than mere technology-led.      
Further emphasising his point of view, Captain 2 was engaged in discussion on the Royal 
Majesty grounding, the unique case of the passenger vessel running aground in broad 
daylight, when full complement was manning the ship’s bridge. He commented: 
Royal Majesty is a classic example to showcase the perils of automation without 
any process engineering. In fact, eNavigation strategy is more about process 
engineering than technology application. The Nav system designers at the IALA 
(International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse 
Authorities) e-Nav discussion seem to think redundancy systems (be it position 
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fixing,  course and speed indication or depth) is all about having a back-up in 
case the primary fails due to a technical hitch.  I have been rather strenuous in 
my assertion that the secondary system is meant to cross check the primary as a 
matter of routine and diligent navigational practice to avoid the kind of false 
sense of security the officers on Royal Majesty operated in just prior the 
grounding. I have discussed this in the eNav strategy input paper for the IMO.  
The S-mode is one aspect of eNav process engineering that will have a 
tremendous impact on safety. S-mode would require all navigation displays, 
regardless of manufacturer, to have a clearly identified button that, when pressed, 
brings the display into a standard format. (M2) 
A positive affirmation is noted here with the S-Mode (Standard Mode) of the consideration 
of cognitive ergonomics
18
 and human factors in the conceptualisation, design and 
development of human-systems integrated technological systems. The younger Captain 1 
from the view of the operating end of the new technology also indicated towards such need 
as he said:  
 
If designers of marine equipment and software could achieve a common standard 
for basic operations such as operating the ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System) it would go a long way into making all our lives easier as we 
move from ship to ship. (M1) 
 
The companies who in general are close to the trends of developments taking place within 
the industry resounded much the same views. One interviewee, for example, said: 
 
                                                          
18
 Cognitive ergonomics studies cognition in work settings in order to optimize human well-being 
and system performance.  
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But it is not just the technology that is giving cause for concern. It is the systems 
themselves, because of a natural tendency for manufacturers to add their own 
features, in an attempt to make their equipment ‘user-friendly’ or 
made distinct within the market. For example, the seafarer can be faced with either: 
joystick, trackball or menu-driven controls, depending on the equipment fit in the 
vessel in which he is serving. (Company B) 
 
The above highlights that (a) considering the design of individual interface workstations in 
isolation is no longer enough; today systems are complex and its holistic interaction with 
humans need to be taken into account, (b) acknowledgement of commercial pressures in the 
design of systems with little awareness of the tools and best practices in related fields. 
 
The need for the S-Mode (Standard mode) as expressed by the ship staff was also seen to 
be emphasised by the companies from their point of view. One interviewee, for instance, 
said: 
The different nationalities and cultures of seafarers dictate a need for commonality 
of symbols, switches and control keys, together with appropriate education in the 
basic principles of new technology. (Company A) 
 
Early and proper planning with user-led inputs at design stage again was highlighted by the 
companies as well, as can be noted from the remarks of another interviewee from another 
company who said: 
 
Firstly planning is the key. Understanding the ship’s staff, their capabilities, their 
needs, aspiration and complete familiarisation helps. 
Another caution that needs to be exercised is the early planning for effective 
induction of new technology, particularly that which is mandated by regulation. 
Leaving it to the last moment is another well-trodden path within our industry, in 
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spite of IMO giving enough lead time that is envisaged necessary for fleet-wide 
implementation. (Company C)  
 
The findings therefore strongly suggest the importance of incorporating accurate usability 
requirement at the design stage. This is not entirely new as the National Research Council 
(2007) study, for instance, had already identified inadequate integration of user 
requirements as the major contributor to project failures. It further attributes the main 
reasons for this to (a) inadequate understanding of the intended users and the context of use, 
and (b) vague usability requirements, such as ‘system must be intuitive to use’.  Usability is 
defined to be in terms of understandability, learnability, operability, and attractiveness.  
The lack of adherence to these fundamental principles including lack of consideration 
towards user perspective in the design stage results in a major challenge in the management 
and operations of today’s ships. The following sections present the related issues in more 
detail. 
6.6 Information clutter in management and operation of ships 
Empirical evidence corroborated the sentiments expressed in Section 4.2 of chapter 4 that 
pointed to the proliferation of information inadvertently caused in the effecting of practices 
through the eased technology. It showed that the ease of communication rendered by 
modern ICT was found to have resulted in much increased information exchange between 
the ship and the shore management. As noted in section 6.1 of this chapter while discussing 
the process of inspection and monitoring of ships, the paperwork which was now in 
electronic form had only increased. This was possibly effected by the apparent closure of 
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distance through communications, giving the shore management a closer comprehensive 
view of the shipboard operations and the consequent decision making. Such panoptic 
supervision by the shore management having an adverse effect on the behaviour of the 
ship’s staff was amply discernible, as can be made out from the comment of Captain 1 who 
stated:  
What effect does it (management from shore) have on ship captains? Increased 
inertia attitude - I can do nothing so better do not do anything, survive the 
assignment, change nothing, minimum communications...And, believe me: the 
office loves such attitude best! Until anything happens, then Master is simply 
dispensable scapegoat. (M1) 
The apparent loss of autonomy is perceived by the ship’s staff. The shore side involvement 
is taken as interference in the work leaving them frustrated even resentful and killing the 
drive to take their own initiatives. There is also apprehension that whether it is about 
efficient management or a more cunning agenda of washing their hands and fixing legal 
responsibility on the ship. The critique of “panopticism” in organisational theory draws 
attention to the inevitable interrelationship between power and resistance, and also to that 
between capital and control, which may not work when applied in much concentrated form 
(Boyne, 2000, p.288). 
From the interviews of the seafarers it was evident that as the process/information bridge 
between the ship and shore is becoming quite a non-issue there probably is a need to 
exercise caution in the unnecessary use of this bridge. The abuse of the facility creating 
uncalled for clutter comes to light with disregard towards the shipboard objective function 
of the safe conduct of the voyage.  What is sent from ship to shore or shore to ship must 
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add explicit value to those involved and with due regard to the complete understanding and 
appreciation of the objective functions of those at each end. This seemed to be the 
sentiment reflected in what Chief Engineer 1 had to say: 
Ship is now being considered as a mere extension of the office. Unnecessary 
information, at any time (without considering the time differences between the ship 
and shore office), is called for with misplaced sense of urgency. (CE 1) 
As for the information clutter in the operation of ships, there was an overwhelming 
affirmation of this fact. One Chief Engineer said: 
Of course there is information overload and too many alarms. If there is going to be 
an alarm every thirty seconds then people just acknowledge it and do not even look 
at the screen to see what is there. Many alarms were unnecessary, and many we 
think is needed are not there! (CE2) 
While another Chief Engineer expressed that: 
If I had a wish list, it would be to ensure that the ship is delivered with easy-to-
understand and operate systems and one selector switch to hide all non-critical 
alarms. (CE1) 
The ship’s captain using examples of navigation said: 
On the deck side, ECDIS, e-navigation, integrated bridge systems is all about 
information management and unless there is focus on the proper collection, 
management and display of multiple sensor inputs in a coherent and user-friendly 
presentation, it does not achieve its desired purpose. (M2) 
While the other mentioned that: 
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Today with automation, in the nautical environment the watch-keepers are 
increasingly made responsible for additional tasks of engine and cargo control 
besides the main task of safe navigation. (M1) 
 
It is apparent from the tone of the interviewees that there is a shift of operator’s role from 
direct control of systems to a more remote and supervisory relationship which then puts 
greater demand on cognitive resources if there is an overload or plethora of information to 
be dealt with. In addition, if there is a demand on increased monitoring of secondary 
controls thus stretching the operators’ span of control, the resulting effect of automation is 
an increased workload rather than less. Research on this area suggests that there may be 
then undesirable consequences in terms of increased fatigue and work strain (Sauer et al. 
2002). Smeaton et al. (1995) and Wickens (2000) also point out that visual scanning of 
separate and cluttered displays and mental integration of the overloaded information puts a 
heavy demand on cognitive resources resulting in greater difficulty for the operator. 
The findings therefore point to the need for the integration of primary information sources 
in ship control. Studying this area Lee and Sanquist (1996) suggest that two aspects need to 
be considered, “perceptual augmentation” and “control integration”. Perceptual 
augmentation is about improvement of the operators’ perception of the ship’s environment, 
i.e. ‘situational awareness’ and control integration aims to improve the operators’ ability to 
control the ship operations.  
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6.7 Challenges in the operations with automation 
Beyond the challenge of information clutter in operations with automation, there were other 
challenges noted to have resulted in reduced crewing, over-reliance on technology and 
reduced situational awareness. The companies however were seen to argue that 
rationalisation of crew strengths on-board was afforded by the increased technology and 
automation as a measure of economic policy to cut crewing costs. This argument was put 
forth by the companies because the costs of crewing had today become a major component 
of running expenses of ships. For instance, one company official said: 
 
In these times of downturn with freight earnings at the lowest, crewing costs are the 
focus of attention as crewing is a major part of the costs. (Company C) 
Likewise, an official from another company said: 
A record delivery of new-buildings and low scrapping levels has contributed to 
freight rates ‘hitting the bottom’, and high volatility and challenging market 
conditions are continuing. The financial and economic realities are making degree 
of consolidation necessary. Anyway, the good news is that ‘the world is still turning 
and trade is growing! (Company B) 
 
Another reason cited for cutting crew on-board was the non-availability of adequately 
skilled sailing staff coupled with the fact that the high automation levels were rendering the 
crew inexperienced in handling many situations, corroborating the noting in the literature 
review of ‘taking the man out of the loop.’ A manager from company A commented: 
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I can testify that there is a similar situation happening in the engine room, where 
many ‘modern’ engineers are becoming bus drivers that simply inform the shore 
office when something doesn't work anymore. It is difficult for a company to see 
value in such an operating mentality, so it is natural that they start cutting the crew. 
(Company A) 
 
 
However, the ship’s staff (Case D), were seen to come out with some strong opposing 
views on the need for cutting crew. A Chief Engineer articulated this point of view and 
argued: 
Regarding the highest cost to ship owners being crew wages...they are not the 
highest operating cost, but they are the highest discretionary cost. In other words, 
ship repair, dry-docking, fuel, etc. are all non-discretionary costs because they are 
overhead costs that are outside the ship owners’ area of control. They can't make the 
ships use less fuel, but they can cut the number of crew on-board and still make it to 
their destination. (CE1) 
 
In the same way the other said: 
 
For the most part, shipping companies "do" realise they need competent mariners, 
but they fail to realise that as their numbers are reduced, their cost of maintenance 
and repair goes up. Why? It is because those who count the beans for crew costs are 
usually not the same people who count the beans for repair costs. So while one part 
of the company bemoans the high cost of repairs and maintenance, another 
complains about the high cost of mariner wages. (CE2) 
 
The lack of appropriate and adequate skills in the newer crews coming was also seen to be 
acknowledged by senior sailing staff and a reason cited for technology integration. For 
instance, the Chief Engineer 2 asserted: 
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The move to absolute minimum or no crew on ships in the future will most probably 
not stem from the activities of the bean counters but from the lack of suitably 
capable staff coming forward to do the work. Rather than accept lower qualified 
staff, I believe owners will opt for automation and a couple of multi-tasking riders 
that can keep a lookout, fix the PCs and actuators and assist the berthing or 
maintenance riders get on-board. These guys will earn very good salaries and have 
home leave of at least two to one. (CE2) 
 
It also came out clearly from the responses of the ship’s staff that the newer crew was 
tending to become over-reliant on the technology to the detriment of safety against the 
principles of good seamanship. For example the maxim that regards technology as mere 
‘aid to navigation’ and not to be overly relied upon was overlooked. This came out clearly 
from one Captain’s remark as he said: 
A common thing in the young lads is that all are very skilful regarding the new 
technologies; because they are very good at hitting buttons they think they are good 
in their jobs!!! That's where the big problems start. They don't realise how limited 
their nautical, marine or seamanship skills are. Just as an example I had a 2nd 
Officer that never put the course in the log book since the first time I told him how 
to do it; as the problem persisted I asked him why he was not doing it, he just told 
me that wasn't necessary because we were using the ECDIS so why bother with 
that!!! Obviously was the first and only time he would sail with me...(M2)  
 
 
However it was also pointed out how efforts to make this technology integrate with good 
practices of seamanship were being made, with another Captain citing the example said: 
 
‘Looking out of the window' is the fundamental rule of good navigation. I am aware 
that California Maritime Academy is in advanced stages of research where the bare 
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essential information of ECDIS are superimposed on the main bridge window in 
Head-up display thus dramatically improving 'situational awareness' and 
encouraging 'looking out of the window' to counter the syndrome of over-reliance 
on technology. (M1) 
Likewise, the Chief Engineer corroborating on the need for good human-machine interface 
remarked: 
The expert’s behaviour goes beyond analytical rationality, and is situational, 
experience-based, and intuitive. (CE2) 
While the other Chief Engineer, acknowledging that no technology was infallible, added: 
 
The moral of the story is that no matter how ubiquitous or reliable a system, it will 
eventually fail, and do so at the most inopportune time. Without spare parts on-
board, without a back-up system and the trained personnel to use it, the ship and 
those who expect certain performance will find themselves in serious trouble. (CE1) 
 
The companies in turn were also found to concur on the absolute need of a proper and 
considered integration of technology into the practices of management and operation with 
exhaustive risk assessments carried out and the full involvement of all that are going to be 
part of the operating systems. It was pointed out that training too needs to be developed 
keeping the complete system integration in mind, of which trends are now being seen on 
specific training like crew resource management (CRM) on simulators with the bridge and 
the engine crew operating in unison in the respective but connected bridge and engine room 
simulators. Two interviewees, for instance suggested: 
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If the automation and tools are used correctly and the officers are competent not 
certified for their positions then we should not be having discussions such as this. 
(Company C) 
 
In answer to the original question, I would say that (a) technology must be 
developed to cope with the reduced numbers of suitable people available, and (b) 
newer methods of skills development must be adopted in the present scenario of 
increased human-machine interface environment. Some big cruise companies have 
already begun to adopt CRM trainings. CRM actually began as ‘cockpit’ resource 
management in the aviation sector. It is now coming as ‘crew’ resource 
management and will move to ‘corporate’ resource management. (Company A)  
CRM training concerns with the cognitive and interpersonal skills needed to cope as part of 
team both in everyday work and in crisis in a high technology environment. As an 
instructional strategy it gives crew members the knowledge and good practice needed to 
apply non-technical abilities in the management of available resources (human, equipment 
and information), ensuring safety and efficiency. Cognitive skills are those mental 
processes used for gaining and maintaining situational awareness, for solving problems and 
taking decisions. Interpersonal skills are those related to teamwork, as communication and 
delegation of task. 
The challenges in operations especially with regard to the increasing involvement of the 
shore-based personnel are seen to be further aggravated due to the relative isolation of the 
work environment that exists in the case of a typical merchant ship. The discussion in the 
following section draws on the interviewees’ views on this specific feature of the industry. 
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6.8 Influences of the work culture and work environment 
The ship operations are characteristic of its uniqueness as a work culture and the work 
environment of seafaring. Guided by the discussions on this aspect in the literature review 
particular efforts were made to probe its influence in the technology integration with the 
established practices. 
6.8.1 Traditional ship-shore divide persists 
Modern communication systems have invariably resulted in drastically increased 
importance of shore-side management with shore managers seizing the decision-making 
functions traditionally associated with the ship’s Master. One Captain lamented: 
Particularly when it comes to commercial directions the shore based management is 
often represented by young talented graduates who have no idea about seafaring, 
have no experience of on-board life, and do not really care about or understand the 
needs of the seafarers. On the other hand, the ship’s staffs usually have little 
knowledge about ship management and the commercial side of shipping. They do 
not study business matters in any depth in marine colleges and are not involved in 
them on-board ship. This alienation of senior ship staff from the management 
process can have costly consequences for the industry. (M2) 
It can also be noted from the above that having sea-time is a veritable rite of passage and a 
sine qua non of having a say in any matter concerning seafarers. While generally the 
technical management departments in the case companies did have staff in the technical 
management division albeit with varied sea experiences, they did succumb to commercial 
pressures that seemed to play a domineering role, at times driving compromising practices 
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(Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 2012). The existence of the ship-shore divide appears accentuated 
with the followings remarks noted from the shore and the ship’s staff respectively: 
It is only wishful thinking to have our senior shipboard staff involved in 
management, economic and financial decisions. For this we need to train our people 
along those lines. But in the backdrop of popular crewing policies and the basic 
education and training infrastructure in non-established countries that supply most 
seafarers, this was impossible. Without the right tools, we cannot expect our people 
to make difficult management decisions. (Company A) 
Almost all the Masters I have sailed with are much more capable managers than the 
jumped up accountants who are in charge. It is not the Masters who need the 
training in becoming effective managers. Management is a small part of the Masters 
job. A Master has to be capable and competent in many different areas. Way beyond 
the capabilities required of a shore administrator. No-one had the illusion that the 
accounts clerk could run the company. I have noticed a marked decrease in the 
capability of managers, when the myth that the general purpose accountant that 
could manage anything, became current wisdom. (M2) 
In the companies a realisation of the need for better ship-shore interface and appreciation of 
each other’s roles was discernible. They seemed to believe that ensuring both seafarers and 
managers were part of the same team was critical and moreover felt that this bond be 
emphasised. A strong comment noted was: 
 
We don’t want a ‘them and us’ attitude. We do try to give opportunities to our 
sailing staff to spend time in offices and appreciate our side of work. (Company B) 
 
 
However, the ship staff were noticed to be sceptical in believing this attempt which aptly 
summed up the divide in an interview thus: 
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Oh! It’s never windy behind his desk! (M1) 
 
 
The ship-shore divide thus tends to exacerbate the level of trust at the very critical ship-
shore interface of the ship management and ship operations. As identified in the literature 
review (sections2.3 and 4.4.1) this inadvertently leads to conflicting objectives of the ship 
and shore, resulting in working cross-purposes with the technology integration agenda and 
leading to inefficiencies, ineffectiveness of ship management, and even jeopardising safety.  
6.8.2 Crew conveniences and willingness all-around 
Contrary to the generally established notion of greater reluctance from the ships staffs’ in 
readiness for the uptake of technology, a general willingness was noted among them which 
confirmed the expressions in section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4. Furthermore, a pleasantly 
surprising revelation that came about from the interviewees of the companies was the tacit 
acknowledgment, at times even emphasis on the social considerations underpinning 
shipping operations, as noted below: 
We are delivering communication convenience and flexibility to our crews who 
demand, and deserve reliable connectivity, easy-to-use software, dependable voice 
and consistent data. We have made sure that worldwide news and recreational 
content of the highest quality will be enjoyed, uninterrupted, by our crews around 
the world. (Company B)  
The new satellite communications set-up will be used to run office communications 
and crew calling as well providing broadband internet access and television services 
to vessels. (Company C)  
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While such a strategy towards crew was a welcome finding it could also be argued that 
such a change of heart towards crew welfare was more a reactionary result of economic 
pressures. For instance, the non-tariff trade barriers of the Oil-majors whose Tanker 
management and self-assessment schemes (TMSA) which among other requirements 
dictated minimum 80% staff retention to meet the competency matrix requirements of 
certain ship type experience. It could even be in preparation towards the impending 
Maritime Labour Convention, but this was something the companies seemed shy of 
accepting.   
Be that as it may, the willingness for technology integration towards simplifying operations 
for the ship’s staff was also discernible in company responses:  
Well, the tablets and mobile devices are getting very common nowadays, these can 
be directly connected to the ships PMS system and records the documents 
automatically. Also these devices are used for training purposes too. We have a 
project on these to enhance the pre-joining and familiarisation trainings by mobile 
devices and e-learning. I think we will see the implications in the very near future 
and this will be a very user friendly and beneficial way to cut down the paper 
generation. (Company A) 
 
The ship’s staffs were also seen to acknowledge the efforts of the companies in these 
directions: 
Use of tablets about the ship is the wave of the future. I understand there are already 
some intrinsically safe tablet PCs. They probably already are in the offshore 
industry - the maritime industry should be encouraged to widely adopt them and get 
rid of the paper burden whenever possible.  It should be a matter of time that there is 
common acceptance of electronic checklists. The hanging of the confined space 
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form at point of entry is a challenge I am sure we can find a way to properly 
manage. Class reports are now provided electronically with a digital signature. (M1) 
 
Third-party inspectors will have to eventually accept computer based records of 
permits and checklists - they have no other choice as more and more vessel 
operators move to almost paperless systems - don't let them bully you into thinking 
otherwise. (CE2) 
 
It just goes to establish that there is a general willingness all around, both ashore and on-
board for embracing technology and that it really was the inadequate integration that was 
throwing up its many challenges that had to be dealt with. This was perhaps creating user 
dissatisfaction that erroneously translated to the myth of seafarers’ reluctance. 
Despite all the criticisms of the way in which implementation of technology was 
undertaken, in practice the findings from this empirical study provides strong evidence that 
there is much potential in optimisation of ship operations and its management. In order to 
provide an analysis of this, the discussion proceeds to exploring the views of the ships’ 
staffs and managers especially on these potentials.  
6.9 The potential of technology integration in modern ship management 
practices 
The data collection and analysis logically progressed to the issue of exploration of 
optimisation opportunities, a theme noted to be vehemently articulated during the 
interviews given the rising awareness of shortfalls, gaps and strengths discussed in 
technology induction and its integration. Ideas were exchanged on the proper exploitation 
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of advancements and capabilities rendered by improved information communication 
technology application as well as advanced process control and automation developments 
on ship machinery as identified in chapter 2 section 2.4. Furthermore, chapter 3 in its 
section 3.3 had offered strong arguments in favour of enhancing the optimisation potential 
of technology in shipping, ranging from lessons from other industries to being competitive 
through low costs and differentiation. It had also highlighted similar emerging trends in the 
more resourceful shipping of Western European nations in as much as technology is 
becoming more capable and rendering safer and greener operations.  
The participants were engaged in imaginative thinking on possibilities that may exist 
towards optimisation with increased capabilities due to technological advancements, 
however, never losing sight of constraints that accompanied every possibility. The 
companies were found to unanimously strongly acknowledge that ‘optimisation of 
resources’ was indeed another key theme which companies were pursuing in their pro-
active technology upgrade agenda. One interviewee from the company summed up: 
In the times of economic downturn and knife-edge competition, optimised resource 
management is the key. (Company B) 
6.9.1 Which process for optimisation will bear ‘low hanging fruits’? 
Technology integration into ship operation and ship management has been happening in 
many fronts, but what specific process would it be that had the major concerns and bore 
maximum potential for delivering optimisation was the question. That it had to be in the 
area of ‘Inspections and monitoring of vessel performance’ which was at the core of 
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Technical Management functions and seemed to have the maximum irritants, was the 
unanimous choice. 
Very specifically, the process of ‘Monitoring of fuel consumptions and vessel performance’ 
easily came out to be preferred area as could be inferred from one of the company 
managers’ remark: 
Without doubt the machinery and fuel performance system. With the soaring 
bunker fuel prices making it the biggest cost element, it is but naturally a 
priority area. There are tremendous advancements happening in this area and 
reportedly it is now possible for information to be relayed directly from the 
machinery systems that have become highly advanced with self-diagnostic and 
rectification capabilities. This will ease a lot of work load on ship’s staff. 
Accuracy is also bound to become sharper and most of all it will encourage 
transparency. We operate some tankers in Tanker Pool, so the Pool operators in 
as much as the Oil companies who charter our vessels will have direct access to 
fuel information and promote trust. Shipping is a big relationship business and 
trust building is at the core. (Company C) 
A manager from another company even provided statistics to prove the point: 
Rising fuel costs have turned the shipping economics on its head. Today the capital 
cost is becoming cheaper, but the cost of operating ships is soaring into the 
stratosphere. I have actually seen more regular recessions and crises in this industry 
rather than the far fewer and shorter booms. Today we have a topsy-turvy world in 
which the capital costs of a ship might be USD 17000 per day and USD 25000 will 
have to be spent daily on bunkers!  Today in Japan there is no less than a national 
effort being undertaken within the Japanese shipping and shipbuilding industry 
which focused on fuel consumption, with understandably no fewer than 22 different 
projects contributing to this research. (Company A) 
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Yet another manager from the third company was of the opinion that there was proliferation 
of technologies happening in the area of fuel consumption and its monitoring: 
Matter-of-fact, I feel that owners and builders need to work more closely together if 
there was to be continuous improvement in ship efficiency, and more operational 
data shared about how ships performed. I would go on to say that production 
technology needs to be properly assessed and proper oversight provided on the issue 
of competitiveness and the risk of oversupply! There could be too many 
technologies being developed and more coordination is needed. (Company B) 
Besides the stakeholders’ concerns, the development of a regulatory regime towards energy 
efficiency was cited by another interviewee:   
I must commend the progress being made by IMO in this respect, towards the 
adoption of Energy Efficiency Design Index and the Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan. These standards will encourage ship designers and builders to 
develop more efficient ships and the ship owners to further optimise on their 
operations contributing towards energy efficiency. (Company C)  
 
The ship’s staffs’ concerns also emphasised the need for looking into the ease of operations 
as an optimisation strategy. Their views were categorical and clearly portrayed the 
message. All four senior officers in Case D said: 
There is so much time and effort being taken up in this process of ‘Monitoring of 
fuel consumption and vessel performance’. There are daily reports, weekly reports, 
monthly reports, quarterly reports, half-yearly reports besides the special reporting 
that is not at fixed intervals. The master today is not a seaman anymore, he is a 
clerk. (M1) 
 
P&I Clubs are reporting growing number of accidents in which fatigue was 
identified as a major contributor. There is a need to ‘work smarter’, perhaps through 
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task analysis that will assess the optimum manpower needed for tasks and voyages. 
I actually know of some encouraging results with manpower software being tested 
by a reputed maritime administration, in which manning levels can be simulated and 
overburdened personnel can be helped with additional manpower! (CE1) 
 
As you said, convergence of Information Communication Technology, Advanced 
Process Control and Automation is indeed the new area of development enabling 
computerised monitoring of the engine with a direct feed to the office computer 
without any ship interface. Ships systems can be now accessed from any computer 
anywhere. (CE2) 
 
Communication and trust between ship and shore are key to the success of the 
system. (M2) 
The concerns from the perspective of the ships’ staff provided ample support to Knudsen’s 
(2009) research on paperwork in shipboard operation which revealed that a growing 
amount of paperwork has been implemented in a time where the size of the crew and its 
quality has been considerably declining. She concedes that it is undeniable that tight 
schedules, high workload and long working days are conditions most seafarers experience. 
6.10 Key findings 
The findings from this empirical study as discussed in this chapter thus provided a range of 
views from various perspectives to the practice of technology integration in the 
management of shipboard operations.  
While there was consistency seen across the case companies and the shipboard staff in the 
similar understanding of the various processes involved, there were differences too. These 
were largely between the overall companies’ approach to meet the objectives and the ships 
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staff’s version of the approach to the same objectives in some areas. This contrast and at 
time contradictory points of view has provided a rich understanding of the complex issue of 
integration of technology in the operationalisation of management practices.  
When it came to the compliance process there was no discord, and both the teams worked 
in unison, highlighting the effectiveness of the regulatory compliance regime in the 
shipping industry. However in the other processes of technical management, differences did 
manifest themselves in the process of operationalising the policies with the shipboard 
staffs’ feeling being left alienated of their opinion and concerns. 
In this summary the key message from the findings are reiterated against the original 
research questions raised in section 4.6.1. The first subsection read: 
What are the drivers for uptake of technology in the ship management industry? 
The answer seemed to suggest that enhanced regulatory compliance as well as customer 
created non-tariff trade barrier requirements both of which increasingly mandated the use of 
technology, were seen to be the main driving forces. There was however a need for a 
responsible compliance regime that would assess all risks and its cost-effectiveness prior 
mandating requirements.  The data showed that the drive for better economics and 
optimisation were other reasons pushing the technology agenda. However, this enthusiasm 
when weighted against the economic logic of returns on investment seemed to result in only 
incremental advances of technology without giving consideration to a holistic approach. 
There is thus a realisation of a lack of any scientific approach in integration of technology 
into shipping practices which consequently seemed to have resulted in its falling way short 
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on expectations. This concern was looked into in prior studies and featured in the 
discussion on the review of the literature in section 3.1. Thus the second question is there 
any scientific approach adopted in the technology application/integration in ship 
management practices, was answered as follows: 
From the findings there was no direct admission noted of this possibly for want of lack of 
awareness. The interviews revealed that unlike some of the leading technology-driven 
industries, there was limited use of a scientific approach adopted in the uptake of 
technology. 
Exploration of challenges in the management and operation with technology and 
automation was discussed as it was the next subsidiary enquiry which read: 
How well is the human-machine interaction addressed in the application/integration of 
technology in ship management practices, and what are the gaps if any for it to meet the 
objectives of enhanced performance, safety and user satisfaction?  
The findings from the study revealed striking gaps in cooperation and coordination, making 
the technology integration ineffective, even counter-productive. Technology being regarded 
by shore management as additional crew replacing humans did not find favour with the 
shipboard staff. Although it was acknowledged that the similar trend in future will be more 
determined by lack of availability of skilled staff and solutions worked around it. 
In the opinion of the ship’s staff it was the domineering role of the shore based 
management that was found to be even demeaning the strongly embedded practices of 
seamanship which define the shipboard team operations, became a bone of contention. The 
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acknowledgment of its existence by the shore based management and the directions of 
efforts to progressively close this gap, was however also seen to be existent. 
Consideration of crew conveniences through enabled technology signified the advent of the 
integration of social factors which was a positive trend. A sense of general willingness all-
around and the acceptance of the inevitable fact of technology integration into the practices 
of ship management and its operation were clearly discernible. It was no wonder then that 
the theme of bringing out improvements and optimisation of processes emerged strongly as 
a logical extension to the issues at hand which was then dealt with.  
These main findings synthesise into the following five areas which address the main and its 
subsidiary research questions: 
6.10.1 Reactionary technology uptake 
The main drivers for uptake of technology emerge to be compliance to customer 
requirements as well as regulatory mandate. The findings revealed that uptake of 
technology largely followed a reactionary approach despite the shipping industry being 
safety-critical. The study showed that a proactive stance towards value creation though 
fairly appreciated was overwhelmed by the economic considerations. Unfortunately this 
resulted in a reactive and cautionary incremental initiative causing even more challenges of 
technology integration. 
6.10.2 Limited scientific integration of technology 
Technology becomes a key driver of organisational evolution. Understanding whether and 
how it affects firm performance is an important research issue as it allows the value of such 
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investment being delivered to be appreciated. Whilst chapter 3 had dealt with the theory of 
technology integration, the empirical findings reveal very limited if any such organised and 
concerted effort behind technology induction and integration decisions.   Scanty literature 
on the subject in the maritime domain has already been identified in chapter 4. 
Consequences of poor integration then get amply reflected in shortfalls, gaps and uncalled 
for side-effects and may even be counterproductive.   
6.10.3 Limited human factors engineering 
Although the shipping literature has been acknowledging the role of humans in systems, the 
empirical data evidences continuing concern in its developmental phases with the human 
element not adequately being considered along with hardware and software elements. It 
was found that some of the fundamental principles of human factors engineering not 
considered were (a) description of human capacities, limitations, their needs, tasks and the 
environment they work in, and (b) characterising and evaluating alternative designs by 
trained human-systems design professionals. Particular attention needs to be paid to 
consideration of these factors in the system life cycle covering issues of manpower, 
personnel (aptitude and skills), training, safety, and health; the inadequacy getting reflected 
in the many challenges encountered in the operation and management of ships. 
6.10.4 Limited usability perspective 
The case study interviews amply demonstrated the failure to introduce usability 
perspectives early enough and the lack of effective methods and tools to predict its direct 
and ripple effects of envisioned future systems early in the design process. It was also 
found that there is even a tendency to focus on people as error-prone links in a system that 
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needs to be “automated away” rather than important contributors as its users. User analysis 
in early stages of design includes methods as contextual enquiry, scenarios, task analysis, 
cognitive task analysis, ethnography or participatory analysis (National Research Council, 
2007). New technologies provide new capabilities, and these often generate new 
expectations, roles and ways of doing things that are not always anticipated ahead of time 
(Woods and Dekker, 2000).The following quote from the findings of Lutzhoft (2004) on a 
related enquiry appropriately has noticeable parallels to the findings of this study. Her work 
revealed: 
Many ostensibly technically integrated maritime systems are neither well integrated 
from a human cooperative point of view, nor from a technical point of view. Work 
cannot be broken into pieces and then put back together again. New ways of 
designing for and thinking about the workplace are already in use in other domains. 
We suggest that cognitive tasks and social tasks should be the focus, not 
engineering and devices (p.88). 
6.10.5 Harnessing potential optimisation 
Finally, the findings from the interviews also revealed that a large scope for optimisation 
exists in considering process reengineering leveraging technology in the process of 
monitoring of fuel consumption and vessel performance. The very capable information 
communication technology (ICT) that is increasingly becoming available for deployment in 
the operations and management of ships is rendering such a possibility waiting to be 
harnessed. The respondents believed that this was certainly an area when evaluated from a 
risk assessment perspective of effort to outcome, would rate very high in terms of ‘low 
hanging fruits’ given the current environment of high fuel costs and pressures for energy 
efficiency related greener operations. 
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The exhaustive list of challenges and potential of technology integration in modern ship 
management practices as revealed in this study is further analysed in light of theories and 
previous academic work to gain an in-depth understanding of the causal factors influencing 
the practice. The following chapter elaborates on these as discussions.  
202 
 
Chapter 7: Discussions 
Introduction 
The analysis of the challenges and potential of technology integration in ship management 
practices leads to an informed discussion on the underlying causal factors contributing to 
the persistence of such challenges and the reasons for the tardy and decelerating progress in 
harnessing the potential of optimised operations. This chapter further deliberates upon the 
empirical findings of this study and analyses the issues with the help of academic literature 
and through a theoretical frame of reference against which ship management practice can 
be evaluated. In the process it attempts to find convincing answers for the research 
questions. 
Chapter 6 broadly summarised the challenges for reactionary technology uptake driven by a 
compliance culture, unscientific approach in executing technology integration, limited 
appreciation of human factors engineering in the industry and limited usability perspective 
in the early design stages itself. 
Each of the issues is discussed further in this chapter. 
7.1 Regulation driven compliance culture – pitfalls, theory and self-
governance 
The findings of the study indicated that the uptake of technology and its integration into 
ship operations was more a result of the dominant minimum compliance culture in a 
reactive stance rather than a proactive initiative. The myopic economic considerations of 
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low cost operations weighed heavily in any technology change decisions. The global 
industry environment proliferating varying degrees of quality standards in manning, 
technical management and operations was not conducive to support reliance on automated 
and technology integrated practices.  The industry is thus driven by sets of regulations 
originating from the IMO or as non-tariff trade barriers imposed by the customers of its 
services. It thus calls for in-depth deliberations on the underlying factors influencing the 
current practice in the industry.  
7.1.1 Pitfalls 
By re-examining the shipping industry in the context of this study, one finds that while 
globalisation does affect industry functions, the impacts on the shipping industry are far 
more significant. Being a truly fully globalised industry it tends to take economic 
advantages offered by this globalisation, with greatest impact being that of flagging out of 
the ships to Flags of Convenience (FOC) that offered liberalised regulatory regimes. While 
IMO as the specialised agency of United Nations is entrusted with the responsibility for 
measures to improve safety and pollution prevention, it facilitates adoption of legislation 
which is then left to be implemented by the member Flag states of which by and large the 
FOCs (also called ‘open registers’) particularly tend to put enforcement fairly low in 
priority. Alderton and Winchester (2002) actually note this trend as “de-regulation” of the 
maritime industry. They however make a distinction between the established open registers 
and the new entrants and note that the raison d’être behind these new entrants and its 
existence is due to the regulatory free environment they offer for the ship owner, exercising 
its sovereign privilege and creating an unregulated environment where capital is left free to 
act as it pleases. Progoulaki and Roe (2011) further suggest that ship management 
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companies engage the services of specialist crewing agents who offer competitive services 
by engaging labour from the new labour supply countries and intensify their use through 
reduced crewing levels and extended working hours afforded by registering vessels under 
FOCs associated with lower regulatory cost, weak labour rights and lower wage levels. 
They quote studies pointing out that the world’s largest fleets are attached to FOCs and 
over the last 25 years, 80% of the world merchant fleet has been manned with multicultural 
crew i.e. one ship having crew from different countries and different cultural backgrounds 
thus throwing up its own challenges. 
It thus leads to a false sense of complacency that mandating technology through regulation 
will be a panacea because the implementation of these regulations is still in the hands of the 
flag states. Thus all the push of technology through regulations is seriously threatened 
when it comes to the implementation stage. 
Discussions and deliberations in the IMO strongly suggests this and has enacted measures 
to control this trend through Port State Control (PSC) where government agencies inspect 
foreign ships that visit their ports and detain them if not meeting IMO standards. The 
primary responsibility for ships’ standards rests with the flag State – but port State control 
provides the ‘safety net’ to catch substandard ships. Another initiative has been Voluntary 
Member State Audit Scheme (VMSAS) which presently is voluntary, but is likely to be 
made mandatory by the year 2015. 
Key developments in PSC have been the adoption of a ‘name and shame’ policy of 
publishing detention lists and grading of flags in white, grey and black lists based on 
inspection and detention statistics as highlighted in section 3.3.5. It also provides useful 
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performance-measuring tools to flags themselves and the recognised organisations (ROs) 
delegated by flags to carry out statutory surveys, as well as to ship operators and charterers. 
One measure of the success of PSC might be in the fact that Liberia, the flag flown by the 
Amoco Cadiz, known for its oil spill off the coast of northern France, now regularly 
features on the main white list. Flying a white-list flag, a ship is less likely to be inspected, 
a fact that could influence a ship owner in the choice of register.   
The benefit of voluntary auditing through VMSAS is seen in those flags that have gone 
through the process being rewarded for their commitment to improve standards by 
inclusion in a ‘whiter than white’ list that has two criteria: inclusion in the main white list 
and evidence of an IMO audit. 
7.1.2 Regulation of technology - the theoretical framework 
Technology and regulation are often looked upon as adversaries, with technology 
symbolising markets, enterprise and growth and regulation representing government, 
bureaucracy and limits to growth. Wiener (2004) concedes that to some extent this conflict 
is inevitable. Regulations do exercise considerable influence on the rate of technological 
change. However, it is also argued that newer products and devices are safer and less 
polluting so any regulation meant to reduce risk should not inhibit new technology. In this 
way regulations could contribute to conserving resources and giving innovative edge. In a 
global scenario like that of shipping, one fall-out is that if the technology move is costly, 
the economically advanced countries that regulate first take the lead in selling new 
technologies to countries that follow. It is often reported that it is this club of economically 
advanced countries and the body of technology suppliers who enjoy consultative status at 
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the IMO which dominate the proceedings in pushing the technology agenda. Often this is 
done behind the shield of safety enhancement that finds appeal and ready buy-in. This quite 
conforms to the leading theory of regulatory politics that concentrated industry groups 
could capture regulation and bend it to serve their own interests (Wiener, 2004).These 
suppliers put up a barrage of prominent eye-catching graphics extolling the virtues of 
technology and it takes a while to scratch beneath the surface to discover a slightly less 
enthusiastic take on the matter.  In a bid for exclusivity on products supply the user’s 
perspectives or need for standardisation are found to be overlooked with the self-serving 
objectives.   
It thus calls for exercising care and caution in framing regulations. Indeed there can be 
more imaginative ways of rulemaking and it is not necessary to view its impact on 
technology integration as straightforward accelerating or retarding the initiative. Different 
regulatory mechanisms do exist like performance standards, management system 
requirements, taxes and incentives, tradable allowances, information disclosure etc. that can 
effect differently and influence consequences.  Thus for example, a technology requirement 
approach may turn out to be less effective at stimulating technology change than a 
performance standard or tradable allowance as in carbon emissions. If say scrubbers were 
mandated for washing off the sulphur-di-oxide emissions prior to its release to atmosphere, 
firms would have lesser incentives to invent better methods. The Goal Based Standards 
(GBS) approach now being adopted by the IMO is one such example where the IMO would 
state what has to be achieved, leaving classification societies and ship designers the 
freedom to decide how best to employ their professional skills to meet the requirements.   
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Another major development is the regulatory impact assessments to forecast the impacts of 
new regulations before their enactment through Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) thus 
encouraging regulatory innovation in testing alternate designs of technology and regulation 
and selecting the best. The IMO is seen to be adopting this of late that promises enabling 
balance between various technical and operation issues, including the human element and 
between safety and costs. However, as yet there are few empirical investigations of actual 
impacts sighted. 
A strategy much used particularly in the area of environment protection is “technology 
forcing” where the regulator specifies a standard that cannot be met with existing 
technology, or at least not at an acceptable cost (Gerard and Lave, 2005). The intent is to 
elicit advances in technology and force firms to invest in R&D, whereas firms want 
regulators to delay or relax standards. The outcome of such conflicts then determines the 
rate of technological innovation and its diffusion. This option may enjoy more political 
support than others like gasoline taxes. The IMO in its efforts towards mandatory energy 
efficiency measures for international shipping is seen to embrace this approach with its 
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships along with its set of guidelines. A 
more tempered approach is with the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) 
that uses the management system approach and provides a mechanism for operators to 
improve their energy efficiency of ships over time.  
7.1.3 Self-governance 
The regulatory framework in the shipping industry in practice extends much beyond the 
IMO and flag states. The fragmentation of the industry and the range of organisations and 
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decision – making structures involved can be illustrated by the typical example of a 
German owned ship flying a Panama flag, manned by Indian officers and Filipino crew 
carrying Saudi crude oil to Japan. The ship may be classed with the Norwegian 
classification society, have her hull and machinery insurance placed in London and her 
cargo insurance in Paris. 
With such a multitude of stakeholders of different nationalities, the regulation of the 
shipping industry is inevitably complex. There are then intra- and inter-organisational 
relationships within and among the various members of the global maritime community. 
These intermediary organisations also interact to form both systems of self-governance and 
private systems of governance. Examples are the International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(INTERTANKO), International Association of Dry Cargo Ship Owners (INTERCARGO), 
etc. Porter (1995) points out that INTERTANKO is a good example of self-governance 
where membership is subject to a number of requirements, and members found not in 
compliance may be expelled from the association. Classification Societies, Marine 
Insurance companies and Protection and Indemnity (P&I Clubs, who are concerned with 
safety of crew and integrity of cargo), also have the ability to set standards of accountability 
among ship owners and ship operators (Fueger, 1997). 
Social rules, practices and standards of accountability characterise an industry at any given 
time and have as significant an impact on safety and environmental protection as traditional 
command-and-control regulations by the State that rest on tacit assumption that government 
regulations are the only source of accountability. Self-regulation is in fact a notable trait of 
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professional organisations. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s discussion of 
intermediary organisations analyses business groups and states: 
Neither political society in its entirety, nor the state can take over function of rule-making 
as the economic life in its specialisation grows more specialised every day and escapes their 
competence and action. ‘An occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a 
group intimate enough with it to know its functioning....’ (Durkheim, 1933:5) 
In the maritime industry it was the insurance sector that created the classification societies 
as a way to reduce uncertainty and to manage marine risk. Many classification societies 
have now assumed statutory functions on behalf of flag states thus blurring the distinction 
between intermediary institution and a system of self-governance. Abrasions in as much as 
lowering of standards have been noticed though, because classification societies are not 
monopolistic and have competitive practices, a trend noted in times of sluggish demand for 
ships when ship owners in a bid to cut operating expenses engaged in ‘class hopping’. Also 
a case in point was the use of high tensile steel and poor design produced by shipyards that 
led to a number of bulk carrier losses in the mid-80s (ABS, 1992; Intercargo, 1995).  
However it is notable that the marine system of governance has displayed a surprising 
ability to address its own institutional failures in a timely manner. Marine insurers being 
institutional counterparts to classification societies, could force ship owners to be registered 
with reputable classification societies to obtain adequate insurance and a superimposed 
system of self-governance in IACS came to be exercised (Furger, 1997). IACS adopted 
developing Common Structural Rules (CSR) to remove variations and achieve consistency, 
and further to be incompliance with IMO's Goal Based Standards. This changes the 
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century-long practice of independent classification rule making and also marks a significant 
step taken by IMO, as it has never been involved in the past in the detailed convention 
requirements for the structures of the ships (Kim, 2005).The IACS press release of 2
nd 
July 
2012 confirms the placing of draft IACS harmonised CSR on its website and states that the 
harmonisation project is also set out to achieve full compliance with the IMO's GBS which 
comes into force in the middle of 2016 (IACS, 2012). 
There hence could be more such initiatives of self-governance in place of the ineffective 
regulatory regime. 
In summary, in a global shipping environment with fragmented structures of organisation 
and split incentives for number of stakeholders in a venture, if regulation, as it strongly 
emerges, is to be the basic means of driving technology uptake, then it is calls for far more 
caution and imagination in its making and its implementation. 
7.2 Unscientific approach 
Another key finding of this study had noted that the root cause of many challenges with 
poorly integrated technology had been the very unscientific approach in its induction and 
integration into the operations and management practices.  Reactionary compliance culture 
that so dominates the industry has the fall out that any progress is then driven largely by 
findings of accidents and incidents. It is here that one has a fleeting glimpse of the less 
orderly mix of technology and science. However, since it is seen this way only around 
accidents, one tends to believe that in normal cases the practices are more orderly, failing to 
see that the seafarer as operator makes a construct of workable technology alignments even 
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with malfunctions and deficiencies. In effect this becomes a reckless and irresponsible 
judgement call on the part of those in-charge taking failure within 'acceptable' bounds. Thus 
failure gets redefined and abnormality becomes the new normal and evolving practices then 
make operating rules which in time get recapitulated into updated formal codes of practice. 
It is least appreciated that evolution of such operating practices has resulted from the 
practical contextualisation of technology that the seafarer copes with and is a steady 
accumulation of empirical experience by precedent of the technology-social structure 
paradigm (Wynne, 1988).    
Shipping has been seeing a conflict in the approach to technology with the policy field 
being dominated by the premise that treats technology as autonomous with the non-social 
domain. Technologies are evaluated by their external effects or risks alone and not by the 
relationships which are intrinsic to them. The concept of technology as social organisation 
has been far less influential, that examines the design needed to ensure technology's overall 
viability. These questions have at best been haphazard and vague and a better focus is 
accorded by examining the need to apply the sociology of scientific knowledge to a better 
understanding of technology for its application in shipping (Perrow, 1984). 
The socio-technical system that constitutes and characterises the work in the shipping 
domain has ingredients in humans (e.g. crew members), groups (e.g. the crew), technology 
(ship, instruments, equipment), work practice (procedures, convention, traditions), 
organisation (management, company culture, pressures etc.) and work environment (light, 
noise, vibration etc.). A breakdown in the socio-technical system could be related to or 
caused by poor design  of equipment (human-technology), inconsistency between work 
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practice and written procedure (work practice-organisation), crew stress caused by 
company pressure (human- organisation), poor communication between crew members 
(human-group) or fatigue caused by vibrations or noise (human-group-work environment) 
(Koester, 2005). The academic literature review and empirical findings of this thesis 
provide ample evidence of this fact.  The network is illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: The socio-technical network. Source: Koester, T. (2005). 
A typical case of optimisation recommended by Goulielmos and Tzannatos, (1997) for 
ship's bridge operations illustrates the application of above concept. The bridge operator's 
knowledge and skill together with his psychological and physiological capabilities get 
enhanced through measures on following three aspects: 
1. Ergonomic aspect: 
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- physical optimisation of bridge environment, i.e. illumination, temperature, vibrations, 
odours, noise. 
- design of controls, equipment, systems and work-stations based on analysis of 
anthropometrics 
2. Organisational aspects: 
-  allocation, sequencing and scheduling of tasks, work and shift cycles, 
- improvement of organisational attitudes and goals and practices concerning safety, 
3. Personal aspects: 
-  improvement of psychological and psychological conditions like vision, audition, 
information processing, skill level, expertise and manual performance, 
- compatibility of person and environment through safety motivation, high level of training 
and practice, optimisation of work-load, and control of types and level of stress. 
The bridge operator's capability is critical to shipping safety because they still exercise 
judgement and decision making. However, the findings from this study showed no 
evidence of the practice of technology integration in the shipping industry taking into 
account ergonomics, organisational or indeed personal aspects involving the operation. 
Lack of any such scientific approach in technology integrated bridge operations as an 
example then manifests into its many challenges as identified in the findings. 
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What restricts the adoption and application of such a scientific approach is arguably the 
politics of regulation at IMO that gets so dominated by the group of technology 
manufacturers each proclaiming its many virtues, but seen to be evolved devoid of holistic 
scientific research into its ultimate application in the unique working environment of a ship. 
The fragmented structure of the globalised industry with many actors and stakeholders in a 
common venture of a typical sea voyage as seen in the findings, affords no real incentive to 
further the proper and scientific research and development agenda for the industry. The 
technology that gets pushed in with such a lack of concerted approach remains largely un-
optimised even counter-productive as is seen with the many challenges in its operation and 
management. 
As such verifying the ways in which regulation of technology uptake was introduced to the 
industry was beyond the scope of this research. Debate in the wider academic literature 
(Gereffi, 1999; Kaplinsky, 2010) however suggests that private commercial players 
involved in selling technology or indeed in other forms of business are driven by sales 
figures, which is a measure of penetration into the market and increasing their share of the 
market. Particularly in technology related markets the producer-driven commodity chains 
use barriers to generate returns from scarce assets that arise from asymmetrical access to 
key products and process technologies.  Consultation on the usability of the product 
involving the end-user issues is seldom given top importance. Issues involving physical 
optimisation of the work environment, anthropometrics and psychological conditions 
demand a high degree of R&D involvement and commitment from the private company 
players. In the current market driven business environment such investment both in terms 
of commercial resource and long-term engagement with users are unlikely to be voluntarily 
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complied with. In view of this greater regulatory control is often seen as the only 
alternative. 
Arguably in order to stem this route of ineffective implementation of technology on board 
ships there is a need for greater degree of regulatory control at the top level. The current 
arrangement and the level of supervision from the regulators expose lack of appreciation 
and/or involvement of the ways in which the commercial players influence the adaptation 
of technology. Perhaps what is required is to take into account the various usability 
concerns before manufacturing and selling their products to ship-owners. 
This issue is further explored in the following subsection. 
7.3 Why limited human factors engineering (HFE) 
Another causal factor for the various challenges in technology integrated operations was 
found to be poor adoption of human factors engineering (HFE). HFE brings to design 
engineering concerns about anthropometric limits, visual and motor sensitivity, cognitive 
capacity and memory limits, and workload capacities. With this missing, the design 
engineers are unaware of the organisational context in which the operator functions. 
The cause for neglect of HFE in design rests with the users and consumers of this design, 
who in shipping either make the design in-house or specify them to the vendors who 
produce them. The empirical data reveals that they do not want to be bothered with them 
and are also incapable of appreciating them. The influencing factors of low cost economic 
logic that dominates this sector of transportation industry coupled with the volatility of the 
shipping business restricts committed technology integration and many ship owners end up 
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as mere asset players playing the cyclic market with frequent buying and selling off of 
ships or moving them through third party managers and flags with the sole aim of profit 
making at any cost.  The consequences are borne by the operator seafarer. Short of a well-
publicised catastrophe, the design engineer will probably never know the consequences of 
his or her design, and the top management will hear of it faintly and not until the next 
project is already under construction. They do not hear because as is seen earlier, the costs 
are borne by those who must make the system work on a daily basis. The operators’ 
argument that it is poorly designed is judged by everyone else as self-serving. 
Traditionally the design and operating logic are to some degree contradictory. For instance, 
a good design is compact, but from an operator's view point there must be easy and logical 
access to controls and to system-state information as well as easy maintainability.  A good 
design would favour a dedicated single-purpose information source and control, but a safe 
and flexible operation may require many entry points into the system for confirming 
information from different sources. 
HFE as a discipline is fully engrained into other high risk industries like aviation, but rarely 
talked of in shipping, even in formal accident investigations. The prevailing view is that 
failures are the result of operators’ errors rather than design engineers or top management. 
HFE on the other hand talks of design-induced errors or 'forced errors' due to 
circumstances. Assigning 'human error' as the cause is not only convenient from liability 
and insurance point of view but also wards off the despair in connection with systems 
which can have catastrophic potential. Otherwise it may lead to conclusion that if we 
cannot engineer safe systems then we should not build them. Furthermore, it is also argued 
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that managers largely subscribe to the human error theory that assumes workers behaving 
irrationally or wrongly applying the rule or plain being unmotivated as main cause for 
workplace accidents and incidents. As a result the corrective actions get directed to tackling 
seafarers’ behavioural attributes rather than the root cause of accidents (Bhattacharya, 
2009). 
HFE is thus more tolerant towards operators than the design engineers or top management. 
It can identify deceptive error inducing control panel designs, task overloads and difficult 
system comprehension that produce forced errors. Coupled with operational pressures such 
poor designs encourage and necessitate overriding conceptualised procedural safeguards 
(Perrow, 1983). As technological systems increase in complexity, the gap between the 
human operator and technical system tends to increase as well. Occupational ergonomics as 
interplay of human, technology and organisation in the process of design and organisation 
of tasks and work environment is an area much neglected in the shipping industry and as 
Osterman (2012) suggests, it is an area of potential to develop in the effort to optimise 
maritime operations. 
7.4 Why limited user perspective 
Yet another causal factor resulting in many challenges of ship operation has been identified 
as inadequate user perspective in the design of technology integrated devices. In 
considering the drive for efficiency, it is important to understand both error and resilience, 
and to consider in greater depth, the role of human interaction in the socio-technical system 
of the ship operating in the global maritime complex.  
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Usability is now widely recognised as critical to the success of an interactive system or 
product. It renders increased productivity as it allows the user to concentrate on the task 
rather than the tool. The achievement of usability within system design requires a 
combination of the following (WMU, 2012) all of which have been the empirical findings 
of this thesis as discussed in chapter 6: 
a. Careful planning of the human-centred design process 
b. Understanding the context of use for the system as a basis for identifying requirements and 
evaluating the system 
c. Understanding and specifying user requirements in a clear manner which can be assessed 
for achievement. 
d. System and user interface development based on an iterative approach. 
e. Utility evaluation based on both expert and user testing at appropriate points. 
In the compliance culture of shipping, the classification societies' requirements that 
dominate the industry always viewed the ship as a system and never focused on the 
seafarers or their operating environment. There are occasions where the operating 
environment makes it difficult for a ship's crew to achieve the desired compliance standard 
expected by a classification society (Goss, 1991). 
The governing boards of classification societies do not have representation of seafarers or 
people who use their services. Rather it is the ship owners, ship builders and insurers that 
dominate the board. This may tend to bias the focus of the classification societies towards 
the interest of its constituent members. Furthermore, no system of feedback exists from 
seafarers direct to classification societies when they face undesirable outcomes. This results 
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in a situation that only takes into account the ship owner’s view who is the prime customer 
for the services of the classification societies and procedures may get biased towards 
economy of operations rather than safety. 
It is also noted that most of the interaction that the seafarers have with class surveyors is at 
the busiest times of operations in port and also the focus is on compliance lest seafarer be 
rewarded negatively, and this makes him take up a yet more defensive attitude. 
Another reason for a lack of user perspective is the fragmentation of stakeholders in the 
industry as highlighted earlier in the chapter. With the flagging out of ships to FOCs and 
resorting to cheaper crew recruitment from crewing agencies, there is a sense of dislocation 
and distancing of the seafarer from the managing entity of the ship. This leads to 
dysfunctional communications between the two, further aggravated by their cultural 
differences. The perceived distance seems smaller rendered by advanced communication 
and results in excessive control by the shore staff and its related consequences as noted in 
the findings. There is a sense of loss of autonomy on-board, excessive paperwork leading to 
fatigue and worse still is the sense of mistrust, being used as a scapegoat in fixing 
accountability thus exacerbating the ship-shore divide. The empirical findings had 
suggested shore management exercising a panoptic control over the ship operations in the 
wake of advanced technologies. It may be reiterated that the origins of panopticism were as 
much in social architecture – in a concern for the criminal and the vulnerable – as they were 
in prison design, as a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism with the ever-visible 
inmate always the object of information, never a subject in communication (Foucault, 
1977). It however evolved to a more generalised model as an expression in a pure form of a 
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realisable technology of power to maintain a general reign of docile subjectivities, doomed 
to fail (Boyne, 2000).  
The Danish Maritime Authority (DMA, 2011) report on administrative burdens
19
 on 
seafarers, points out the lack of responsiveness on shore side to look into the consequences 
of new paperwork and procedures introduced on vessels with not enough channels for 
communication and also not much cognisance taken of them either. The result of such a 
dysfunctional feedback mechanism is a feeling of alienation to the rules and procedures 
especially those constructed in office and far from the reality of the seafarer. 
With limited user perspective, the top driven technology application finds greater resistance 
and limited influence particularly in the shipboard environment that demonstrates a strong 
sense of a community of practices. Individuals in the community held together by informal 
relationships through which they share identity, unity of purpose and shared experiences 
within a particular domain of knowledge that develops perspectives, practices and 
approaches (Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, 2002) get much amplified given the ship’s 
geographical isolation, tough work environment and further accentuated by the sense of 
alienation from own management ashore. The strength of communities of practise lies in 
providing the much needed psychosocial elements that make up the knowledge 
management (Rivera, 2011) and a perceived ship-shore divide does not particularly help in 
                                                          
19
 In this study burdens are defined as administrative work which in the opinion of the seafarer is 
not adding value proportionate to the resources that the seafarer will have to put into the work to 
comply with specific rule and requirement. The burden is thus work that does not make any sense 
to the seafarer and which causes frustration and affects both efficiency and job satisfaction in a 
negative way.  
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effectively managing a knowledge base with a deficient cultural and behavioural 
dimension. 
In view of the hardened community of practice matured over time in a unique work 
environment that is difficult to penetrate, there is possibly a need to reconsider the evolving 
framework of technology integration on a platform of an ‘emerging’ community of practice 
that embraces the technology enabled shore based organisation into the fold. As Lesser and 
Storck (2001) confirm it is indeed such a platform that will encourage creation of trust and 
mutual respect and the formation of another common language and context among 
members of the evolving community. Creating a newer community of practice as a 
paradigm to create and disseminate knowledge is also recommended by Easterby-Smith, 
Snell and Gherardi (1998) as such communities then have a clear understanding of the 
knowledge domain in their organisation and represent an excellent mechanism to help 
companies in transforming tacit knowledge to more explicit. It will be necessary to know 
how the human beings at both ends of the ship-shore communication construct knowledge 
in social and dynamic interaction that will create an environment which will lead to 
continuous learning in an organisation (Lave and Wenger, 1991). However, as Liedtka 
(1999) cautions, only communities operating on good value systems will encourage 
organisation learning and practices to be grounded on goal congruence basis among all 
members as a primary value, and keep them nimble to adapt to continuous change. 
The above discussions highlight the underlying causal factors of the challenges to effective 
technology integration and accounts for the persisting gap in the intent and the outcomes of 
such integration. 
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The data findings in section 6.8.2 however showed that there is no dearth in technology 
appetite from a shipboard standpoint. So also it noted that the shore based management was 
convinced of the potential of proper technology integration delivering on value additions. 
The following section develops on the empirical findings of suggested potentials in specific 
areas and substantiates this view. 
7.5 Optimisation potential and its value proposition 
The data findings had exemplified substantial optimisation potential particularly in the 
process of monitoring of fuel consumption and vessel performance. As the review and 
analysis progressed interplaying the exchange of ideas within the case studies, a focus on 
reengineering of this process to eliminate, combine, change sequence, simplify  and then 
apply the improvement strategy emerged. Process reengineering with its principles in a 
systems approach affords waste elimination, simplification, integration and automation, a 
theme found to be central to the perceived challenges in the empirical findings. Effective 
reengineering is seen to be enabled through modelling of processes that provides visibility 
to the process. Froholdt (2012) explains that in the academic disciplines of investigation in 
human factors, the role of design draws upon and contributes to engineering approaches for 
systems analysis and modelling. Furthermore, the representation of information flow 
between people and technology as used in process modelling draws upon and contributes to 
computer, communication and information science. In cognitive engineering, analysis and 
modelling techniques are applied to inform the overall design of human-technology 
systems.  
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Jackson (2000) draws on the respective strengths of the social sciences and systems 
traditions to further enhance their working together and argues that in the area of practical 
task of managing problems and bringing about change, this approach is very strong. Such 
an approach encourages analysis of the needs and expectations, in this case of the charterers 
and ship owners, definition of the processes to enable contribution to the outputs, and also 
keeps the processes under control. It thus provides a good framework for driving 
improvements and optimisation and increases the probability of enhancing the satisfaction 
levels of the interested parties. It is a powerful way of organising and managing activities to 
create value for the stakeholders. 
Another major advantage of this approach is in the management and control of the 
interactions between these processes and the interfaces between functional hierarchies of 
the organisation, typified in this case as shipboard functions and shore based organisation. 
It introduces horizontal management, crossing the barriers between different functional 
units and unifying their focus to the main goals of the organisation. It also improves the 
management of process interfaces.  
Reengineering of the process of ‘Monitoring of fuel consumption and vessel performance’ 
on the above principles is thus envisaged to render the following advantages: 
(a) It would establish transparency. The charterer who normally pays for the fuel costs can 
directly access real-time fuel consumption from the machinery and there is no need for 
reporting on the same either by the ship’s staff or more conventionally by the technical 
managers ashore, giving rise to doubts on covering up for inefficient excess fuel 
consumptions. 
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This in turn would afford excellent relationship building between the charterers and ship 
owners / ship managers, which is a key component of shipping business. This business is 
not a one-time transaction but a continuous interaction upon which stable, long term 
relationships are built. ‘Trust’ being inherent to relationships, comprises perceived 
integrity, willingness to reduce uncertainty, expertise, congeniality and timeliness 
(Panayides and Gray, 1997). 
Furthermore, Jessen (2003) researching on the innovation led competitiveness of the 
Norwegian shipping industry, reports that a strong relationship with demanding customers 
is important for driving innovation, and that experts ranked this as the most important 
factor for innovation in the shipping industry. Many services created by the company were 
in response to and with close cooperation with customers, which then creates crucial value 
for the business.   
(b) Elimination of paperwork and avoidance of duplication of paperwork. The daily, 
monthly, and voyage reporting need not take place between ship and shore thus much 
reducing the workloads on ship staff thus lessening the administrative burden as the 
findings had conveyed.  
The ship staff would get more time at hand to focus on tasks demanded of efficient watch-
keeping that otherwise would go wasted in manual checking of fuel consumption, analysis 
of performances and reporting of data to shore based managers. Data management becomes 
easier with utilities like on-line entry of data, single point of storage, automatic logging of 
all technical data and data being conveniently available in remote offices for usage. The 
whole process of information exchange becomes more efficient, reliable and accurate. The 
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ship operation and management as well as the ship-shore cooperation would become much 
more efficient in timely, reliable and accurate data and information exchange with the shore 
based management and other interested parties. 
It would render easy application of data analysis tools for driving efficiency, in as much as 
making available data archive for decision support systems. It would also afford 
compatibility for data transfer to other systems for usage and it also could provide truthful 
evidence in case of disputes.    
 All the above factors are seen to contribute immensely to the employee well-being on the 
ships. Although there is no generally agreed definition of employee well-being, theory and 
research has focused on topics such as physical and mental health, job satisfaction, 
employee morale, stress, motivation, organisational commitment and climate (Grawitch, 
Gottschalk  and Munz, 2006).  
 ( c) Definitive cost advantage would accrue because of: 
(i) Savings in fuel consumption. 
(ii) Reduction in off-hires and charter disputes. Charter disputes frequently occur on 
account of causes attributed to discrepancies in fuel consumptions against as agreed in the 
charter party document. 
(iii) Reduced communication costs 
(iv) Time savings that accrue in the process of data collecting and reporting. 
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(d) Improved compliance to energy efficient operations requirement and greenhouse gases 
emission. 
All these above factors are seen to be readily addressed by this reengineered process and 
opined so by the case study participants who confirmed that, that was the way forward, in 
some form or other. 
Furthermore, recent relevant literature too has been found to report advancements in similar 
directions using similar methodology. The World Maritime University (WMU, 2012) notes 
the Vessel Performance Management Service (VPMS), which is a decision support service 
for monitoring and controlling fuel efficiency recently introduced by Maersk line. This 
service is based on the ship’s daily reporting of operational data, and is designed to 
optimise the operation and technical management of hull, propeller and main engine 
performance and voyage efficiency. The system provides daily reporting on a range of 
performance metrics including hull and propeller performance, lubrication oil performance, 
voyage abstracts and statistics and the vessel’s operational efficiency. Some key metrics 
such as main engine SFOC (specific fuel oil consumption) performance, main engine load 
profile, and emissions are calculated dynamically and in real-time.  
Relevant to this context is an important study by Liang et al. (2010) who conducted a meta-
analysis of 42 published empirical studies to examine how different factors from the 
resource-based view affect firm performance. They contend that it is unclear whether a 
direct relationship exists between IT resources in organisations (as those that could be used 
in the above process reengineering) and their performance; hence they adopt an indirect 
model using a third construct -organisational capabilities as a mediator between resources 
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and performance. Organisational capabilities refer to the ability that an organisation 
assembles, integrates, and deploys its valued resources to build unique competencies, deal 
with environmental changes and management challenges. The major argument is that IT 
resources can enhance organisational capabilities through integration and synergy, which 
can then improve firm performance.  
The distinction between resources and their capabilities is that: a resource is an observable 
(not necessarily tangible e.g. software) asset that can be independently valued and traded, 
while capability is unobservable and hence necessarily intangible, cannot be independently 
valued, and changes hands only as part of its entire unit (Makadok, 2001).  
Liang et al. (2010) further state that technological resources can significantly improve 
organisational capabilities. Its impact on both internal capabilities, i.e. ability to utilise 
resources that can enhance internal control, strengthen cooperation, improve capacity of 
system and deployment; and external capabilities, i.e. ability to adapt to external 
environment, facing the market and customer needs; are again positively significant and 
affect firm performance. Furthermore, organisation resources positively affect 
organisational efficiency through its impact on internal capabilities. 
This distinction helps the appreciation of the optimisation potential that is envisaged in this 
section and shows that there is scope for optimisation of management processes through 
proper deployment and integration of technology in the critical ship-shore interface process.  
The next chapter now draws out the conclusions of this research. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
After discussing the causal factors of the challenges with technology integration in modern 
ship management practices and elucidating the optimisation potential, this chapter sums up 
the overall findings of the study and rationalises the gap in light of prevailing theories and 
framework generally applicable across industry sectors. It then makes policy 
recommendations towards addressing these gaps as a way forward for the shipping 
industry. Finally, it reflects on the methods and contribution of the study before 
acknowledging its limitations and suggesting further work. 
The pace of technology invasion in shipping operations had picked up significantly since 
the early 1990s. Unmanned machinery spaces (UMS), as a Class notation was already 
existent for many ships even then, precluding the necessity for a qualified engineer to man 
the machinery spaces 24 hours in constant attendance. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
had revolutionised the conduct of navigation since then. Satellite communication systems 
had made the position of Radio Officer on-board ships redundant. Planned Maintenance 
Systems (PMS) as a software based system greatly aiding technical management was 
already making inroads. Yet the industry was plagued with issues such as fatigue, 
administrative burdens and technology assisted accidents. While technology advancements 
were designed to be contributing to minimising task complexity and in mitigating human 
errors, it had created new problems in human-machine misfits. The user system interfaces 
were not aligned with actual usage or need in specific contexts.  Clearly the process of 
technology induction and integration into modern shipping practices was wanting, that was 
leaving a large gap in its intent and delivery on performance.  Questions were raised guided 
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by the review of the literature which led to the development of the main enquiry - What are 
the challenges and potential of the technological advancements and its 
application/integration in modern ship management practices? 
To be able to answer the research enquiry comprehensively, a case study approach was 
adopted using semi-structured interviews, group interviews, observations, analysis of 
documents as basic research tools as described in chapter 5. The research studied the 
induction and integration of technology in the technical management systems of the 
company that primarily interfaced closely with the ship and was central to management 
practices. Three companies of mutually diverse ownership and operation structures 
impacting technical management were the cases studied. The fourth case comprised of 
interviews using purposeful selection technique of senior ships staff that enriched the study 
with the important shipboard perspectives. The analysis and synthesis of data has led to the 
key findings constituting the challenges and potential of technology integration into modern 
ship management practices along with their underlying causal factors. The following 
sections provide the concluding perspective. 
8.1 The technology integration gap 
This research has shown that the seafarers who are at the cutting edge of delivering on 
ship’s performance for the shipping industry are not in the least averse to technology 
integration. There is no vacuum towards this initiative from the shipboard standpoint. For 
example during the fieldwork of this study the enthusiasm towards handling the latest 
technology that in particular reduced their administrative burden or made operations easy 
for them was amply discernible. So also their vehement assertion of the existence of large 
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potential for optimised operations through enabling technology that could also enhance 
their own safety further affirms the notion. 
However the evolving structure of the industry under the influence of forces of 
globalisation in which it exists, are seen to create failures and barriers in its holistic and 
well founded implementation. The main challenges thrown up due to this scenario were 
seen to be as below: 
The main drivers for technology uptake were seen to be more as a reactionary stance of 
compliance to the requirements of regulations and customer directives rather than a 
proactive initiative as a value proposition guiding organisations towards satisfied 
constituents and sustainable value creation.  
The economic logic of low cost operation underpins every technology change decision and 
the cost-benefit analysis remains myopic to short term financial returns on investment. The 
ship manager, in keeping to business objectives fails to undertake any initiative on 
technology implementation and is driven by the regulatory demands. As a result such 
implementation takes the shape of mere incremental advancement without considering its 
design, operational constraint or impact. The regulatory drive in turn originates from the 
business initiatives taken by the private entrepreneurial organisations promoting such 
technology without any in-depth understanding of usage circumstances. This technology 
push is largely proposed keeping in mind the need for greater safety in industry operations. 
Thus the need for enhancing safety in the industry is made to take the centre stage, which 
being a safety critical industry cannot ignore. The concept and the scope of technology 
integration are largely drawn from similar forms of technology already in use in other 
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industries. The literature review showed evidences of a far greater degree of technology 
interventions in industries such as aviation, medical sciences and process industries, but as 
compared to shipping industry the interventions in such industries were based on a much 
more robust fundamental research application (Perrow, 1983). 
Some of the features of the shipping industry which are not directly connected to the 
implementation process of shipboard technology nonetheless have a profound impact on 
the final outcome. The industry’s fragmented structure fails to encourage any such holistic 
and concerted approach to technology integration. It is seen that in the globalised shipping 
environment there are a myriad of actors in a common enterprise. This gives rise to a split-
incentives phenomenon. The ship owner, particularly if he himself is a mere asset player 
who finds himself not reaping the full benefits, with the ultimate beneficiaries of 
technology change being many other actors in the business. The fragmentation and lack of 
genuine interest in the value of technology implementation is then reflected in the way in 
which it is implemented and operated in practice. Not much attention is paid to whether 
such implementation benefits the operators or not but what was evident from the study was 
that such implementation was seen as a cost and the management were keen to see that its 
immediate benefits were realised. The reduction in crew size is thus considered as a natural 
and inevitable corollary as it is equated with the cost that needed to be recovered due to 
implementation of ‘expensive’ technology on ships. Arguably in some cases the 
implementation of technology in this way is seen as a good return on investment and the 
implementation of technology itself is a ploy to reduce expenses on manpower. 
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Technology excuse thus gets pushed to reduce on-board crew numbers below the optimum. 
This gets coupled with a lack of learning opportunity and experience in an automated 
environment which then proves risky in situations of abnormality or emergency. Also often 
the seafarer who is not an electronics expert is ill-equipped to handle automation faults. 
Thus reduced and inexperienced crewing only adds a layer of complexity adding to 
seafarers’ stress and fatigue. Skilling issues prevail within the industry which is left 
grappling with the up-skilling/deskilling dilemma in light of poor technology integration. It 
is seen that while technology intervention incentivises crew reduction and allows for a 
cheaper deskilled workforce, in reality poorly integrated technology integration demands 
placing up-skilled and not down-skilled shipboard workforce. In practice abnormality and 
emergency, even occasional technology failure demands highly skilled crew to be able to 
adequately respond to out of the normal operational needs.  
What was also evident from the study was the technology aided panopticism of the shore 
based management which proves detrimental to independent and trustworthy work 
environment on-board ships, thus exacerbating the traditional ship-shore divide. The study 
showed that the application of technology was interpreted to the advantage of the 
management to the extent that it was felt that in practice the usage of technology is skewed 
to work largely for the managers. It was used for improved flow of instruction from the 
managers to the ships and for monitoring work output of seafarers. The work environment 
of the ship in itself is considered challenging enough, and on top the poor considerations of 
socio-technical systems in the technology integration process involving ship-shore interface 
only exacerbated such divisive feeling. The dominating and controlling stance of the shore 
management engendered a sense of apathy and reluctance among the seafarers. The critique 
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of panopticism in organisational theory draws attention to the inevitable interrelationship 
between power and resistance, and also to that between capital and control, which may not 
work when applied in a much concentrated form (Boyne, 2000).The seafarers thus felt 
undervalued and mistrusted and tended to perceive shore management as cunning even 
immoral that tried to fix liability on them. This again was largely a consequence of poor 
consideration of social factors in technology integration process that eroded mutual trust 
and respect. The underlying reason for why seafarers were not considered as a key player in 
the introduction of technology arguably relates back to the fact that technology adoption 
was a reflection of mere regulatory compliance and an act that only had to satisfy 
immediate economic rationality.  
The design of technology remained alienated from the operation function. It is 
acknowledged that the design stage itself is the most crucial stage to address the functional 
requirements direct from the user perspective and all the principles of human factors 
engineering can if at all, find its most worthwhile application at this very stage. However, 
as evidenced from the findings, this aspect did not find visibility in the shipping domain, 
where design was seen as technology-led rather than design-for-use (Allen, 2009). It led to 
non-standardisation and poor integration of equipment into work systems but without 
integrating human characteristics into its definition, design or development. Even the 
quality of assessment, type approval and certification of such interconnected systems by the 
approving authorities like classification societies was found to be inadequate and wanting. 
With operability hardly being considered at the design stage, it resulted in stress and fatigue 
for the operator even encouraging mistakes which no amount of training or management 
intervention can mitigate.  
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This research has further established that often over-reliance on technology crept into 
operation functions leading to reduced situational awareness, suspension of traditional 
seafaring skills and consequential enhancement of risk of accident. Although no direct 
evidence of a technology initiated accident was noted in this study it is not hard to see that 
the operator could be getting absorbed into technology overlooking its vulnerability and the 
need to treat it with healthy scepticism. It could be argued that such technology spawns a 
sense of over-confidence about the situational awareness inducing the seafarer to forego his 
core-competency skills, which in some scenarios could prove counter-productive. 
Furthermore, this study shows that the investment in appropriate training of crew in 
handling integrated technology finds no ownership in the growing disintegration between 
the owner, flag, operators, managers thus blurring the link between owners and those 
responsible for the crew. The short-term contracts afforded minimal obligations towards the 
seafarer and the economic logic in a split-incentive scenario afforded the evasion of anyone 
baring the costs of any such training (ILO, 2001; Alderton et al. 2004).    
Another discernible outcome of such blinkered application of technology led to information 
clutter in the management and operation of ships. In the management function of the ship-
shore interface, the ease of communication afforded shore management to exercise 
excessive control by demanding documentary evidence from the seafarers resulting in the 
production of a plethora of paperwork. It is no surprise that the ship’s staffs question the 
value of such exercises that adds to the administrative burden and diverts them from the 
main objective of running the ship safely. Many seafarers also perceived such top-down 
implementation practice as countering the use of their professional skills and experiences 
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embraced in proven good practice of seamanship (Knudsen, 2009). The study showed that 
in the operation of ships the un-optimised overload of information through poorly 
integrated operating systems puts greater demand on cognitive resources over-saturating the 
operator. The premise that automation reduces the workload thus remained an illusion. 
Such forced implementation not only increased avoidable work load but was also perceived 
by many seafarers as countering the use of common sense, experience, and professional 
knowledge epitomised in the concept of seamanship. The strong community of practice 
established over a long period of time in a relatively secluded working environment made it 
harder to penetrate into and bring about any change with ease. It requires deft handling and 
as discussed, through a paradigm of an inclusive new practice with technology integration 
rather than such imposition.  
In summation, the seafarers’ attitude to technology integration is unequivocal. However, 
the economic short-sightedness of the split-incentivised industry operation totally ignores 
the seafarers. Bhattacharya’s (2012) seminal findings reveal that ineffective regulatory 
infrastructure, weak employment practices, the absence of trade union support and lack of 
organisational trust in the shipping context manifests deeper sociological issues and 
organisational weaknesses in the shipping industry. Such concerns were the underpinning 
concerns in this study too. The seafarers’ antipathy to un-optimised technology integration 
in the wake of his experience of enhanced control, mistrust and disrespect towards his 
seamanship, even his genuine concerns for safety were construed as rejections by the 
maritime business operating from ashore. 
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8.2 Technology integration gap rationalised 
The above interpretation of the research is further analysed below. This section reviews and 
explains the gap in technology integration in the light of prevailing theories and framework 
of globalisation, neo-liberal capitalism, principal-agent theory, regulation of technology, 
socio-technical theory and community of practice. While these generalise across industry 
sectors however in the shipping industry due to its unique nature and structure, they are 
found to be highly accentuated. This creates the paradox of immense potential of 
technology integration failing to be taken up and manifesting as the gap.  
It is seen that the globalised shipping industry environment affords no real incentive to the 
ship-owner directly for technology uptake beyond remaining compliant for business to run. 
The highly fragmented structure of the industry that is seen to give rise to split-incentive 
problem is akin to the principal-agent problem that is accompanied by a rich stream of 
theory and empirical research. Principal-agent theory premises that where parties have 
partly differing long-term goals, for example that they aim for profit maximisation in their 
respective companies, then market failure occurs (Johnson, 2013). There is then 
economising on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the terms of 
contract against the hazards of opportunism (Williamsion, 1979).  
The ship-owner only minimally complies with the technology that gets pushed through 
regulation imposed for safety, security and environment reasons, conforming to the reactive 
compliance culture that dominates the industry. This in turn is exacerbated when the 
globalisation affords the ship owner to choose his regulator in terms of the flag of the state 
he wishes the ship to fly. Guttal (2007) among many others has argued that globalisation is 
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a form of capitalist expansion that entails the integration of local and national economies 
into a global, unregulated market. Although economic in its structure, globalisation is 
equally a political phenomenon, shaped by negotiations and interactions between 
institutions of transnational capital, nation states, and international institutions. Its main 
driving forces are institutions of global capitalism, but it also needs the firm hand of states 
to create enabling environments for it to take root. Globalisation is always accompanied by 
liberal democracy, which facilitates the establishment of a neo-liberal state and policies that 
permit globalisation to flourish. Contrary to the development theories, be they 
‘conservative, modernisation, or dependency theory’ that conceived development as 
‘national development’, present notions underlying neo-liberal economic development 
being pushed through globalisation, re-conceives development as global competitiveness 
within the global market place (Onder, 1998). The neo-liberal freedom as a concept gets 
tied down to free markets where people are free so long as they submit to the dictates of 
deregulated free markets.  Significantly, the race to the bottom hypothesis argues that states 
in their competition to attract mobile capital must converge to the lowest common 
denominator. 
The extra-ordinary element for the shipping industry is the fact that the law of the seas is 
grounded in the notions of freedom of the seas with underlying principles of navigation of 
the oceans freely, a ship’s national state having exclusive dominion over that ship and no 
other nation can exercise dominion over that ship. The Flag of Convenience (FOC) 
phenomenon and later mimicked by the international registries that is encouraged in such 
an environment, shows the veracity of de-regulation of the marine industry. This conforms 
to the notion of globalisation theory put forth earlier and explains the minimalistic attitude 
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adopted by the industry regulators. The fact that an international regulation is enacted upon 
a nation by nation basis who remain keen to make their states an attractive choice as 
regulators, the sovereign privilege creates an unregulated environment where capital is free 
to act as it pleases (Alderton and Winchester, 2002).   
In the global context, the policy making is seen to get politicised with a self-serving agenda 
of the constituent members of policy making bodies belaying the notions of any common 
good for the industry. The issue, particularly in safety-critical industry like shipping 
becomes that the dividing line between social regulation on health, safety, environment and 
economic regulation of technology gets blurred when technology is passed off as enhancing 
safety. The regulation of technology follows the leading theory of interests lobbying to 
shield business profits. The theory that it is the subgroups of the industry that drive 
technology in the garb of social regulation on safety, health and environment, do so to serve 
their own parochial advantage by raising rival firms’ cost, endures (Wiener, 2004).  
Munck (2002) had contended that globalisation combines several strands, such as the 
consensus among global economic policy makers who favour market-based development 
strategies over state-managed ones, the control of G7 states over global market rules, and 
the control of financial power in the hands of transnational corporations and banks to 
facilitate its implementation. Seen in this light, even the monopoly rights such as patents 
and copyright are strengthened to encourage innovation arguably become counter-
productive. They not only become barriers to shared common ideas of standardised 
operation that plague the shipping industry as seen in this study, but also with powerful 
state actors pushing the policy making in favour of their own technology suppliers wards 
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off any competition. Stiglitz (2006) has argued that the developed world has carefully 
crafted laws which give innovators the exclusive right to their innovations and the profits 
that flow from them. In cases like pharmaceutical industries the costs go beyond money 
when access is denied to affordable lifesaving drugs and highly profiteering companies 
researching on lifestyle drugs rather than lifesaving drugs simply because the poor cannot 
afford to pay for the drugs. R&D intensity defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP 
is an important determinant of innovation. This is in excess of 4% in OECD countries with 
USA alone accounting for 41% in the OECD area gross domestic expenditure in 2009 
(Dumont et al. 2011, OECD, 2011). 
The discussion thus in part explains the lack of control from the flag states in the case of 
regulating technology implementation in the shipping industry. As flag states remain 
competitive in acquiring business of ship registration – especially those which are not so 
scrupulous and renowned for being under-resourced– a flag-state based control for the 
implementation of shipboard technology is unlikely to be effective. But what is equally 
striking is that the maritime states where such technology is being developed also fail to 
control the adoption and implementation practices of such technology. They refrain from 
interfering because by giving the freedom they are better able to promote home-grown 
technology manufacturers corroborating the arguments presented above. 
Another causal factor for the technology gap is identified as lack of fundamental research 
into the technology integration in the shipping environment and paucity of appreciation of 
the fact that technology has always been the central variable in organisational theory 
guiding research and practice so evident in other safety-critical industries. Being an 
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extreme case of a globalised industry, the ship and the seafarer lie in the centre of a 
complex constellation of multiple interests. The contractual employment of the seafarer, his 
non-existent relationship with owner, mixed nationality crewing, and dysfunctional 
communication with managers find no support for him. What comes out glaringly is that 
the seafarer, who manages technology for optimum performance of the sole productive unit 
– the ship, and on whose performance the profiteering of the myriad of actors in the 
industry hinge, finds himself as the lowest priority.  
The explanation once again lies in the outcome of economic globalisation that underpins 
the state–capital–labour relationship. The increasing dependence of national economies on 
the global economic flow of investments sees financial capital play off one territorial 
jurisdiction against another to gain optimum return including labour that is cheaper, more 
flexible and more easily subjected to hard work. As nations compete amongst themselves 
the content of their labour laws are watered down to the detriment of their workers 
including those that protect their rights (Servais, 2004). Even ILO (2004) has conceded that 
while there is improvement in global production systems, globalisation has impacted work 
and worker relations, compromising the observance of core labour standards.  A growing 
amount of literature on social dimensions of globalisation shows that many are wary of the 
so-called benefits of globalisation (Jenkins, 2004; Servais, 2004; ILO, 2004). Labour 
fortunes are undermined by an ideological discourse that upholds profit as a sign of 
efficiency that will generate the required levels of productivity to sustain economic growth 
for national development. To succumb to labour demands or interests would render an 
economy inefficient and directed towards failure, thus making out labour ‘standing in the 
way’ of national progress if it insists that its interests should be considered. In this way, 
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while globalisation is about removing state restrictions on capital, it seeks also to control 
labour by making believe that social protection and job security are uneconomic and 
inimical to economic growth (Jenkins, 2004). Stiglitz (2002) asserts that such economic 
policies that purport to separate efficiency issues from equity treat labour as a commodity 
and runs counter to the interest of workers. ‘Labour market flexibility’ and ‘capital market 
flexibility’ appear as symmetric policies but they have very asymmetric consequences – 
and both serve to enhance the welfare of capital at the expense of workers. Lack of 
consultation with seafarers in the use of shipboard technology, discarding the user 
perspective in the development of such products and requiring seafarers to merely adapt 
and comply once the technology is implemented as this study reveals, can all be explained 
by the wider developments discussed above. It corresponds to the statements made earlier 
(Bhattacharya, 2012) of the shipping industry where a widespread laissez-faire approach 
has resulted in significant restructuring of its labour market to the detriment of the seafarer. 
There is thus no concerted effort or interest or ownership towards long term and organised 
development. Any development is then left to be driven by reactionary situations of 
accidents and incidents which in the maritime industry have severe limitations in getting to 
the root of the causal factors to drive meaningful change. Worse still, there is a failure to 
see the seafarer coping with abnormalities and evolving practices that get built on this ‘new 
normal’ that even start defining rule-making practices. In complex systems, there are ‘latent 
pathogens’ normally tolerated in the system but ‘awakened’ by a specific situation and then 
create a causal link leading to an accident. The seafaring culture of ‘making everything 
work,’ as highlighted in this thesis and seen to be accepted by the organisation is a potent 
ground for harbouring such latent pathogens. As Wynne (1988) has argued, contextual 
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normalisation of working technologies takes place according to local rationalities but this 
fragments the overall social nature of technology while evolving its informal practical 
rules. A general perception remains that just before the accident everything was perfectly 
normal. Thus a holistic application of sociology of scientific knowledge in better 
understanding of technology remains stunted. Technologies get evaluated by their external 
effects or risks alone but not by the relationships that may be intrinsic to them. As science 
becomes an increasingly economic resource in industrial competition, the rush to exploit 
scientific knowledge as commercial technologies allows less time and social access in pilot 
phases. Thus wider systems problems arise often more acutely during the commercial 
lifetime of technologies. 
Related to the above is the causal factor of limited end-user participation in the design and 
development of technology integrated functions. This effectively means that the knowledge 
and experience of the seafarer is scarcely entered into the information networks which 
inform the design process.  There also is a lack of appreciation that end-users contribute 
important workplace knowledge on processes, tasks, equipment and potential risks. 
Ethnography with participatory user analysis of contextual enquiry does not find a place in 
the design considerations, which is a critical factor in the success of any interactive systems 
function. The most important objective is to achieve usability which is defined by Fiset 
(2009) as, “...the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve 
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a special context of use...” 
Limited application of human factors engineering is then evidenced in the design and 
operations of technology integrated practice. The focus remains technology, engineering 
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and equipment rather than cognitive and social ability of operation in an integrated 
environment with due regard to human characteristics, limitations and the ergonomics.  
This thesis has investigated that the socio-technical theory as a systems approach focuses 
on the interdependencies between and among people, technology and organisational 
environment that provided the holistic construct. Clearly then, the socio-technical theory 
remains as valid today as it was in the 1950s. We continue to live in a world greatly 
affected by technology; so much so that we take for granted the choices made for us by the 
technical system designers. Today as in the past, the socio-technical paradigm calls on us to 
question the design assumptions underlying technical systems to ask, “Is this the best way 
to design and utilise technology for people and society?” So also, when attempting 
optimisation, to question “Have we assessed the degree of joint optimisation of social and 
technical systems in light of the demanding external environment?” Both the technical and 
the social systems must produce positive outcomes. This method contrasts with the 
traditional that first designs the technical component and then fits it to people, as is seen to 
be widely practiced in the shipping industry. The traditional method as seen often leads to 
mediocre performance at high social costs (Cherns, 1986). The cause lies in the 
organisational context of rewards and sanctions in case of high technology systems. The 
shore based management finds appeals of speed, power and manoeuvrability in current 
sophisticated design winning over concerns of ease of operation or maintenance.  The costs 
in excessive fatigue and workload are borne by the seafarers who make the systems work 
on a daily basis as their feedback on poor design is judged as self-serving (Perrow, 1983).  
This section has analysed the technology potential gap in terms of theoretical frameworks 
generally applicable in other sectors. But it is exacerbated in the shipping industry 
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environment due to its unique structure and disposition, which is why the un-optimised 
technology integration results in the seafarer who is the driver of technology, becoming a 
victim of the circumstances. The technology that was intended to ease the seafarer’s 
operations and burdens ends up in controlling him, even leaving him under-resourced with 
fewer crews and causing fatigue. Influences of a strong community of practice then 
manifest his frustrations as resistance and hindrances to technology integration from the 
ship standpoint. There is a large gap in what seems technically rational in concept and 
intent and what actually gets implemented in the shipping industry. 
8.3 Policy recommendations 
It is seen that the uptake of technology in the first place is merely a reactionary response to 
compulsions of compliance rather than a proactive stance for driving efficiency. Hence, a 
responsible and risk-assessed regime of regulatory and customer requirements is thus seen 
to be the key driver in enhanced technology integration in modern ship management 
practices. If the potentials are there as seen to be, then it needs the attention of the policy 
makers’ like the IMO, Maritime Administrations, Classification societies and industry 
organisations like Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and Society of 
International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators(SIGTTO).What is fundamentally 
lacking is policy entrepreneurship that will encourage policy innovators who will develop 
and test new forms and approaches to regulation for greater effectiveness, less caustic side-
effects, even less cost and promote other desirable attributes. Regulatory design should be 
about consequences – what works, how much, with what costs and side effects compared to 
the available alternatives. The influence of regulation on technology is complex and as 
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Wiener (2004) puts it, depends on the “technology of regulation” that aids governance - the 
actual design of instruments of enforcement.  
There is thus a need for the rules to become more performance based with defined 
outcomes, rather than set technological solutions in a prescriptive format. This would also 
allay the view that it tacitly supports influence of commercial players in the adaptation of 
technology.  Prescriptive regulations tend to be a distillation of past experience and as such 
become less and less relevant over time. It is the innovator that is best placed to ensure the 
safety of design rather than the regulator. Care should also be taken to see that the 
additional regulations do not add to the administrative burdens on the ships’ crew and calls 
for a user-centric approach in even designing of regulation in as much as the design and 
implementation of technology integrated practices. The user-centric approach puts 
employees in the centre where they play an active role in identifying potentials for 
rethinking of business regulation and how burdensome experiences can be reduced (DMA, 
2011).  
Furthermore, the industry needs to link humanism and effectiveness together in the design 
of work and work systems. This is best achieved if the specific design of human-machine 
interface (HMI) is incorporated and used by design engineers, given that a system’s 
architecture is driven by the design of its interfaces. A major component of many systems is 
people, who act as either users or operators or maintainers. Even a highly automated system 
requires people – at the least to start, stop and monitor the system. Often users and 
operators also perform service and maintenance on the machines. The term socio-technical 
system refers to the interrelatedness of social and technical aspects. Engineers are said to 
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ignore the social concerns of the work and social scientists to ignore technology. As Ropohl 
(1999) puts it, what is needed is the “technisation of the society and the socialisation of 
technology”, and a systems model is a tool that brings both sides together. 
All of the above gaps stem from a lack of synergy between research and practice that 
results in the practitioners insufficiently aware of relevant research and at the same time 
research tends to be not sufficiently informed by the body of knowledge gained from 
practices. In the shipping domain particularly, there is a need to develop methods and tools 
to more effectively leverage the knowledge and insights gained from practice and improve 
the cross-dialogue between research (be it in other domains if it is lacking in shipping) and 
practice.  
As has been seen, the large potential for the optimisation of processes that exists, needs to 
be harnessed by appropriately leveraging the technology integration in ship management 
practices. Companies need to take further steps beyond simply ‘going digital’. They need to 
improve the employees’ skills as well as to integrate technology into their business process 
and actually conduct business electronically. It has the potential to change the work 
processes significantly both within and between organisations, with very positive impacts. 
It may be reiterated that along with the concerns for human safety and environmentally safe 
operations the key dimensions of service quality for the shipping industry include 
operations and management efficiency. These are characterised by the outcomes of service 
performance and enabled by technology applications for process efficiency. 
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8.4 Overall reflections 
It needs to be appreciated that the challenges and potential of technology integration into 
management practices ultimately translate into human performances. Human performances 
and human-system integration will never be effective unless it is seen by all stake-holders 
as an integral part of the entire systems engineering process, from initial exploration and 
concept evaluation through operational use, even reengineering; and be responsive to users’ 
needs.     
By bringing to light the limited application of some fundamental principles of human-
systems integration and discussing the broad underlying optimisation potential of ship 
operations and ship management, this study has attempted to expand the boundaries of 
research on the subject in the maritime industry, in a way that both contributes to academic 
knowledge and has significance for those in the industry. It thus achieves the objectives that 
the study set out for itself. 
Credibility of a study involves the level of truth value that it achieves by investigating the 
level of engagement which allows an analyst to build trust and learn about the setting under 
investigation.  Adequate engagement was achieved in the settings of the three companies 
and the ships staffs’ interviews. Verification of correct understanding and analysis was 
achieved from the respondents, for example on the process maps annexed in the appendices 
1 to 4.   
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Due to the rigour applied in the application of appropriate methodology it can be claimed 
that the findings while emerging from the study of three specific companies do relate to the 
wider context in the maritime sector. 
This study thus contributes to the better and holistic understanding of the impacts of 
technology integration in ship management processes and its productivity, thus providing a 
better picture of this take up in the shipping industry.  
8.5 Limitations of this study 
Nonetheless it must also be acknowledged that the study suffered from a few limitations.  
As discussed in the chapter on methodology, primarily, it is acknowledged that the research 
approach and tools to some extent have been influenced by the researcher’s pre-
understanding. On a general side, a certain amount of pre-understanding entering a research 
project can be timesaving since the researcher does not have to read up on structures, 
procedures and other peculiarities of the industry which is being studied. It is also said to 
simplify acquisition of institutional knowledge, such as informal hierarchies, cultural 
values, social interactions and patterns that can otherwise be difficult to access 
(Gummesson, 2000). However, there is a risk that pre-understanding leads to 
preconceptions that can block new information, create bias and hamper creativity and 
innovation. This has been thoroughly acknowledged. Throughout the present thesis, the 
researcher has been aware of, and reflected on the subject of preconceptions, the risk for 
selective perception and personal defence mechanisms, values and beliefs. 
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By explicitly accounting for relevant experiences significant for the pre-understanding, and 
striving for a detailed documentation of the analysis process and line of argument, the 
researcher has aimed for a transparent research process and believes that it has 
compensated for any negative consequences of the prior knowledge. 
Availing one or more research voyages on ships and undertaking on-board studies to know 
first-hand the shipboard aspects of cooperation with shore clearly would have enriched the 
account of the seafarers. Getting access on-board ship for a research voyage does not come 
by easily. It is ridden with complexities such as security considerations, accommodation 
and lifeboat capacity, insurance requirements, maritime regulations permitting a non-crew 
member to sail on-board. All these issues dissuade even a half willing company from going 
through the ordeal. This shortcoming was however anticipated in advance and data 
collection methodology was adequately strengthened with good selection of shipboard staff 
for interviews while they were ashore and through review of shipboard communications 
data in the shore based offices.  
Another weakness of the present research is the lack of complementary quantitative study 
to test the potential of the proposed optimisation with external validity. However, that is 
seen as the natural next step where the present thesis work constitutes a robust base for the 
design of future studies in knowing what to measure and how. 
Furthermore, generalisability or applicability problem arises with all forms of social 
research. As Guba (1990) comments, while qualitative studies have their own special ways 
of dealing with the problem none of which are perfectly adequate, but all of which add 
confidence to the conclusions.  
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8.6 Scope for further research 
New technology deployment always carries the risk for the first time users and the industry 
normally waits and watches closely the developments before self-deployment. As further 
work to this research, ways can be formulated to subject the optimisation potential of 
holistic technology integration to further tests of validation and falsification. A 
complementary quantitative study using a model shipping company that shows the least 
traits of the vulnerabilities of the unique sector as a prototype can investigate the 
availability of data on optimised operations and empirically validate the suggested 
potential.  
In today’s world of competing financial priorities, the value proposition of improved 
technology integration and positioning the potential core values that can be delivered to 
employees, customers and other stakeholders within and outside the marine transport 
system needs to be further studied. Value propositions as part of operational strategy 
guiding organisations towards satisfied constituents and establishing relationship between 
commercial value generation and optimised technology enabled operations towards 
business performance should be the aim of such further work. Fine balancing of apparently 
mutually incompatible and divergent issues of cost, safety, regulation and efficiency within 
a sociological framework would need to be studied in the fast evolving technology enabled 
industry. There is an obvious risk of sub-optimisation if decisions are made and measures 
are taken unilaterally, instead of adopting a wider perspective that takes more than one 
aspect into account.  As the technological systems increase in complexity and automation, 
it reduces transparency of work operation and the gap between human operator and 
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technological systems is found to be widening. Suggestive research design and data 
collection would entail specific methods to give precise and testable expression on various 
value propositions of optimisation from a wider base of seafarers' and shore based 
managers' using structured and validated data-collection instruments. This confirmatory 
approach will help test hypothesis as well as remain open to inductive input from practising 
mariners. Within the ethical parameters of social research, data may be sourced from 
serving seafarers returning to maritime universities for post sea competency related courses. 
While at the same time perspectives of the ship management companies in global shipping 
hubs such as Mumbai, Singapore and Hong Kong may be necessitated. First a model, 
theory and hypothesis need to be developed followed by the instrument and method of 
measurement. This can be followed by the collection of empirical data. Thematic analysis 
of data collected can be done using eclectic approaches by combining both methods to 
capitalize on the respective strengths of quantitative and qualitative research techniques. 
Mixed methods research as an approach draws upon the strengths and perspectives of each 
method, recognising the existence and importance of the physical, natural world as well as 
the importance of reality and influence of human experience (Johnson and Onquegbuzie, 
2004). Triangulation will then help interpret data towards successfully balanced safety with 
technology integration and commerce leading to the main assessments and conclusions of 
the research.  
Funded study involving more qualitative data as well as a large-scale quantitative study 
involving global shipping should be the next research for a better understanding of the 
interplay of humans, technology and organisation in the process of design and organisation 
of tasks and technology integrated work environments. Furthermore, these studies need to 
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be cognisant of the socio-technical system within which they operate and may be tested out 
in simulation facilities. Safety monitoring cannot be based only on historical data but needs 
to proactive and lessons from best practices. Complementary studies are thus needed to 
investigate this feasibility as well. 
Since the industry is predominantly compliance driven, further study on how to make the 
compliance regime more effective and performance driven in the very challenging maze of 
globalised operation is called for. Additionally, since shipping is a safety-critical industry 
and all technology intervention has its bearing on safety, the balancing of apparently 
mutually incompatible and divergent issues of cost-safety and risk- regulation- efficiency-
sociology would make an interesting and meaningful study for the fast evolving technology 
enabled industry. There is an obvious risk of sub-optimisation if decisions are made and 
measures are taken unilaterally, instead of a adopting a wider perspective that takes more 
than one aspect into account.  Moreover, as the technological systems increase in 
complexity and automation it reduces transparency of work operation and the gap between 
human operator and technological systems actually increases.       
Lastly, while this study contributes to the studies within maritime human factors, it needs to 
be recognised that the amount of research in this area is not vast. Hence it should continue 
to be a research focus, particularly in the continued identification of poor integration 
between technology and humans whose consequences can be dire in the least. As more and 
more technology gets pushed into the industry it is the practice of its implementation that 
needs to have a better understanding.  
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Appendix 1: Budgeting for vessel operations 
(Process map sketched by researcher used for respondent verification).This process is 
performed prior to the taking on acceptance of the ship for its management. It involves the 
review of own capabilities as well as to budget out the activities involved. 
Process Flow Dept. Resp. Document Objective Record 
  
 
Technical 
 
 
 
Technical 
 
 
 
Technical 
 
 
 
Technical 
 
Technical 
 
 
Technical 
 
 
Technical 
 
 
 
Tech.Supdt. 
 
 
 
Tech.Supdt. 
 
 
 
G.M. 
 
 
 
G.M. 
 
Tech.Supdt. 
 
 
G.M. 
 
 
Tech.Supdt. 
 
 
 
Checklist 
 
 
 
Format 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% Budget 
Overruns 
 
 
Input 
Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input 
Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final 
Budget 
 
Perf. 
Record 
  
Collate 
requirements 
Prepare Budget with 
explanations 
 
Review and 
Amend 
Submit to Client 
Make agreed 
amendments 
Final Budget to Client, 
Accounts and others 
Monitor Performance, 
however budgetary 
constraints do not 
override safety 
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Appendix 2: Maintenance including supplies of spares and stores 
(Process map sketched by researcher used for respondent verification).The core function of 
the Technical department, this process outlines the maintenances and supplies activities to 
ensure optimal operation of the vessel to the regulatory and contractual requirements  
Process Flow Dept. Resp. Document Objective Record 
  
 
Technical 
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Planned, Breakdown, 
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Sanction and Provide 
external assistance 
through approved Service 
Providers 
Sanction and arrange 
spares and stores supplies 
through approved 
Suppliers 
Monitor Performance. 
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Appendix 3: Compliance requirements of class and flag 
(Process map sketched by researcher used for respondent verification).This process details 
out the activities involved in the process of inspections, audits and certifications and 
ensures that the vessel remains in compliance to all regulatory and own requirements.  
Process Flow Dept. Resp.  Document Objective Record 
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Class records 
Arrange certification 
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report from ship 
Receive and Send original 
Cert. to ship, retain copy 
in office 
Monitor Renewal of 
Certificates 
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Appendix 4: Inspection and monitoring of vessel's performance 
(Process map sketched by researcher used for respondent verification).This process lays out 
the methodology adopted to physically inspect and to regularly monitor the performance of 
the vessel to ensure optimal operations meeting the contractual requirements. 
 
Process Flow Dept. Resp.  Document Objective Record 
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others  
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Monitor Regular 
Performance. 
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Appendix 5: Schedule of interviews and project work 
 
Presentation of Project Plan at PhD Seminar in 
Copenhagen   
30
th
 November 2009 
Initial visit to Companies A, B & C 7th December 2009 
1
st
 on-site visit to Companies A & B     12th February 2010 
1
st
 on-site visit to Company C    13th February 2010 
1
st
 Interview with Captain 2 & Chief Engineer 2 6
th
 March 2010 
2
nd
 on-site visit to Companies A & B 7th  May 2010 
2
nd
 on-site visit to Company C           8th May 2010 
1
st
 interview with Captain 1 and Chief Engineer 1 (on -
leave) 
5
th
 June 2010 
2
nd
 interview with  Captain 2 & Chief Engineer 2 12
th
 June 2010 
Evaluation at University of Southern Denmark 10th September 2010 
Project presentation at IAMU AGA at Korea 16
th
 October 2010  
3
rd
 on-site visit to Companies A & B 10
th
 December 2010 
3
rd
 on-site visit to Company C 11
th
 December 2010 
2
nd
 Interview with Captain 1 and Chief Engineer 1 (on -
leave) 
27
th
 December 2010 
3
rd
 Interview with Captain 2 & Chief Engineer 2 28
th
 December 2010 
 
Note 
Contact on e-mail continued with all three case companies as well as the seafarers of case 4 
right through and beyond until the end of the year 2011. 
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Appendix 6: Access letter 
Date: 
From:  
Capt. S. Bhardwaj 
 AMET University, Chennai. 
To: 
The CEO/MD/Director 
Shipping Company…. 
………………………………… 
Dear Sir, 
Subject: Request for research facilitation at your organization 
As part of my PhD study I am undertaking research on the subject concerning challenges 
and potential of technology integration in modern ship management practices. A contract 
concerning this PhD study that is registered with University of Southern Denmark exists 
between AMET University Chennai where I am employed fulltime and the Faculty of 
Social Sciences, Department of Maritime Research and Innovation at the University of 
Southern Denmark. 
The nature of my research entails study of ship management practices and interviews with 
relevant staff particularly that of technical management in at least three companies’ settings 
that have mutually different structure of operation and management.  After a careful 
consideration of various company profiles I find that your company operations ideally suit 
the purpose of my research.  
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Since this study is registered with a Danish university, it has to comply with the 
requirements of the Danish Data Protection Agency. Hence I offer full anonymity, 
confidentiality and discretion to all research participants and even the Danish university 
will not have access to confidential information. It will not be possible to connect specific 
and confidential information to individuals or organizations in my dissertation or other 
scientific articles. These are basic norms of ethical conduct of any research.  
Sir, you will appreciate that this is only for academic purposes and bears no commercial 
significance. Furthermore, I firmly believe that the opportunity afforded to your staff in the 
participation of such study to objectively relook at own systems and processes in itself 
would be found very much value-adding. 
I look forward to meeting you in person at your convenient time and date to explain the 
context in more detail. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
Capt. S. Bhardwaj 
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Appendix 7: Interview schedule 
 
Part 1 - COMPANIES 
Understanding processes 
1. Please define the processes involved at macro-level in the Technical management 
function? 
2. Please describe each of the macro-level processes step-by-step from its start to 
finish; with  
(a) Who takes the step? 
(b) Other department or ship interfaces at each step? 
(c) Document used for reference if any to take that step, and 
(d) Record if any generated at each step? 
3. What is the performance indicator for that process to measure how well that process 
is done?  
4. Do you have a documented management system of the functions and can I sight 
them? 
5. What is your filing system of various records?  
6. May I sight the records generated and the documents used at each step of the 
process? 
7. How is the interface with ship effected? 
8. What sort of reporting is required of the ship? 
9. How are these reports from ship dealt with? 
10. To whom are you answerable to? 
11. Please define your: 
(a) Role? 
(b) Responsibility? 
(c) Authority? 
12. Please verify the rough process map that I generate and confirm if the map correctly 
represents the activities as done? 
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Drivers for technology 
13. What kind of technology exists that is deployed in the operation of your ships? 
14. On the deck for navigation, cargo operations and ship-shore communications? 
15. In the machinery spaces?  
16. What kind of technology exists that is deployed in the facilitation of management of 
these ships? 
17. With respect to ship-shore communication and exchange of data? 
18. With respect to deployment of software for process integration?  
19. On a scale of 1 to 10 where will you rate your fleet in terms of technology 
integration in operation and management of your ships? 
20. Please provide an overview of the advancing technology deployed in technical 
management of ships that you are aware of?  
21. What is the average age of your fleet of ships? 
22. Whether in new-building or in existing fleet, what in your opinion are the drivers to 
uptake/ upgrade of technology? 
23. How do you perceive the technology push in the industry?  
24. Is it proactively adopted to optimise operations? 
25. Is it adopted to comply with regulatory requirements? 
26. What part do the technology manufacturers play in pushing their technology? 
27. How does the cyclic nature of shipping industry influence technology 
uptake/upgrade decision? 
28. What returns on investment are expected from investments in technology?  
29. How are the values and risks perceived in investments in technology? 
30. What flag do your ships fly? 
(a) Why? 
 
Overview  of technology integration and its impact 
31. Is the technology integration meeting your expectations on its performance? 
32.  How has your experience been with technology integration? 
33. What sort of challenges do you encounter in working with technology? 
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34. What sort of challenges does your crew report to encounter in working with 
technology? 
35. Why do you think the crew reports that way about technology? 
36. Do you see enough of fundamental research in technology integration processes? 
37. What are your guiding parameters in selection of technology? 
38. What in your opinion are the reasons for challenges in handling technology in 
present forms? 
39.  How do you think the challenges can be addressed in the shipping industry? 
 
Crewing Issues 
40. Where do you predominantly source your crew from? 
41. Why do you source your crew from these locations? 
42. Does technology influence your decisions on crewing? 
(a) How? 
43. Is technology capable and reliable enough to allow for cheaper deskilled 
operations? 
44. Do you find crew capable of handling technology efficiently and effectively? 
45. What do you think are the reasons of challenges posed in ineffective handling of 
technology by the crew? 
46. Do you find age of persons as a defining factor in ease of handling technology? 
47. Are there changed skilling requirements for crew to handle shipboard technology? 
48. How often do you have to rely on shore assistance to handle technology related 
issues on board ships?   
49. How do you train your crew in handling technology integrated operations? 
50. What mandated skilling requirements would you recommend in light of technology 
integrated practices? 
51. Is there broadband facility on-board for crew to use for personal communications 
and usage? 
52. Are there any restrictions on such usage by the crew? 
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Specific issues in technology integration 
53. In your opinion are there issues in proper designing of technology? 
54. What sort of issues do you see? 
55. Do you find sufficient user input in the design of technology? 
56. More and more technology is seen to operate as a system rather than stand-alone 
add-on approach, with operators as integrated part of the system. Would you agree? 
If so, then how well do you think human element integration is considered at the 
design stage itself for example with respect to: 
(a) Ergonomics 
(b) Cognitive limitations 
(c) Information overload 
(d) Ease of operation 
(e) Human factors engineering in general 
 
57. Normally Class certifies all equipment for usage on-board that gives user the 
assurance, but how competent do you think is the Class itself in testing and 
certifying a hybrid human-technological integrated system? 
58. Would you agree when it is said that humans are the main cause of incidents and 
accidents?  
59. Would automation and keeping the man out of the loop be a good answer to 
improve safety? 
 
Technology application in management 
60. What technology applications do you utilise to assist you in management of ships 
under your charge? 
61. Do you use any customised software in technical management processes? 
62. How frequent is your interaction with the ships’ staff given the ease of ship-shore 
communications? 
(a) On what issues do these communications take place? 
63. How often do you visit the ship and interact with the ships’ crew? 
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64. Do senior ships’ officers meet you before and after they sign on / sign off from the 
ship?  
 
Part 2 -  SHIPS STAFF 
 
65. Please verify the rough process map that I have generated out of my interaction with 
companies on technical management process and confirm if the map correctly 
represents the activities as done? 
(a) On the interfaces that happen with the ship 
(b) The documents and records exchanged with the shore based management 
(c) Do practices differ in various companies? 
(d) What changes do you perceive have take place over the period of your 
sailing career? 
(e) Is there any scope for improvement in any practices? 
(f) Any other comments 
66. What latest technology have you handled in ship operations in  
(a) Navigation/machinery spaces 
(b) Cargo operations 
(c) Communications 
67. You have sailed on ships of various owners/managers. What in your opinion drives 
the technology agenda in shipping? 
(a) Is it enhanced performance? 
(b) Is it safety related? 
(c) Is it regulation driven? 
(d) Is it customers’ requirements like the oil majors? 
68. Why, in your view, such large disparity exists in technology application among 
various companies? 
69. What have your overall experiences been with the various technology applications? 
(a) Why good experience? 
(b) Why bad experience? 
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70. Do you think there is a gap between the users expectation and the designers of 
technology?  
(a) And why? 
71. How do you cope with 
(a) Deficient technology integration? 
(b) Non-standardised equipment? 
72. In your opinion, is there enough research carried out in the shipping industry to base 
the technology integration as seen in other sectors like aviation? 
73. In your opinion, is the technology reliable enough to allow deskilling of human 
handling them or do the seafarers need to know the fundamentals yet and remain 
up-skilled? 
74. Is there a need to re-skill in light of technology invasion happening in shipping? 
75. Is the move to reduce crew in light of technology advancement justified? 
76. How do you view the ease of communication with shore based management? 
(a)  Why is good? 
(b) Why is it bad? 
77. How do you handle the information overload in automation systems? 
78. Is there a tendency of over-reliance on the technology? 
79. Does technology spawn suspension of traditional seafaring skills? 
80. Does technology enhance situational awareness? 
81. How frequent are situations of emergency and abnormality? 
(a) How are these handled?  
82. What challenges do you face with crewing issues? 
(a) Contractual employment and transient work force? 
(b)  Multi-cultural environment? 
(c) Alienation from the ship owner? 
83. Would you favour greater technology integration if the gaps were addressed? 
84.  Is there potential for optimisation of processes through enabling technology? 
85. Which process in your opinion has the maximum potential for optimisation and can 
give large benefits with least effort? 
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Appendix 8: Matrix matching issues discussed in literature review 
with its empirical findings 
 
 Literature Review  Empirical Findings 
Section Topic Section Topic 
2.1 Economics of shipping, 
economics of technological 
change 
6.2 Drivers for uptake of 
technology 
2.2 Inescapability of technological 
advancements 
6.2 Drivers for uptake of 
technology 
2.4 Technical advances–ship 
management 
6.1 
 
6.2 
Technical management 
process 
Drivers for uptake of 
technology 
2.5 Technical advances – 
technical management 
6.2 Drivers for uptake of 
technology  
3.1 Theory of technology 
interface 
6.3 Lack of scientific approach to 
technology integration 
3.2 Skilling dilemma 6.4 Skilling issues  
3.3 Enhancing optimisation 
potential 
6.9 Which process for 
optimisation will bear ‘low 
hanging fruits’? 
4.1  Issues in design stage 6.5 Issues involved at design 
stage 
4.2 Challenges of management of 
information in management 
and operations 
6.6 Information clutter in 
management and operation of 
ships 
4.3 Challenges of operation with 
automation 
6.7 Challenges in the operations 
with automation  
4.4 Influence of work culture and 
work environment 
6.8 Influence of work culture and 
work environment  
4.5 Technological limitations 6.2/6.4/6.7 As above 
 
 
